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ABSTRACT 
A large part of the study of politics is dedicated to identifying the circumstances under 
which democracy will flourish. Putnam made a major contribution to this field through 
his concept of social capital as developed in Making Democracy Work. Putnam found 
that communities with a high number of civic associations –i.e. social capital- had a 
better chance of developing an effective style of democratic government. 
This definition of social capital sparked much subsequent research and policy 
activity. It is argued here, however, that this work ignored the immediate needs of 
societies which do not have the required stock of social capital. There is still little 
guidance available on how effective government can be achieved even if the right 
societal circumstances are absent. 
This thesis hopes to find inspiration from government agencies that were 
successful despite their challenging social capital conditions. It specifically looks at 
sixteen public utilities on the Caribbean islands of Aruba, Curacao and St. Kitts between 
2005 and 2009. The thesis then systematically investigates the relationship between the 
performance of the agencies and the behaviour of their senior officials. 
It emerges that in the absence of social capital, governance is in these cases 
mainly hampered by a deluge of irrelevant data. Successful utilities overcame this flood 
by constantly upgrading the quality of information, implementing a strict yet inclusive 
style of governance, and allowing strong leaders the space to translate words into 
actions. These outcomes suggest that social capital forms an important tool for ordering 
information, and that, in its absence, there are still alternative strategies available to 
secure success nonetheless. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: SCOPE FOR PERFORMANCE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The fate of societies and their governments intertwined. Academics and policy makers 
have long sought to understand how the attributes of a people translate to the form of 
government that arises and survives. In particular, they have explored which key social 
levers can increase the success rates of democracies.1  
One branch of this research focussed on which societal conditions are conducive 
to the flourishing of democracy. Prominent scholars such as Huntington, Fukuyama and 
Sen explored whether formerly authoritarian societies could be remade into democratic 
communities, and how democracy could be maintained in societies where it was already 
established.2 This concern also extended to countries that have been longstanding 
members of the club of democracies, and asked whether on-going societal changes 
would have an impact on the endurance and effectiveness of democratic government.  
These efforts generated a long list of conditions that are deemed essential to the 
prosperity of democracy; ranging from social cohesion and civic traditions to stocks of 
interpersonal trust and active civil societies.3  
This thesis does not aim to identify further conditions for democratic success. 
Rather it wants to document how democratic governments can perform well even if 
                                                 
1  B. Gilley, ‘Democratic Triumph, Scholarly pessimism’, Journal of democracy, vol. 21, no. 1, 
January 2010, p. 160-167. 
2  S. Huntington, The third wave: Democratization at the end of the twentieth century, (University of 
Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991). F. Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man, (Free Press, New 
York, 1992). A. Sen, ‘Democracy as a universal value’, Journal of Democracy, 10.3, 1999, p. 3-17. 
3  G. Goertz and H. Starr eds., Necessary conditions: theory, methodology and applications, 
(Rowman and Little Field Publisher, Lanham, 2002), p. 7. 
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their societies do not meet the ideal requirements. Specifically, it investigates how 
democratic governments can be effective in delivering public services, even if the socio-
cultural circumstances are adverse to democracy itself. 
The thesis hereby responds to one of the most influential modern theories of 
democracy; social capital theory as developed by Robert Putnam in Making Democracy 
Work.4 Based on a comparison of regional governments in Italy, Putnam found that a 
high number of civic associations, or a stock of social capital, correlated with the good 
performance of the regional government in question.5 He argued that the interactions of 
citizens in the civil sphere go on to shape the relations with the government. Put simply, 
the egalitarian associations of Florence nurtured an effective style of democracy, 
whereas the hierarchical relations of Sicily leave the community prey to damaging 
forms of political patronage. 
Putnam’s work sparked much activity amongst scholars and policy makers alike, 
prompting both frantic study of the effect of social capital and work to bolster civic 
associations. However, most of this activity focussed on how social capital can be built 
over long periods of time, and not on how democratic governments can be made to 
perform even if social capital is absent. As a result, the social capital literature provides 
little guidance for societies that need good government today, and do not have the 
luxury of waiting for social dynamics to change.  
This thesis takes three societies, the Caribbean islands of Aruba, Curacao and St. 
Kitts, that arguably lack this important asset of extensive social capital. And indeed, 
many parts of their governments were struggling to perform in such challenging socio-
                                                 
4  B. Gilley, ‘Democratic Triumph, Scholarly pessimism’, Journal of democracy, vol. 21, no. 1, 
January 2010, p. 160-167. 
5  R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993).  
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cultural circumstances. However, some parts of their administrations were able to 
achieve success nonetheless. These exceptions serve as the inspiration for this research. 
The thesis evaluates the performance of sixteen local government-owned utilities. 
It employs a range of analytical tools to identify the successful agencies and dissect the 
roots of their exceptional performance. The thesis specifically looks at the behaviour of 
the senior officials responsible for the governance of these utilities. 
 
Overview of chapter 
This chapter presents an overview of the entire thesis. All of the elements discussed 
here will be revisited later in more detail. The theory of social capital is introduced 
briefly, and its limitations are examined. The research question on how democracies can 
be effective service providers in the absence of social capital is generated from this 
lacuna in the literature, followed by a short discussion of the key terms in this question. 
The subsequent paragraphs cover the scope and relevance of the project. Lastly, the 
structure of the thesis as a whole is outlined. 
1.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ITS UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
The main tenets of Putnam’s concept of social capital will be introduced here, as his 
work marks the departure point of this thesis. A full literature review will be presented 
in chapter 2. In Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam presents the results of a 
twenty year study of regional governments in Italy. He and his co-researchers compared 
the performance of the regions and concluded that, on average, the Northern regions 
outperformed their Southern counterparts. Putnam then compared the regions on various 
dimensions which could potentially explain this performance gap. Putnam found that 
the pattern of social associations within a region is the most important determinant of 
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government performance. This effect was even more significant than the economic 
circumstances.6  
In Putnam’s definition, social capital evolves around the structure, nature and 
expectations of relations within society. From a structural point of view, social capital is 
made up of the civic associations connecting the different factions and groups within 
society. These associations bind together the different groups of the community, but 
also make up the bridges between them.7 However, associations are only counted as 
civic if they have the right nature, i.e. egalitarian and geared towards the common 
interest.8 These relations will then foster positive expectations of cooperation amongst 
citizens. On the whole, positive experiences gained in civic associations generate trust 
in collective action, which eases the work of government. Negative experiences gained 
in ‘uncivic’ associations undermine trust in collective decisions.9 
The strength of Putnam’s concept of social capital is that it accumulates the 
individual experiences of citizens into a society-wide account of government success. 
This makes it both a micro- and macro-theory of democratic performance. It allows us 
to connect a neighbourhood conflict about a garbage dump in Naples to a wider 
narrative about the failures of governance in Southern Italy. Moreover, by finding a link 
between the number of civic associations and government performance, social capital 
can be measured relatively easily. A simple count of the civic associations within a 
community would give an indication of its social capital.  
                                                 
6  R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993), p. 173-176.  
7  D. Narayan, Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty, (World Bank, Washington, 1999). 
8  R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993), p. 173-176. 
9  R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993), p. 167. 
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Putnam’s theory was therefore engaged in much subsequent research, meeting 
with both high praise and heavy criticism in the process.10 Prominent institutions 
including the World Bank and the European Union extended their research scope to 
include surveys on social capital in a wide range of communities.11 Putnam’s concept of 
social capital has been the dominant paradigm on the socio-cultural conditions for 
democracy in the last two decades; either as research agenda to pursue, or as the 
orthodoxy to attack.12  
However, this thesis arises from the conviction that, in spite of all of this activity, 
a question already raised in Making Democracy Work has still not been addressed 
satisfactorily. At the end of the book, Putnam relates how one ambitious regional leader 
from the South was exasperated by the research results, exclaiming: ‘This is a counsel 
of despair! You’re telling me that nothing I can do will improve our prospects for 
success. The fate of the reform was sealed centuries ago.’13 
The core of Putnam’s concept is that a community’s history shapes the structure 
and nature of the relationships between its members, which will in turn determine the 
performance of its government. Moreover, as the introduction of the government bodies 
in Italy demonstrated, new organisations will usually be absorbed into the old mould. In 
this argument, the better performance of the North can be traced to the legacy of the 
Renaissance city republics, while the problems of the South relate to the medieval 
feudal practices. This strong emphasis on historical determinism, means that 
                                                 
10  Empirical work: C. Boix and D. Posner, ‘Social capital: Explaining its origins and effects on 
government performance’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 4, 1998, p. 686-693. H. Flap and 
B. Volker, Creation and returns of social capital: A new research program, (Routledge, London, 2004). 
Collection of criticisms and responses: R. Putnam, ‘Robert Putnam Responds’, The American Prospect, 
no. 25, March-April 1996, p. 26-28. 
11  World Bank, Overview: Social capital, http://go.worldbank.org/C0QTRW4QF0, (retrieved 23 
March 2011). 
12  B. Gilley, ‘Democratic Triumph, Scholarly pessimism’, Journal of democracy, vol. 21, no. 1, 
January 2010, p. 160-167. 
13  R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993), p.183. 
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communities without social capital are left with little else than the heavy hand of history 
weighing them down.  
Putnam was aware of this limitation, but merely advises that ‘[t]hose concerned 
with democracy and development in the South should be building a more civic 
community, but they should lift their sights beyond instant results.’14 This change could 
then take several decades to be effected. However, several decades is a long time in the 
life of a citizen waiting for adequate government services, let alone in the life of a 
politician hoping for re-election. 
This is where this thesis starts. It explores how societies without a strong social 
fabric, can achieve effective service delivery today, rather than wait for decades of slow 
societal change. It looks at societies that would be destined for ineffective government, 
as their prevalent pattern of relationships does not correspond to the social capital 
conditions as detailed by Putnam. The aim of thesis is then to identify clusters of public 
service provision within these societies that are creating value for their citizens 
nonetheless. The research design then aims to identify the mechanisms that made the 
difference between success and failure. This is summarized in the figure below. 
Figure 1 Research question framework 
 
                                                 
14 R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993), p. 190. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS 
The central research question reads as follows: How do the senior officials responsible 
for government-owned public utilities on Aruba, Curacao and St. Kitts in some cases 
manage to create public value despite apparently adverse social capital conditions? 
The units of analysis are formed by sixteen public utilities on the small Caribbean 
islands of Aruba, Curacao and St. Kitts. These government organisations are 
responsible for public services vital to the community, such as the disposal of waste, 
generation of electricity and maintenance of the airport. They are set in societies which, 
due to their size and history, apparently do not conform to the prescribed social capital 
conditions. Still, there is evidence that at least some of these sixteen organisations were 
still performing effectively, and the question is how they achieved this success. 
The dependent variable in this research design is the amount of public value the 
utilities produced. The controlled variables are the institutional, economic and social 
circumstances of the public utilities. This entails that the social capital circumstances 
should be difficult, whereas the institutional and economic circumstances may not be so 
poor that the government failure could be ascribed to these two factors alone. The 
independent variables, which will hopefully explain the variation in performance, are 
the actions of the elite officials responsible for the utilities. This configuration of 
variables is summarized in the figure below. 
Figure 2 Variables studied 
 
The more detailed questions that arise from this research design -Which officials? 
Which public utilities are successful? - will be explored and defined in later chapters. 
 
20
For now, the discussion will address the more fundamental issues underlying this 
research question: What is government success? Why study small-scale democracies? 
Why evaluate public utilities? 
1.3.1 Defining government success 
It is notoriously hard to define and measure success in democratic government. Indeed 
much debate remains surrounding the definition of democracy itself. However, as Dahl 
observes, the general form of democracy has acquired distinguishing features.15 Free 
and competitive elections are considered the defining element of democracy, although 
depending on the scholar, further requirements such as rule of law, division of power, 
free media or civil society may be added to the mix. The important question here, 
however, is not when a government can be called a democracy, but when a government 
can be called a successful service providing democracy. 
The challenge for defining success in this context is the duality of citizen’s 
demands. Individual citizens could be argued to have two conflicting desires: Efficiency 
and fairness. On one hand, people expect the government to deliver its services quickly 
and cheaply. For example, citizens do not want an ineffective police service or to pay 
excessively high taxes. On the other hand, they have expectations of how these services 
are delivered. They do not want the police to unnecessarily intrude and they do want the 
government curb tax evasion.16  
The problem is that there is a tension between these efficient outcome and fair 
process demands. Strongly put, a citizen will try keeping the state out of his or her 
house and wallet as much as possible, but will also demand an effective service from 
‘cradle to grave’. Government success has thus become a function of both outcomes and 
                                                 
15  R. Dahl, On Democracy, (Yale University Press, London, 2002), p. 7.  
16  M. Moore, Creating public value: Strategic management in government, (Harvard University 
Press, Boston, 1995). 
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process. To qualify as successful democracies, governments have to provide certain 
services, but also have to follow certain procedures. This requires a careful balancing 
act when assessing the degree of success of governments, as Putnam had to do as well 
when making his assessments of the regional governments of Italy. 
For public utilities, the subject of the thesis, one of the ways of dealing with this 
conundrum was to separate government service delivery into autonomous public 
enterprises. These organisations could supposedly focus solely on the task at hand as 
they were isolated from political turbulence. This idea has recurred in different forms 
since the late nineteenth century; Whettenthal, for example, traces it back to the way the 
Australian railways were managed around the 1880s.17 The central idea of ‘creating 
managerial space’ also emerged in the turn-of-the-century Progressive era in the United 
States.18 This era introduced a dichotomy between the political and administrative 
sphere. And still more recently, the World Bank concluded that in such state-owned 
enterprises, the government should set the strategic objectives, whilst the management 
should have managerial control.19 
Next to autonomous service delivery, the concept of a successful service 
providing democracy has also been influenced by comparisons to the private sector. 
Several movements, most recently New Public Management, have argued that the 
delivery of public services would be improved by adopting practices based on those 
used in commercial organisations, or what were thought to be private sector practices.20 
In this paradigm, public enterprises were deemed successful into the extent they were 
able to mimic commercial organisations, i.e. create satisfied customers and deliver high 
                                                 
17  C. Hood, ‘New Public management’, International dictionary of social science, (Elsevier, London, 
2001), p. 12553-12556. 
18  E. Overman, ‘Public management’, Public Administration Review, vol. 44, 1985, p. 275–278. 
19  R. Ramamurti, ‘Controlling state-owned enterprise’, in R. Rammamurt and R. Vernon, 
Privatisation of states owned enterprises, (World Bank, Washington, 1991). 
20  C. Hood, ‘Public service managerialism: onwards and upwards, or "Trobriand cricket" 
again?’,The political quarterly, vol. 72, no. 3, 2001, p. 300-309. 
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returns to shareholders. This led to thinking about citizens as clients or even customers 
of the state, moving public administration closer to the realm of business and 
efficiency.21 
However, such a focus on output and bottom-line results clashes with the fair 
process demands also placed on governments. A tax agency is not supposed to make all 
of its customers happy and the police service will be criticized if it is seen to maximise 
returns by handing out more fines. Although the public utilities examined in this thesis 
have often aimed to mimic private organisations, their performance will still be 
measured in terms of both efficiency and fairness.  
This is why Putnam himself looked at both outcome and process when measuring 
the success of the Italian regional governments. He aimed to capture diverse aspects of 
government success, looking at such diverse indicators as the legislative process, 
economic policy and quality of childcare centres. Problematically though, his specific 
indicators are difficult to translate to the Caribbean public utilities examined in this 
thesis.22  
This provides scope for introducing a further concept of government success that 
was introduced in the mid-1990s as an answer to the narrow perspectives of New Public 
Management; The concept of public value as developed by Moore. This measurement 
framework places the tension between outcome and process at its very core. The public 
value method calculates the success of a government by measuring the benefits 
provided by the government and then subtracting the sum of liberty and private gains 
forsaken.23  
                                                 
21  C. Hood, ‘The New Public Management in the 1980s’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, 
vol. 20, no. 3, 1995, p. 93-109. 
22  R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993) 
23  M. Moore, Creating public value: Strategic management in government, (Harvard University 
Press, Boston, 1995). 
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For example, a citizen sacrifices part of his income to pay the police in the form 
of taxes and forsakes his right to retaliate against an enemy directly. In return, however, 
the police will prevent acts of violence against him. If the costs of this protection are 
lower than the gains of the subsequent security, the police system could be said to add 
public value.  
Success in Moore’s model is thus measured on two axes; costs versus gains. The 
costs are the material sacrifices (taxes, tariffs, loans taken on by the community) plus 
the restraints accepted (appointing someone else to choose the best for the collective). 
The gains are measured in terms of the value of the services (utilities, protection, 
welfare) provided. The figure below captures this weighing of costs and gains. 
Figure 3 Weighing public value 
Costs Benefits
Freedom
forsaken
Material costs Value of 
service
 
This conceptualization of government success is not without its critics. The main 
criticism is directed towards its supposedly utilitarian nature. Public value could be held 
to come down to ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ in the spirit of Bentham, 
where the few suffer for the benefit of the many. For example, 60% of the island might 
get excellent electricity supply while the rest is cut off. In this view, the suffering of 
those left out cannot be compared or weighed against those benefitting. 
This criticism is fair and should be remembered when reviewing the public value 
of the different utilities. However, it should also be emphasized that public value is 
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measured from the perspective of the average individual citizen. The production of 
public value is not a matter of simple maximisation of utility. Providing a great service 
to only a share of the population will not be counted as a high score in terms of public 
value. Even if only a minority suffers high costs, their losses will discount the benefits 
experienced by the rest, resulting in an overall low value.  
Public value could also be criticized for being too prescriptive in terms of the 
procedural indicators of success it measures. According to Metzger its emphasis on 
involvement and information introduces an undue cultural bias on how government 
should work.24 Yet denying any similarities in people’s preferences across cultures is 
also not without controversy.25 It is probably true that different societies have different 
definitions of what involvement and representation means. However, it is also likely 
that the costs of a poor water supply or benefits of long term planning of infrastructure 
are more universal in nature. This might be also a good reason to opt for the study of 
such concrete services as public utilities when creating a research design. 
1.3.2 Small-scale democracies and social capital 
The reason for choosing small-scale democracies as the research setting also needs to be 
explained. Dahl and Tufte argue that small size could actually be beneficial to the 
survival of democracy.26 However, small size does not necessary mean that the small 
Caribbean islands examined here are effective democracies. Moreover as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, Aruba, Curacao and St. Kitts failed the basic prescriptions 
of Putnam’s social capital theory supposedly required for effective government.  
The core of Putnam’s definition of social capital is that the right type of structure, 
nature and expectations of relations need to occur within a community in order for its 
                                                 
24  T. Metzger, The Western concept of civil society in the context of Chinese history, (Hoover 
Institution of War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, 1998). 
25  B. Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, (Harvard University 
Pres, Cambridge, 2001). 
26  R. Dahl and E. Tufte, Size and democracy, (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1973). 
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democracy to prosper. The three islands did not conform to these standards. Firstly, the 
structure of the relations on the islands is severely limited by the size of the community, 
ruling out the singular, objective connections envisaged by Putnam. With populations 
between 35,000 and 138,000 people, these countries are considered small even within 
the family of micro-countries, which the Commonwealth considers to be all polities 
with less than 1.5 million inhabitants.27  
In these islands, the communities are so small that everyone is related to everyone 
in several ways; your next door neighbour could simultaneously be your cousin, tax 
inspector and business competitor. The literature and respondents covered in this thesis 
report that these convoluted connections were detrimental to performance.28 This would 
mean that the type of relations deemed necessary by social capital theory are not 
present.  
The nature of the relations is also subject to a certain claim by the history and 
culture of these islands. If the Norman feudalism engendered associations with a 
strongly hierarchical nature in Southern Italy, centuries of colonialism, slavery and 
institutionalized racism may have done the same in the Caribbean. Primary and 
secondary sources discussed in this thesis do indeed point to worrying behaviour of 
leaders and an overall high incidence of patronage.29  
Apart from their poor social capital circumstances, these islands are also good 
testing grounds because the other environmental factors were relatively benign to 
democracy. Although this research design focuses on the socio-cultural conditions of 
                                                 
27  World Bank and Commonwealth Secretariat, Small States: Meeting challenges in the global 
economy, (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 2000). 
28  S. De Smith, Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other 
Minute Territories, (London, University of London Press, 1970). G. Baldacchino, ‘Human Resource 
Management Strategies for Small Territories: An Alternative Proposition’, International Journal of 
Educational Development, vol 21, no. 3, 2001, p. 205- 215. 
29  G. Oostindie and P. Sutton, Good governance and small islands states, (KITLV, Leiden, October 
2006). V. Stolcke, ‘The Slavery Period and its Influence on Household Structure and the Family in 
Jamaica, Cuba, and Brazil’, Family Systems and Cultural Change, 1992, p. 248–261. 
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democratic government, it does not ignore the effects of institutional or economic 
realities. It would not be surprising if a very poor country was unable to deliver high-
quality services or a state without an effective justice system was swamped with 
corruption. By investigating states that struggle on all fronts, the influence of the socio-
cultural circumstances is not isolated and cannot be satisfactorily assessed. It is 
important to realize that the research design does not look for failed states, but 
democracies failing to perform. As will be explored in chapter 4, Aruba, Curacao and 
St. Kitts all have relatively strong institutional systems and benign economic 
circumstances.  
There also disadvantages to selecting these three islands polities. There are some 
differences between them that might trouble the comparison of the utilities. For 
example; both Aruba and Curacao are still countries within the Dutch Kingdom, 
whereas St. Kitts is independent. The Arubans by majority consider themselves 
descendants of indigenous Indians or Europeans, whereas the inhabitants of Curacao by 
majority self-identify as black. These differences and their impact on the comparison 
will be addressed specifically in the methodology and description of the islands.  
However, what matters most is that these countries shared the characteristics most 
significant for this research design. They combined poor social capital conditions with 
strong institutional and economic circumstances. Most importantly, they were 
comparable at the level of analysis employed here; the delivery of public utilities. 
1.3.3 Public utilities and public value 
The basic unit of analysis is formed by sixteen government-owned public utilities. 
These were the organisations responsible for managing the airport, collecting waste or 
providing electricity, etc. All of them were in government hands, be it as a department 
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within the civil service, or as nominally private corporations owned by the government. 
The different utilities are listed in table below. 
Table 1 Lists of cases 
Aruba Curacao St Kitts 
Airport 
Seaport 
Bus transport 
Electricity & water 
Electricity distribution 
Waste management 
Airport 
Seaport 
Bus transport 
Electricity & water 
Oil distribution 
Waste management 
Air- & seaport 
Electricity 
Water 
Waste management 
There are three reasons why the delivery of public utilities is of special relevance to this 
research question. Firstly, the governance of utilities demands a lot of any democratic 
government: good policy relies on long-term decision making an integration of political 
desires with technical expertise, respecting the rules of good governance and constantly 
appeasing a demanding public.30 This is a challenge for any political system and a 
reasonable performance could credibly be presented as a success. 
Secondly, there are reasons to assume that the wider social dynamics associated 
with poor social capital will appear with increased intensity in these public utilities. For 
a start, even though the public utilities were often nominally separated from the 
government, they were still part of the wider societal dynamics. As Mutch et al have 
shown, ‘organisations do not somehow float in a neutral “environment” but […] their 
actions produce and reproduce the world that they inhabit.’31  
Moreover, these public utilities possessed several key resources that made them 
the main prize in the political game on the islands. The research focuses on the 
interaction between the responsible minister, the civil servant in charge of the utility and 
the intermediary officials, such as directors of the board, auditors, etc. If one of the 
                                                 
30  I.S. Martina, Regulation in splendid isolation, (NGIF, Delft, 2009), p. 21. 
31  A. Mutch, R. Delbridge and M. Ventresca, ‘Situating Organisational Action: The Relational 
Sociology of Organisations’, Organisation, vol. 13, no. 07, September 2006, p. 607-625. 
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actors seized control of the utility, they could also access the organisation’s 
considerable revenues, labour force or policy instruments. 
From the viewpoint of the political actors, the utilities could be excellent tools for 
vote-winning strategies, be it through genuine policy improvement or servicing of 
specific individuals and constituencies. The executive agencies might also become 
patrons, dedicating large parts of their resources to continuous rent-seeking in order to 
safeguard their exceptional position in the utility market. 32 Actors would thus be 
expected to invest heavily in controlling these utilities. Accordingly, the patterns of 
patronage and political infighting could be expected to show up with increased 
intensity. 
Thirdly, comparing public utilities offers some clear methodological advantages. 
Due to their separation from the rest of government and the concrete nature of their 
services, it is to some extent more feasible to give a measurement of their performance 
than other types of government services. The nominally more distinct separation 
between the political and executive sphere found at the utilities should also make it 
easier to observe the interaction between the different actors. 
Naturally, measuring and comparing different utilities also comes with its own 
problems. Differences between the types of product might influence the outcome, and 
one can never be sure to observe all the relevant variables. These concerns and their 
impact on the relevance and scope of this project will be addressed more specifically in 
the methodology chapter. 
                                                 
32  A.O. Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’, American Economic Review, 
no. 64, 1974. M. Khan, and K. Jomo eds., Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and 
Evidence in Asia, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000). 
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1.4 RELEVANCE AND SCOPE 
Relevance 
According to the advice of King, Keohane and Verba, any research exercise should pose 
a question important to the real world and make a contribution to an identifiable 
scholarly literature.33 The real world ambition of this thesis is mainly to identify the 
pathways for a struggling society to create public value. Rather than looking overseas at 
what changes would be theoretically required to improve the system, this thesis will 
explore what practical solutions have been developed locally. The thesis focuses on 
making the system work, rather than proposing a continuous cycle of change.  
One local respondent framed the potential added value of this thesis as such: ‘A 
relatively suitable system of governance has now been put in place and seems to look 
alright. […] It is now the challenge to move beyond the formal structures. What we 
need is strategies for the politicians to exert their rightful influence over these utilities 
in a way which is both effective and proper.’34 
From a scholarly point of view, this thesis is quite modest in its ambitions. It does 
not claim to overthrow existing theories, but rather hopes to bring forward new 
information by systematically applying a range of analytical tools. In sum, the thesis 
aims to make three types of contributions: 
 Systematically analyze the conditions for success in public enterprise 
performance, aiming to move beyond the older public administration literature 
on public enterprises both in the theoretical framework employed and the 
analytical method used. 
                                                 
33  G. King, R. Keohane, et al., Designing social inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research, 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994), p. 15. 
34  External actor 16 
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 Help to fill a key gap in social capital theory, by adding new information to the 
literature on the performance and behaviour of bureaucrats in supposedly poor 
social capital environments. 
 Link the literature on social capital with that of public management, aiming to 
connect the grander social theory to the practical realities in a comparative 
small-island setting. 
Scope 
Strictly speaking, any research project should contribute through either testing existing 
hypotheses or generating more theorems on the basis of empirical observations. Yet as 
Gerring argues, ‘there is no obvious point of entry for a work of social science, no easy 
way to navigate between what we know (or think we know) and what we would like to 
know out there in the empirical world.’35 This thesis could indeed be said to stem from a 
dual core, responding both to a literature and an empirical anomaly. However, it 
ultimately opts to generate new thoughts rather than testing theories. 
Potentially, the thesis could also have formulated a few narrow hypotheses from 
social capital theory and then tested them on the sixteen cases. However, this would 
have meant that that existing theories would have been used in an attempt to explain 
events these same theories did not anticipate. It would be using social capital theory to 
explain a manifestation of government success which social capital theory would not 
have predicted. 
Therefore this research project is a theory-extending exercise. The empirical 
anomaly is investigated while absorbing as many of the behaviours as possible and then 
reconnect the conclusions to the theory. This should generate the richest amount of data. 
If this project was set up as a theory-testing exercise, simply checking boxes, the 
                                                 
35  J. Gerring, Social science methodology: A critical framework, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2001), p. 22. 
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insights would have been seriously limited by the theoretical framework chosen 
beforehand. In order to still remain connected to the scholarship, the thesis begins with 
an in-depth analysis of the social capital literature. This also provides a proper 
disclosure of the concepts that may have influenced the research design. Moreover, the 
observations will be compared and linked to ideas within the literature at various points 
in the analysis. 
The scope so selected still places several limitations on the research design and its 
possible relevance. As this thesis limits its scope explicitly to small-scale democracies, 
an obvious caveat would be that the outcomes might not apply to larger communities.  
Moreover, this thesis does not analyse the performance of democracy as a whole, 
instead it measures the success of sixteen specific organisations within the public 
sphere. The nature of these organisations, all public utilities, might also be distinctly 
different from government activities such as tax collection, education or policing.  
A final limitation is that the research focuses on the elite interactions, rather than 
the whole organisation. The actions of these officials may be influenced by larger 
movements at the shop floor level or within the other circles of society, yet those 
spheres are outside the scope of this thesis. Although the thesis does respond to a theory 
with universal implications, the outcomes of this research project will have to be 
considered in a more modest light. 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The thesis is structured like an hourglass. Although it consistently tracks the same key 
components of social capital, the analysis first narrows and then widens as it progresses 
through the thesis. The exercise starts from a broad discussion of the relevant literature 
and then narrows down towards the specific situation studies, first zooming in on the 
islands and then the selected utilities. After the data is presented, the analytical scope 
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widens again to consider the dynamics at these utilities within the political field, and is 
completed by a broad discussion on the possible implications of the research outcomes 
for the literature. The structure is presented in the figure below and briefly discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 
Figure 4 Structure of thesis 
Ch. 1 Introducing research question and scope of project
Ch. 4 Islands and conditions for democracy
Ch. 5 Rich description of cases
Ch. 6 Data-set observations
Ch. 7 Causal process observations
Ch. 8 Impact of different causal mechanisms
Ch. 9 Combined strategies creating public value
Ch. 2 Literature and building blocks of social capital
Ch. 10 Implications for social capital and further questions
Ch. 3 Defining research strategy and variables
Structure Nature ExpectationsPublic value
Structure Nature ExpectationsPublic value
CONTENTS OF THESIS
 
The literature review (Chapter 2) further explores the concept of social capital. It 
dissects its mechanism into three chief components: the structure, nature and 
expectations of relations within a community. Putnam makes specific prescriptions for 
how each of these three elements should be filled in if a community is to be awarded a 
high social capital status. The chapter also surveys some strategies that have already 
been suggested in the literature for the best management of public agencies in 
challenging circumstances. 
The methodology chapter (Chapter 3) details the research strategy to first identify 
and then understand the success stories amongst the sixteen utilities. The method is 
principally based on a comparison of the sixteen cases, measuring their performances 
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and identifying key differences between the high and poor performing utilities. The data 
is mainly drawn from 107 interviews, and supplemented through the use of a wide 
variety of data sources. The final part of the chapter deals with the definition of the 
variables, and scrutinises the components of structure, nature and expectations of 
relations from different angles. This approach is then applied throughout the thesis. 
The empirical exploration begins with a consideration of the conditions of 
democracy on Aruba, Curacao and St. Kitts (Chapter 4). On the basis of existing 
sources, it is argued that the institutional and economic conditions are relatively positive 
for democracy. However, these same communities miss the cross-cutting and egalitarian 
ties as prescribed by social capital. Social capital theory can therefore explain many of 
the shortcomings of the local governments, but not their successes.  
The sixteen case studies are first introduced through a rich description outlining 
their general dynamics (Chapter 5). It is argued that apart from the difficulties faced by 
all public utilities the world over, these organisations face specific challenges that may 
well make their mission impossible. 
Narrowing the scope of analysis considerably, the data-set observations (Chapter 
6) examine the countable characteristics of the utilities. Most importantly, this chapter 
measures which of the utilities were adding public value and which were not. In 
addition, it looks at various characteristics of the structure, nature and expectations of 
relations. Interestingly, it emerges that the best and worst performers look very much 
alike, bearing more similarities to each other than to the mediocre utilities. This 
suggests that the key to success is not a simple linear relationship of increasing one 
variable, but on a more complex interaction.  
Chapter 7 deals with this complexity by widens the scope again and looking at the 
most important mechanisms at work in the governance of the utilities. It explores the 
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processes that jointly exhaust the significant differences whilst remaining mutually 
distinct from each other. This chapter identifies six such key processes. These include, 
different ways of sharing knowledge between the actors, the influence of the dominant 
player, the degree to which rules are observed and certain management mentalities 
prevail. 
The fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis (Chapter 8) assesses whether any of these 
mechanisms, or a combination of mechanisms, actually have a positive effect on 
performance. Dividing the sixteen cases amongst different sets, it aims to find the 
characteristics shared by the successful utilities. 
The discussion (Chapter 9) takes a final look at the important mechanisms, aiming 
to find the critical differences between benign and malign behaviours. This scrutiny 
brings out the important differences between the best and worst performers, two sets of 
cases which otherwise, misleadingly, can appear alike. The successful utilities use the 
strict governance rules as a tool for actor inclusion, rather than exclusion, and constantly 
work to upgrade the information available. By contrast, the failing utilities would use 
the governance rules to exclude actors and aimed to stifle the flow of information. 
The concluding chapter returns to the social capital literature and summarises the 
contribution this study makes to that body of work (Chapter 10). It argues that in the 
absence of social capital, policy formation is mainly hampered by a combined deluge of 
information and misinformation. However, this chapter will summarise how, in spite of 
challenges, actors generated strategies to make democracy work nonetheless. This may 
pose some questions to the current understanding of trust as used in social capital 
theory. These conclusions are then translated to some specific questions for further 
research. 
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1.6 CONCLUSION 
This research project does not aim to completely undermine social capital theory. 
Rather it aims to provide new evidence on how democracy can function even if the 
societal circumstances are challenging. This study aims to so shed new light on the 
mechanisms of democracy and social capital. 
The data presented here mainly suggests that social capital plays a pivotal role in 
the structuring of the flow of information. In an ideal world, societal connections work 
like a system of channels bringing together a large pool of information. A strong dam of 
rules lets through only the relevant facts, which then power the policy process.  
These channels and restraints seem to be missing when social capital is absent. As 
a consequence, a flood of information and disinformation washed over the policy fields. 
This hampers decision-making and progress. Technocratic conceptions of governance 
have ignored this data deluge and alternative forms of governance have been sought and 
found. Some public officials managed to create a governance style which combined 
both the high aspiration of the ideal world with the realities of their local circumstances. 
They combined an inclusive style of governance which involved as many people as 
possible, while still rigidly adhering to the formal rules of the game. They continually 
upgraded the knowledge available to all the actors, without ignoring the flood of gossip. 
To achieve this, strong and well-equipped individuals are essential, yet their impact is 
only beneficial when surrounded by a strong system. 
Together, these various behaviours created an alternative arrangement of 
government, not mirroring a well-built dam, but rather a delta of connections. This style 
may sometimes look messy and unstable. Yet by addressing the inherent tensions within 
these societies they were still able to generate success nonetheless. 
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 2. SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY: FAILURE TO EXPLAIN 
SUCCESS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of chapter 
This chapter will present an overview of the concept of social capital as it is understood 
today. It will then dissect social capital theory, exploring its ideas about the structure of 
relationships in a society, the nature of these connections and the positive expectation 
about cooperation that could be produced. Despite the great scholarly activity on social 
capital, it is argued here that the current literature has two faults.  
Firstly, by positioning social capital as a necessary condition of government 
success, the literature fails to explain why some governments do manage to perform in 
spite of dire circumstances for social capital. Secondly, as Putnam himself conceded, by 
emphasising the historical determination of social capital, the concept becomes merely 
an instrument to diagnose the health of a democracy, rather than a potential tool to cure 
it. The first fault makes the concept theoretically vulnerable, the latter fault practically 
inadequate.  
 
Content of chapter 
The chapter opens with a detailed discussion of the concept of social capital. Its 
composite elements of expectations, structure and nature of relationships are discussed 
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separately. This is followed by a discussion of the lacuna in the current literature, and 
asks how pervasive negative patterns of relationships can still allow for effective 
government performance to occur. Finally, the review discusses some connected 
research work which might be of relevance to this project. 
2.2 EXPLAINING PERFORMANCE THROUGH SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
At the beginning of Making Democracy Work, Putnam asserts that in the study of 
politics, government success can be approached from three perspectives. Firstly, 
through exploring the institutional design that orders the different powers within a 
polity; an approach most famously championed by Montesquieu. Secondly, in 
describing the socio-economic mechanisms governing the distribution of wealth; an 
analytical perspective exemplified by the work of Marx. And finally, by charting the 
socio-cultural pattern of relations and beliefs within society; as explored by the likes of 
Tocqueville.36  
Social capital is the latest reincarnation of an age-old concern with the nature of 
relationships in society. Tocqueville describes the cultural stock of U.S. American 
communities that allowed its democracy to flourish. Hume demonstrates the need for a 
commonly held trust to stimulate farmers to cooperate in collective action situations.37 
Bourdieu describes how the nobility of France used network connections to maintain 
their privileges.38 Coleman suggests that this resource could also be used by the less 
privileged, and has found that coalition opportunities are made possible through 
effective social capital management.39  
                                                 
36  R. D. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work (Princeton University 
Press Princeton, NJ, 1993). 
37  D. Hume, A treatise on human nature, (Clarendon Press, 1978). 
38  P. Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, in J. Richardson, Handbook of theory of research of the 
sociology of education, (Greendwold Press, 1986), p. 241-158. 
39  J.S. Coleman, ‘Social capital in the creation of human capital’, The American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 4, 1988. 
 
38
Putnam’s contribution is to frame social capital as the collective property of 
society. In his definition, social capital refers to ‘the collective value of all “social 
networks” and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each 
other.’40 Putnam benchmarks high or low stocks of social capital by comparing the 
quantity of civic associations, such as trade unions, football clubs or environmental 
groups. He finds a positive correlation between the number of civic associations and 
governmental performance in the different regions of Italy. Subsequent research across 
other national settings confirms that social capital does indeed play an important role in 
the success of government agencies.41  
Putnam points to strategic interactions to explain the mechanics of social capital. 
At the end of Making Democracy Work, he discusses social capital in reference to the 
‘Tragedy of the Commons’ – a scenario whereby commonly held grazing land is 
overused as no farmer can control the other players’ flocks; they all fear losing income 
if they restrain their own flocks and as a result, the land is overgrazed and everyone 
suffers.42 Putnam argues that if the shepherds had enough interpersonal trust built up 
through previous positive interactions with each other, i.e. social capital, they would 
have been able to resolve this dilemma.  
Boix captures this strategic element by stating that ‘social capital is, at its core, a 
set of institutionalized expectations that other social actors will reciprocate a 
cooperative overture. This expectation generates cooperation by convincing otherwise 
uncooperative actors to undertake those overtures in the first place.’43 
                                                 
40  R. Putnam, Bowling alone, (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000).  
41  S. Kähkönen, Does Social Capital Matter in Water and Sanitation Delivery?: A Review of 
Literature, (World Bank, Washington, 1999). 
42  R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993). 
43  C. Boix and D. Posner, ‘Social capital: Explaining its origins and effects on government 
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These expectations are shaped by the prior positive experiences of the actor within 
other relationships. The likelihood of cooperative overtures will only increase, however, 
if these experiences stem from positive relationships, a point frequently overlooked in 
the literature. While the amount of connections is usually used to measure social capital, 
it is the nature of relations which determines whether they contribute to a stock of 
interpersonal trust. Bad experiences will not translate to positive expectations.  
The mechanics of social capital can therefore be divided into three components: 
The first element is the structure of connections across society, the number and spread 
of the web of associations connecting people together. The second element considers 
what kind of connections these are, detailing whether these associations are of a 
hierarchical or equal nature. The third element is degree of positive expectations which 
are produced by participation in these connections. 
2.2.1 Structure of relations 
Putnam’s contribution lies in his causal claim about the link between government 
performance and the amount of connections present in a society. At first glance, one 
would think that the more connections present, the better. However, social capital 
theory as understood by Putnam is specific to the structure of connections it finds 
valuable.  
The literature distinguishes between bonding and bridging social connections.44 
Bonding capital refers to the relationships inside a group that creates cohesiveness 
within pockets of society. For example, a network of Turkish immigrants in the 
Netherlands based around a mosque. The latter refers to connections spanning across 
different factions in society. For example, a school board bringing together parents from 
both Turkish and Dutch origins.  
                                                 
44  D. Narayan, Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty, (World Bank, Washington, 1999). 
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This emphasis on bridges links to the seminal article by Granovetter on the effects 
of ‘weak versus strong ties.’ Granovetter juxtaposes close and strong connections, like 
family ties and factional membership, with more distant or weak associations like 
professional associations or sport clubs. An overdose of strong ties within a polity will 
stifle cooperation as actors will try to please only their own factions. If there is also an 
abundance of ‘weak ties’, people would also have ways of dealing with relative 
strangers and the outcomes would be more beneficial on the whole.45  
This means that so-called factionist connections are not considered civic. This 
stipulation rules out bonding connections that tightly bind together family groups, like 
the Cosa Nostra in southern Italy. In game theory terms, these groups can form a cartel 
in game situations and deploy zero-sum strategies that harm the overall collective. 
Both bridging and bonding capital are therefore necessary for a functioning 
democracy, although they do have a slightly different role. In short; bonding capital is 
what everyone needs to get by in everyday life, but it takes bridging capital to exert 
influence in a democratic government.46  
2.2.2 Nature of relations 
Beyond the structure of these relationships, Putnam emphasizes to an even greater 
extent the importance of the nature of civic associations. According to him, a 
relationship can be only qualified as conducive to democracy if it is based on an equal 
footing. Rather than a vertical relationship between a powerful patron and a dependent 
client, it needs to be a horizontal relationship between two equals. This is the essential 
difference between the histories of the North and South of Italy; the distinction between 
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a king handing out favours in Naples and an elected senate held accountable by its 
citizens in Florence.  
Putnam stresses the nature of the relationships because he goes on to argue that 
the nature of the dominant relationships in a society acts as a blueprint for its 
associations. If the experience of relationships is positive, as it was for the citizens of 
northern Italy, people will begin associations with a favourable view of cooperation. 
This increases the chances of successful cooperation and decreases the need for costly 
control measures. 
Unequal relations negatively influence the expectations citizens bring to collective 
action problems, increasing the occurrence of counter-productive strategies and heavy 
controls. This explains why vertical relationships have a negative impact on the 
performance of democracies, whereas those associations that draw upon horizontal 
designs go on to help governments perform. 
These theorems were later substantiated through several empirical reports. 
Pattioni, for example, shows how abundant vertical relationships in a polity undermine 
the fairness in the distribution of wealth. Patrons only reward the obedient, while 
simultaneously striving to keep all their clients dependent on them.47  
This means that unequal relationships are not considered to be part of the social 
capital stock because of their hierarchic nature. In this category, ties like owner-slave 
and patron-client are dismissed as ‘uncivic’. More controversially, this also discounts 
Roman Catholic connections, as Putnam deems their network asymmetric and distinctly 
unequal. The layman is totally reliant on the elevated priest, whereas Protestant 
communities are more egalitarian. Before Putnam, Huntington also theorized that 
liberalization from the Catholic Church was a powerful engine of the third wave of 
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democratization.48 However, this discounting of Roman Catholic relations is not without 
its opponents, especially when considering its contributions made in terms of schooling 
or further exploring whether all Protestant arrangements are in fact egalitarian. This 
question will therefore be revisited in Chapter 5 when assessing the relations on the 
different islands. 
Overall, the importance of the nature of the connections means that measuring 
social capital is not merely a matter of counting the lines between the members of the 
community. One must also assess the nature of the relations to determine whether they 
constitute a civic connection conducive to democratic decision-making. 
2.2.3 Expectations of relations 
According to the theory of social capital, the positive experiences in civic associations 
create a reservoir of positive expectations about cooperation, or trust, which benefits the 
effectiveness of democracy. As Przeworski observes, the outcome of democratic 
processes is inherently uncertain, which means that players need to have some faith that 
the result of cooperation will be better for all.49 Positive expectations mean that people 
are likely to agree to collective decisions and this reduces the need for costly controls.50 
According to Fukuyama, social capital thus helps governments to perform by 
significantly reducing the transaction costs of societal interactions. 
For example, in the case of delegating policy execution, as is done by a minister 
to public servants, social capital helps to solve the principal-agent problem. The 
minister, the principal, has the mandate from the electorate to manage the 
administration. However, due to a lack of time and expertise, the daily running of the 
government is handed over to civil servants, the agents. A high stock of social capital 
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means the minister delegates from a position of trust and will see less need to constantly 
check on the civil servant, allowing the civil servant to work more efficiently. 
Moreover, as the society is well connected, the information on the civil servant’s 
performance is more likely to flow back to the minister, allowing for the correction of 
any mishaps. 
On the whole, when comparing the role of social capital in a democracy versus 
the role of institutions and economics, it emerges that social capital plays a pivotal role 
in determining whether collective action problems are resolved. One could argue that 
whilst institutional design and socio-economic factors structure procedures and the 
nature of problems, social capital determines whether actors will choose to work 
together to solve the problems. 
2.3 FAILURE TO EXPLAIN SUCCESS 
2.3.1 Reception of social capital 
The launch of this concept of social capital, and its subsequent application to the USA 
in Bowling Alone, sparked a great amount of scholarly and policy activity.51 Putnam’s 
arguments have been tested in many research projects, and indeed, many reviews of 
polities around the world confirmed his ideas. However, the concept also encountered a 
range of critiques. 
Initial reactions by scholars like Boix and Posner focused on the missing links in 
the causal model, arguing that social capital gave too little insight into how exactly high 
social capital translated into government performance at a macro-level.52 However, this 
was mainly friendly criticism, aimed towards strengthening the concept. The idea that 
civic associations were important to good government was rarely challenged explicitly.  
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However, a more fundamental critique of social capital argued that it discounted 
possible negative effects of strong networks. Portes argued that strong social norms and 
networks could also enforce inefficient or malign social practices, such as oppression or 
dangerous behaviours. It could be argued that organised crime was also a form of social 
capital. Part of this strand of criticism focuses on the supposed conservative nature of 
social capital. George W. Bush, for example, took the lament about community decline 
in Bowling Alone as a cue for the restoration of old-fashioned values and 
Compassionate Conservatism. This fed the image that a resurrection of social capital 
meant a return to a nostalgic view of the 1950s.53  
These thoughts on the tyranny of social capital have some legitimate foundation. 
However, some of these critiques were based on too readily labelling all connections 
within society as civic associations. As discussed, Putnam is quite specific about which 
forms of relationships are helpful and which not. For example, because of its 
hierarchical and factionist nature, an organised crime family would not be considered to 
be part of social capital 
This loose application does point to a wider problem caused by the popularity of 
social capital theory. Woolcock concludes that social capital has become a victim of its 
own success. Its uptake across disciplines and areas meant that many people have 
distorted or removed essential features from the concept. As a result ‘the collective 
panoply of micro and macro measures of ‘social capital’ - and their correspondingly 
eclectic theoretical moorings - has led many critics to accuse social capital theory (or 
the concept of social capital) of having become all things to all people, and hence 
nothing to anyone.’54 
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In conclusion, it could be argued that almost twenty years after the publication of 
Making Democracy Work, the concept of social capital may not have taken over the 
whole stage, but at least forms the part of the backdrop to many studies into the 
effectiveness of government. Some of these scholars will take up the concept wholly, 
whilst others criticize vehemently, but all have at least referred to it. 
2.3.2 An unaddressed question 
Social capital arguably became famous because its emergence as a popular concept 
coincided with the tidings of its demise as a societal characteristic. After developing the 
concept in Making Democracy Work, Putnam went on to conclude that social capital 
was on the wane in the United States in his subsequent book called Bowling Alone. This 
suggested that the social fabric holding society together was disintegrating. The warning 
was later connected to an increasing concern with a perceived erosion of trust in 
democracy amongst citizens. 55  
This disappearance of trust is so problematic because Putnam argues that there is 
no alternative to social capital in order to achieve success. When Putnam first reported 
his findings back to local government leaders in Italy, one official from a Southern 
region therefore called Putnam’s findings ‘a counsel of despair’. What can a polity with 
negative relationship patterns and subsequent low social capital do to still achieve good 
government?  
The current concept condemns societies with low social capital to the stranglehold 
of history. Putnam does not show any route to quickly change the nature of the 
relationship patterns, as he contends that social capital stocks are rooted in centuries of 
civic experiences. This means that the differences between northern and southern Italy 
are caused by pre-1000 AD divergences in social organisation and are not likely to 
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change overnight. This provides little guidance for policy makers interested in good 
government performance in the short term, rather than waiting for history to alter its 
course. 
In the follow-up work on social capital, Democracies in Flux, Putnam does 
include the account of Perez-Diaz on the creation of social capital in late-Franco Spain. 
Perez-Diaz details how civil society was able to emerge by fostering a web of positive 
relationships at the micro-level.56 This shows how over the course of decades negative 
relationships can be turned into positive ones and subsequently create social capital. 
However, this details how social capital can be generated if it is absent, not how 
government effectiveness can be secured when social capital is absent. In the mean 
time, the citizens are stuck with an underperforming government. 
This problem has two aspects: It raises the question of whether social capital can 
be generated more quickly, and whether good performance is possible despite a lack of 
social capital. Much research has been done to address the former question. However, 
this research project focuses on the latter and seeks to find out if societies can sidestep 
history and find a short-cut to government success.57 
2.3.3 Empirical exceptions 
The three islands of Aruba, Curacao and St Kitts studied in this research project had, as 
will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, an excess of negative relationships. Their small 
communities fostered an overabundance of ‘strong ties’, and were often segregated 
along racial or political lines. Moreover, the islands have a history of strongly unequal 
forms of social relationships, such as slavery, colonialism and racism.  
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Indeed, as predicted correctly by Putnam’s theory, most political interactions 
replicated the entangled and hierarchical style of associations from the past. As will be 
discussed, the islands arguably possessed relatively strong institutions and economies. 
However, organisations such as UNICEF, World Health Organisation and Transparency 
International all pointed to specific fields were the governments were failing to deliver 
the services expected of such otherwise stable and affluent democracies.  
However, as will be shown in later chapters, some policy fields did seem to be 
performing. Looking at the public utilities, several of the organisations achieved 
recognition for their operational excellence through ISO-certification. Some operated 
with considerable success in the fiercely competitive Caribbean tourist market. How did 
these policy fields escape the curse of negative relationships? How did they achieve 
success nonetheless?  
The current concept of social capital is useful for describing how positive 
circumstances lead to successful government performance and how negative 
circumstances lead to government failure. However, the standing theory is not able to 
explain satisfactorily the ways in which government success can be created despite 
challenging social circumstances. There is no insight in how the structure, nature and 
expectations of relations can be handled differently in these circumstances in order to 
achieve success. This summarized in the figure below. 
Figure 5 Missing steps to success 
Strong institutions
Strong economics
Weak social capital 
Low public value
Structure: ?
Nature: ?
Expectations: ?
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The lack of a narrative for success in poor social capital conditions represents both a 
theoretical challenge for academics and a practical hole for policy makers. This study of 
how some senior officials bridge the gap between low social capital and high 
performance, aims to locate and reveal lessons that can be integrated in the concept of 
social capital and possibly replicated across other settings. 
2.4 POINTERS FOR PERFORMANCE IN LITERATURE 
Much has been written on public management, but little on management in these 
specific circumstances. A brief review of the most important literature highlights which 
doctrines currently describe the connection between social relations and performance. 
However, few seem to fill this gap in social capital theory.  
2.4.1 Structure of relations 
Much has been written on the different positions actors should take within society and 
its government. Aristotle described a division of labour between the demos, aristocrats 
and monarch. Montesquieu followed with a further separation of power between the 
legislator, judicator and executive. Given the focus on public utilities in this research 
project, the focus is here on the structure of relationships close to service delivery on the 
executive side of government, rather than the design of the entire democratic state. This 
is also where Putnam centres his research on when working with social capital. 
 
Dictate of distance 
As was discussed when looking at the definition of government success, the question of 
whether service delivery organisations should be put at arm’s length of politics has been 
visited frequently in the public management literature, especially when looking at 
public enterprises. In its latest reincarnation, these thoughts are captured in the ideas of 
Osborne and Gaebler, who argue that government officials should focus on steering the 
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ship of state, rather than rowing down in the galleys.58 For example, a minister should 
simply set the goals for an energy policy, but leave the management to implement it. 
This puts the politician at arm’s length of the actual business of public administration. 
This functional split between politicians and civil servants remains a powerful ideal, 
whether cast as a split between strategy and operations, leadership or management or 
any other juxtaposition.59 
This idea of arm’s length control could also be combined with the practices of the 
private sector and in the power and wisdom of the market. For example, Downs and 
Larkey observes an application use of private sector practices under city managers in 
the late nineteenth century United States.60 In a more recent incarnation during the 
1990s, New Public Management, public service organisations were likened to 
businesses. The central government was merely to act as the shareholder or the market 
regulator and leave the execution to other parties. The board of directors would act as a 
buffer between this shareholder and the management, thereby creating the desired 
distance. 
Ultimately, the dictate of distance relies on a rather simplistic representation of 
public administration as a chain of singular principal-agent relationships. This ignores 
the political reality in favour of business analogy. Firstly, in the case of many poor 
social capital environments, a lack of distance is exactly the problem. As discussed, 
Granovetter argues that it is the overdose of strong ties that make policy fields 
malfunction. Putnam adds that it will take generations to break such patterns. Politicians 
are likely to want to be more involved if all social pressures are heightened. Preaching 
an ideal does not equate to providing a solution.  
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Secondly, a simplification of government consisting of a chain of principal-agent 
relations does not do justice to the rich and densely populated field of modern policy-
making. Building on the work of Boscken, Talbot argues that these systems should be 
more properly defined as a multi-principal-agent relationship.61 For example, a 
government-owned airport, is not only controlled by the political shareholders, but also 
supervised by commercial airlines, traveller representatives and international aviation 
authorities. Just because the governance arrangements are not simple, does not mean 
they are ineffective. Talbot describes them as a governance regime, rather than a 
singular command structure, where different parties add up to a safeguard of the diverse 
interests as stake. 
 
Good governance 
The concept of regime points to the other powerful paradigm on the structure of 
relationships, namely that of good governance. Stemming from a concern for effective 
supervision, good governance relates to the correct positioning of the relevant 
governance actors and ensuring that they all play their part in governing the agencies.  
Grindler, a prominent author in the field, declares that good governance is mainly 
about improving the ‘rules of the game’ for effective government performance.62 This 
has given rise to detailed descriptions of the roles and responsibilities of the different 
actors in a policy field, including the owners, board of directors, auditors, customers, 
community groups, etc.  
The problem with this concept of good governance is that it tends to amount to a 
set of normative rules, rather than effective instruments rooted in reality. It reasons from 
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a very sterile view of the political arena. Many states nominally comply with all the 
good governance rules on paper, yet their day-to-day behaviour is very different. Just 
because a community group is entitled to a voice by the rules of the game, does not 
mean it has influence. The problem is that good governance describes the formal world 
and does not take into account the gritty reality of power relations.  
Rodrik argues that this gap between theory and reality is even larger when 
transplanting good governance across cultural settings. ‘Effective institutions […] 
emerge through local political processes of bargaining, experimentation and interaction 
between state and society, public and private actors, and formal and informal 
institutions. Attempts to leapfrog this process by transferring Western institutional 
models from rich to poor countries often fail because these institutions operate in an 
entirely different social and political context.’63 
O’Donnell tries to reintroduce a sense of realism through his concept of horizontal 
accountability. He too focuses on the positioning of actors in governance, yet points out 
that it is the friction, rather than the smooth cooperation, that keeps the system in check. 
This calls for constant vigilance to guard against informal effects like corruption and 
encroachment to keep the system healthy. 64  
2.4.2 Nature of relations 
Beyond the structure of connections of society, the existing literature on the nature of 
these connections must also be assessed. In this respect, the current literature can add 
insight into the content of the relationship and the special role for leaders. 
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Types of relations 
Rather than a more sociological view on relationships, a competing view looks mainly 
at the connection in terms of the equality of resources. Borrowing from economics, it is 
the field of game theory perspectives which have done much to probe the nature and 
consequence of relationship patterns.  
Herreros, for example, creates an interesting application of the principal-agent 
concept in low trust environments. He shows how the exchange of resources from the 
agent to the principal for information can be the driving force in building cooperation.65 
For example, a relationship between a civil servant and his minister is in this view about 
the minister signing off on the budget for policy and salaries in return for progress 
reports from his civil servants. This closely relates to Miller’s work on credible 
commitment, whereby a smooth cooperation between principal and agent is secured 
through good information exchange.66 
In this focus on the content of the exchange, style may matter as much as 
substance. One approach would be to look at the form of accountability that is being 
created. Talbot cites the inquest into the Challenger disaster, which reveals the 
competing forms of accountability that were present between officials and 
departments.67 Accountability can be of a bureaucratic, professional, political or legal 
nature, the specific form may influence what kind of outcomes result. Not all of these 
forms are beneficial to the development of trust and sharing information. A strictly legal 
form of accountability can limit the scope of information that agents dare to share about 
the successes and mistakes. 
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Dominant parties: Leaders and elites 
Although unequal relationships are deemed to have a negative effect on society, the role 
of dominant individuals may also be positive. Some research illuminates how certain 
actors, be it leaders or change agents, can make a political system work despite low 
trust. 
Rose, for example, describes how a few key individuals facilitated cooperation 
between the veto-players in post-Soviet Russia to ensure the realisation of government 
performance.68. This would connect to Peter’s famous study from Good to Great into 
selfless ‘level 5’ leaders who really make the difference. Klijn sums up this view on the 
overarching importance of senior leaders with the title of his inaugural lecture; It is the 
management, Stupid!69  
Elites could have a transformative impact on society as a whole. While trying to 
explain the democratic turn-around of Spain after Franco, Perez-Dias shows how grass-
roots action by elites during Franco’s final years provided a head start in the social 
capital endowment.70 They formed new associations creating pockets of social capital.  
Friedrich Hayek also hints that the rise of an extended order, a collection of 
individuals across society supporting certain rules, could lead towards a new era of trust 
and equality.71 Boix also attaches value to this explanation and points to the role elites 
go on to play in governing the social structure of the state. He suggests that elites could 
function instead as a third party arbitrator in conflicts, thereby building the resilience of 
the democratic system.72 
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However, elites do not have a flawless track record in maintaining democratic 
governance. O’Donnell shows that the ‘praetorian elites’ of Latin America provided 
powerful backing to military regimes at the expense of democracy.73 Looking at 
organised groups of citizens, Hirschman notes that too much input from a vocal 
minority in society can actually hamper performance: too many chiefs never did a tribe 
much good.74 
Either way, good leaders do not materialise out of thin air; they need to be found, 
groomed and supported. Although one great leader may do a lot of good work, it will 
take clusters and generations of good leaders to guarantee effective policy-making a in 
such a long-term game as utility management. 
2.4.3 Expectations of relations 
Positive expectations of cooperation, or stocks of trust, are the final element of social 
capital. It should be carefully examined before looking for the consequences of its 
absence. It is possible to conceive of either a substitute for trust or finding another route 
to cooperation. 
 
Transparency 
A possible alternative for positive expectations might be transparency, whereby 
governments fully disclose how they arrive at their decisions and deliver their services. 
Moore pleads for such ‘public deliberation’, arguing that government officials will be 
able to forge broad coalitions within society if they inform and motivate the public. 75 
However, Heald and Hood conclude that good decisions and great transparency are not 
necessarily interdependent.  
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This echoes other critiques of transparency, such as Fung, Graham and Weill who 
have demonstrated the negative consequences of full disclosure in the public sector.76 
When looking at several case studies in the United Kingdom and United States, Tsoakas 
actually finds that ‘[m]ore information may lead to less understanding; more 
information may undermine trust; and more information may make society less 
rationally governable.’77 Roberts goes on to argue that the more information is 
published, the more its correctness will be disputed and its contents distrusted.78 This 
suggests that earning trust is not simply a matter of providing full transparency. It seems 
that for extra information to be useful, it requires some additional support and treatment. 
 
Different forms of trust 
It also not completely accepted that positive expectations are always a good thing. 
When people put too much faith in the rules of society, inefficiency may also occur. 
Bohnet argues that policy systems do well under either excellent or absent laws. When 
rules are present, but not really functioning, the partial trust they receive only hampers 
quick decision making.79 Similarly, the Olson effect argues that public provision will 
actually benefit from distrust within segregated societies. In this effect, competing elites 
will jealously guard the fair distribution of the goods between the different camps.  
This raises the question of whether the type or locus of trust can change. In 
Lijphart’s consociational societies, people trust each other within their own religious, 
ethnic or political subgroup and the respective leaders of the segments. There is little 
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trust outside their own groups they anxiously watch each other.80 In a different spread of 
trust, Hayek notes that people can decide to put their trust in rules, such as fair 
procedures, or in ends, like receiving a good share of the value.81 He argued that in 
tight-knit networks, the trust would be in ends. This raises the question whether trust 
may work in a different way in small societies which goes beyond the framework of 
social capital theory. 
                                                
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The concept of social capital is part of a long research tradition concerning the socio-
cultural factors that shape government effectiveness. In Putnam’s definition, it has been 
applied successfully across several settings, but this review has revealed the poignant 
question of how effective governments can be constructed in the absence of society-
wide social capital.  
The review in this chapter has also brought together some building blocks from 
other theories which could provide a framework for further testing these strategies. The 
methodology will have to consider whether they provide enough foundation for the 
formulation of coherent hypotheses that can be tested or whether the thesis should focus 
on theory-extending. 
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3. METHODOLOGY: GRAND THEORIES AND 
INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of chapter 
This chapter deals with the methodology of the thesis. It is necessary to link the grand 
theory of social capital and the actions of the individual officials at the sixteen public 
utilities. This poses several methodological challenges which the research design needs 
to tackle. Most importantly, the analysis should separate successful and failing utilities. 
The research process should then capture all the relevant individual behaviours 
displayed by the elite officials in the organisations. Finally, the analytical process has to 
incorporate a method of causal inference, identifying which behaviours explain 
performance outcomes. On top of this, while fulfilling all of these demands; the 
research process should remain as simple and unbiased as possible. 
 
Contents of chapter 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the four fundamental choices underpinning this 
research design: The choice for exploratory research, the application of comparative 
analysis, the use of qualitative methods and the selection of the cases. 
The next section gives an account of the actual research process followed, 
detailing the different steps taken and the problems encountered, such that readers 
understand the research process followed for this thesis.  
 
58
The third part of this chapter discusses some key challenges in the research 
design. Firstly, there is the challenge of defining the different variables. A key question 
here is whether the thesis should adopt a specific conceptual lens to better capture the 
different behaviours of the officials or whether this would overcomplicate the research 
design. Secondly, the thesis considers the problems of gathering the data, focusing 
specifically on the validity of interview data and the research strategy of consilience. 
Finally, a brief discussion is presented on the merits of the causal inference model used, 
namely the Fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis, developed by Ragin. 
The final part of the chapter introduces the measurement and definitions of the 
variables used. This starts with the assessment of government performance through the 
public value framework of Moore. The official’s different behaviours are categorised 
using the key components of social capital –structure of relations, nature of relations 
and expectations. This will allow for the best integration of the outcomes with social 
capital theory as a whole. 
3.2 METHODOLOGICAL AMBITIONS 
3.2.1 Exploring versus testing 
At the beginning of this project, the decision was made to design this research exercise 
as an open exploration, rather than a narrow hypotheses-testing exercise.82 As discussed 
in Chapter 1, it would have been possible to set up this thesis as a testing exercise as 
well. For example, it could have selected several hypotheses on performance 
management from the public enterprise discourse to see whether they applied in these 
social capital circumstances.  
 
                                                 
82  See Chapter 1, paragraph 1.4, Scope and Relevance 
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However, it was felt that the anomaly of this unexpected success warranted a full 
study. By starting from the empirical data, it is hoped that this method will best reveal 
the intricacies of the elite behaviour. The expectation is that this will generate the 
richest amount of data, contributing to the goal of this thesis to add new knowledge to 
the social capital debate. 
Gerring notes that this difference between the confirmatory and explanatory 
research project is often overstated, as both are part of the scientific method of 
investigation and tinkering.83 However, a very real difference is that confirmatory 
research is always explicit about the theoretical frameworks used, as it actively derives 
hypotheses from the literature. Exploratory exercises sometimes claim to start without 
any previous theoretical position, yet may actually make certain assumptions about the 
direction of causality, scope of actors involved, etc. Any theory brings biases, however 
not declaring which theories are used may leave the biases undetected. 
This thesis therefore aims to apply a scientific rigour in its research design usually 
associated with confirmatory research. The process started with first dissecting the 
social capital literature to which it will respond. This theory and its main building 
blocks of structure of relations, nature of relations and expectations are explicitly 
marked as the framework used to look at the data. 
3.2.2 Finding causality through comparison  
The causal inference is driven by a comparative analysis of sixteen public utilities, 
charting which strategies employed by the senior officials were associated with success 
and which with failure. If, for example, strict financial management is found in all of the 
successful utilities and none of the failing ones, it seems reasonable to assume that 
financial management plays an important part in the creation of public value.  
                                                 
83  J. Gerring, Social science methodology: A critical framework, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2001), p. 23. 
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This approach goes back to Mill’s discussion of the Methods of Agreement, 
Difference and Residue, whereby one compares the similarities and differences between 
cases with reference to a specific set of outcomes. As with every method, there are some 
limitations. It could still be the case that the variation in performance is caused by an 
unidentified variable. For example, it might look like it is strict financial management 
that distinguishes the successful firms, but it is actually caused by the fact that all these 
utilities are the only one’s forced to publish their annual accounts in full.  
The only way to strengthen the reliability of this method is by adding more cases, 
which then should show a variance which cannot be explained by the assumed variable. 
In the case of this thesis, with limited time and resources, this would mean a trade-off 
between number of cases and depth of analysis. Taking guidance from Brady and 
Collier, it was judged that sixteen cases would provide enough variance while still 
allowing for sufficient in depth research.84 
A further weakness in Mill’s method is that it tends to look for a single 
explanation, where it could be possible to uncover several routes that lead to success or 
that performance requires a combination of factors. As argued by Schrodt, Ragin and 
Achen, ‘causal relationships are most likely nonlinear, interactive, and logically 
complex.’85 For example, strict financial management of the utility could ensure 
performance, but fixed tariffs for services might also be a sufficient condition for 
success. Alternatively, strict financial management might be necessary for success, but 
only if it is accompanied by full-disclosure of the organisational accounts.86 As will be 
discussed later in this chapter, the Fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis specifically 
                                                 
84  H.E. Brady and D. Collier, Rethinking social inquiry. (Rowland and Littlefield, Oxford, 2004). 
85  H.E. Brady and D. Collier, Rethinking social inquiry. (Rowland and Littlefield, Oxford, 2004), p. 
447. 
86  For more on this, see: G. Goertz, Social science concepts: A user guide, (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2006). 
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addresses this weakness. It employs Boolean logic, rather than Mill’s inferences, to 
distil the joint-effects of variables on the outcome. 
3.2.3 Qualitative versus quantitative 
The next choice is between a qualitative versus quantitative research approach, which is 
a topic of hot debate in the study of politics. Lijphart, for example, argues that large-
scale statistical data is always superior to small qualitative work, mainly because the 
former more closely resembles an experimental set-up as can be found in the natural 
sciences.87  
This view is mainly based on the conviction that the variables are more easily 
controlled in quantitative work. However, this control is often the product of qualitative 
labelling of variables by the researcher. It does not need to have a direct relationship to 
the actual working of the studied phenomenon. For example, the World Value Survey 
conducts large scale investigations of the impact of trust, but is stillbased on a 
qualitative assessment of interpersonal trust, even if it surveys many thousands of 
people. 
 Moreover, there is one aspect in which interviews are much more like 
experiments than quantitative work; the ability to observe previously unknown or 
unexpected effects. One can perceive unknown forces better by being in the field than 
within the filtered universe of a statistician. Much like Marie Curie needed to have been 
working in her laboratory in order to discover X-rays, rather than reviewing the data 
sheets in the office. This is why King, Keohane and Verba recommend qualitative work 
for the generation of theory.88 As this research project centres on a currently 
                                                 
87  A. Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’,The American Political Science 
Review , vol. 65, no. 3, 1971, p. 682-693. 
88  G. King, R. Keohane, et al., Designing social inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research, 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994). 
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unexplained empirical occurrence, it is therefore necessary to approach the field with 
such an open perspective. 
 
3.2.4 Selecting the research setting and cases 
Research setting 
The research setting refers to the environment of the public utilities. Ideally, it would 
have been possible to draw all cases from one island and have a smooth comparison. 
However, there were not enough similar government organisations present on anyone of 
the islands. For example, St. Kitts only has a handful of autonomous government 
organisations. As argued by Brady and Collier, this would not be enough for a 
comparative analysis and would change the method to in-depth case studies. It was 
therefore necessary to select several islands, making sure that they would meet the 
institutional, economic and social requirement set for this research.  
The design first looked for small polities with weak social capital conditions, 
having to choose from a wider range of islands as detailed on the map in the figure 
below. Population size was the most objective criteria, ruling out larger communities 
such as Trinidad & Tobago or The Bahamas. On the other hand, very small entities, 
such as the Dutch islands of Saba or St. Eustatius with populations of 2.000 to 3.000 
people, were felt to be too small to be meaningfully compared to the larger islands. 
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Figure 6 Overview of islands 
Overview of the Caribbean as of 200689 
 Aruba Curacao St Kitts 
Population 106,050 138,000 35,000 
Ethnicity Mostly white, 
minority black 
Mostly black, diverse 
minorities 
Great majority black, 
diverse minorities 
GDP/capita $25,831 ~$20,500 $15,70090 
Status Autonomous 
country within the 
Kingdom of the 
Netherlands 
Federal province of 
Netherlands Antilles, 
part of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands91 
Independent, sharing 
High Court and Central 
bank with other states 
The next social criteria would be the nature of the relationships. Almost all islands in 
the Caribbean had a history of slavery, colonialism and institutional racism. However, 
some islands seem to have still created quite trusting societies. Barbados is an example 
which seems to do quite well, as demonstrated in its consistently good performance on 
the Corruption Perception Index.92 In order to test whether public value could still be 
                                                 
89  CIA, World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook, (Retrieved on 18 
August 2011). 
90  CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sc.html (Retrieved 
on 18 August 2011). 
91  Curacao became a country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands within its own right on 10 
October 2010. 
92  Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2008, Transparency International. 
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created in the most difficult of circumstances, only those islands were selected that 
reportedly had the greatest deficiencies within their communities in terms of trust.  
Yet the research design also needs to make sure that no other factors than the 
socio-cultural circumstances hinder government performance. From the institutional 
perspective, the islands needed to have a reasonably stable local government. On this 
count, islands like Haiti and Grenada were eliminated. The French territories were not 
considered because the scope of their autonomy was extremely limited. The central 
government in Paris played such a strong role that the local officials arguably had only a 
marginal role to play. 
From the economic perspective, this thesis sought to examine islands with a 
relatively high GDP per capita, and yet within comparable range of each other. The 
Dutch Antilles are relatively rich by Caribbean standards and many Commonwealth 
islands did not match their income levels. It was only islands like St Kitts and Barbados 
that came close. As Barbados was excluded on socio-cultural grounds, the final sample 
consisted of Aruba, Curacao and St. Kitts.  
Naturally, there are still some differences between the islands and it could have 
been easier to only draw cases from one. For example, the Arubans are by majority 
descendants of Europeans, whereas the inhabitants of Curacao are mostly descended 
from Africans. The expectation is that this selection will create more variation in the 
independent variables, which will strengthen the comparative exercise. The one danger 
is that this variation on the variables aligns with the differences between the islands. For 
example, if all consensus oriented ministers in the sample turn out to be from Aruba, the 
validity of the causal inference is extremely limited. However, this effect did not occur 
within the data set, giving support to the notion that conclusions can be drawn on a 
straight comparison between the sixteen cases. 
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Case selection 
The institutional and economic circumstances were again controlled at the case level. In 
effect, this meant that only those utilities that were wholly or mostly owned by the 
government and commanded next to perfect monopolists were analysed. For example, 
the state telephone agencies of Aruba and Curacao face stiff competition from private 
providers and were therefore excluded from the sample. 
Of the sixteen selected cases, all but three of them were nominally private 
enterprises, in fact owned by the government. The three other utility services were 
provided by government departments. Obviously, there were still other differences 
between them. For example, the Aruban waste collector had some limited competition 
from a private provider catering for businesses and hotels, whereas this did not occur on 
Curacao or St. Kitts. 
In the case of the dependent variable, public value creation, variation was a good 
thing and the sample had to include both performing and failing utilities to understand 
what makes the difference. There was no active selection on the dependent variable, 
utilities were included on the basis of their fit in the sample, their performance was 
established only afterwards. 
3.3 RESEARCH PROCESS 
When presented in its final form as a thesis, the match between the data and the research 
can appear very smooth. As King, Keohane and Verba observe; ‘investigators often take 
down the scaffolding after putting up their intellectual buildings, leaving little trace of 
the agony and uncertainty of construction.’93 Although this makes for an easier read, it 
may also obscure some of the choices and challenges of the research process. An 
overview of the actual research process therefore follows below. 
                                                 
93  G. King, R. Keohane, et al., Designing social inquiry: scientific inference in qualitative research, 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994), p. 13. 
 
66
Step 1: Literature review 
This thesis started from both a fascination with the Caribbean islands and an interest in 
social capital theory. However, a conscious decision was made to make the theory the 
first stepping stone of the thesis, rather than just describing political life on the island 
without a previous examination of the literature. The literature review process soon 
identified Putnam’s work on social capital, but also included explorations of public 
value measurement and management of public enterprises. 
 
Step 2: Selection of islands 
The next step was to select the islands and government agencies to be studied. As 
detailed in the previous paragraphs, the islands chosen would need to combine relatively 
strong institutional and economic conditions with difficult social capital conditions. 
Following the criteria on the institutional, economic and social setting, it was in the end 
the islands of Aruba, Curacao and St. Kitts that were selected.One major handicap 
during this selecting process was that there was only a limited amount of island level 
data available.  
 
Step 3: Selection of cases 
In principle, the research design could have taken on all of the government-owned 
utilities on Aruba, Curacao and St. Kitts. However, a few were excluded, because it was 
felt there were some fundamental differences between them and the rest of the sample. 
The postal services of the islands were unfortunately excluded because all of them had a 
different legal status. Following a failed privatisation attempt on Curacao, the postal 
services were returned to public hands in 2009. As the post office on St Kitts was still a 
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department and Aruba an incorporated agency, the differences between them were too 
large to allow for proper comparison. 
 
Step 4: Data gathering 
As will be discussed below, the research aimed to collect a variety of data types to allow 
for a cross-check between the sources. Data was obtained on the sixteen cases through 
interviews, annual reports and secondary literature. It was the aim to speak to all 
ministers and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) involved, and to include a fair sample of 
representatives of the various senior stakeholders. In total, 107 interviews were 
conducted between 2007 and 2010. Over the course of four visits, six and a half months 
were spent on the islands. For two of the utilities, no interview took place with their 
current CEO, although at least one of their predecessors was interviewed. One minister 
was not available for an interview, but all others agreed to at least a short meeting. The 
table below details all the interviews per role and per island.  
Table 2 Conducted interviews 
Category  Aruba Curacao St Kitts 
Ministers 3 7 4 
Directors 2 11 2 
CEOs 6 10 4 
Managers 4 5 3 
Other (Academics, consultants, etc.) 94 38 8 
Total 107 
 
                                                 
94  The group of academics, consultants, etc. has been joined for Aruba and Curacao because the 
interviewees would usually have experience on both islands. For example, an accountant would audit 
organisations on both Aruba and Curacao. 
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The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, following the advice of 
Peabody. 95 On one hand there is a need for structure to consistently examine different 
variables, on the other hand respondents need to be able to provide new insights beyond 
the expected framework. This was tackled through a format whereby the opening would 
contain broad questions, followed by inquiry upon all of the facets of structure of 
relations, nature of relations and expectations. For example, interviews would begin 
with a broad question like ‘What factors contribute to the success of this organisation?’, 
but also cover specifics like ‘How many times in the year would you have contact with 
the board of directors?’  
Because the interviews were undertaken in a low-trust setting, it was not possible 
to use a tape recorder. Actors would be afraid that their comments about other people 
would be passed on, especially as respondents were encouraged to relate their personal 
opinions and discuss sensitive topics like corruption. When a specific comment of 
interest was made, permission was asked to use this as a direct, but anonymous quote. 
 
Step 5: Data processing 
The interviews were typed out immediately after the interviews and coded around the 
key building block of expectations, structure and nature of relations. The calculation of 
the public value per utility was based on both the opinion of experts and the researcher. 
Per case, two experts were asked to score the utility in terms of costs and gains as 
experienced by the average individual citizen. These were people who either audited or 
consulted the utilities over the period researched. These judgments were weighed 
against two assessments by the researcher executed in 2010 and 2011. The subsequent 
average of these four measurements was taken as the public value outcome.  
                                                 
95  R. Peabody, W. Hammond, et al. "Interviewing Political Elites’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 
vol. 23, no. 3, 1990, p. 451-455. 
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Step 5: Data analysis 
The data was then analysed through a three-stage process of data set-observations, 
causal process observations and fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis. The data-set 
observations cover some key characteristics of the utilities involved. These provided 
snap-shot insights into the players and the rules involved in the sixteen utility fields. 
Most importantly, it was determined which cases can be considered successful and 
which one to failing. 
This was followed by gathering of the causal process observations. A causal 
process is a mechanism within the studied field, which can take place independently of 
other effects, and which influences the outcome of the interaction. According to Brady 
and Collier, ‘[a] causal-process observation sometimes resembles a “smoking gun” that 
confirms causal inference in qualitative research.’96 For example, the observation that 
full-disclosure of accounts by the board of directors leads to better bookkeeping by the 
CEO.  
The causal process observations were then tested for their significance through the 
fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis. The aim was to identify the causes which are 
necessary to create a certain outcome and which combination of causes is sufficient to 
ensure that this outcome is realized. For example, this active full-disclosure may 
backfire if not supported by a clear explanation of the result by the board, creating a 
recipe for success with two necessary ingredients. 
3.4 METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
As the account of the research process reveals, this thesis applied several tools to extract 
and analyze the data. There are three major steps that warrant further attention as the 
choices made here directly impact the validity and reliability of the research outcomes. 
                                                 
96  H.E. Brady and D. Collier, Rethinking social inquiry. (Rowland and Littlefield, Oxford, 2004), p. 
277-278. 
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This refers to the definition of variables, the data gathering and the application of the 
analytical tool themselves. These steps are displayed in the table below and some of the 
key challenges that arose are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Table 3 Analytical process 
•Institutional design
•Economics
•Social capital
Public value created 
by policy fields
Definition AnalysisData gatheringVariables
Consecutive steps:
1.Rich description
2.Data observations
3.Causal processes
4.Fuzzy-set QCA
•Structure of relations
•Nature of relations
•Expectations
Controlled
Circumstances
Dependent
Performance
Independent
Elite behaviour
• Official statistics 
• Surveys, reports 
• Secondary literature
Valuation by experts 
and researcher
•Interviews
•Company reports
•Secondary literature
Discussion of research 
setting
 
3.4.1 Definition issues 
The definition of the controlled and dependent variables is relatively straight-forward. 
The literature provides several indications of what circumstances are important when 
assessing the conditions for democracy, including the institutional, economic and social 
setting of government agencies. Equally, for the dependent variable, the choice for the 
public value framework offers a relatively simple way of measuring government 
success.  
The path is less clear for the definition of the independent variables. The main 
question is whether the research design should adopt a specific view on the world, a 
conceptual lens, to order all the observation. For example, the thesis could base itself 
entirely on a rational choice theory perspective, or full-fledged game theory model. This 
research exercise is indeed very ambitious in aiming to take in the full dynamics 
between the senior officials. Moreover, these individual actions are then to be connected 
to the grander theory of social capital. Both the need for comprehensive observations 
and conceptual clarity argue in favour of a conceptual lens.  
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Whether the research design should adopt a conceptual lens could be evaluated by 
applying Occam’s razor. The research design should push the analysis towards the 
simplest solution possible. If any part of the framework overcomplicates the analysis, it 
should be discarded. Conversely, if the framework oversimplifies the causal 
mechanisms, the lens should be adapted as well. 
As this thesis responds to Putnam’s theory of social capital it makes sense to look 
for a conceptual lens in his own work. As discussed in the literature review, the concept 
of social capital can be dissected into structure, nature and expectations of relations. 
Such a partition into three components could serve as a valid framework. It focuses the 
thesis on three distinct aspects of social relations which together comprehensively cover 
interactions between the officials. 
This division of three would be rather straightforward and would therefore pass 
Occam’s test for parsimony. A further bonus would be that when this categorization is 
applied consistently across the analysis, it should be easier to reconnect the outcomes of 
the research project to the wider literature of social capital. However, defining these 
variables more specifically may require some conceptual stretching. Putnam gave clear 
descriptions of what the structure, nature and expectations of relations should be like at 
a societal level, but the translation to an individual level may not be so seamless. 
Digging further into social capital theory, another and more specific conceptual 
lens could be found as well. Putnam discusses several game situations in his books, 
such as the Tragedy of the Commons, and hints at rational choice or game theory as a 
possible worldview underpinning his theories.97 The problem is that Putnam is not clear 
what precise model of game theory he follows. This omission is felt particularly when 
trying to find a model to match with social capital theory.  
                                                 
97  R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993), p. 163. 
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In essence, any strategic action model looks at individuals trying to satisfy their 
preferences and how they go about doing this. The main division exists between the 
models that take the preferences of the actor as an exogenous given – usually presuming 
them to be economically desirable goods – or those that think the formation of these 
preferences is an endogenous and dynamic part of the process.98  
The exogenous school of thought is populated by strongly stylistic rational choice 
models. Tsebelis, for example, summarises all interaction in government by the sum of 
situations, motives and calculations.99 Approaches from the endogenous school of 
thought are often more baroque in their models, as exemplified by the work of 
Bourdieu. These approaches may not be qualified as game theory as such, as they reject 
the perfect ‘calculating machines’ assumed in the rational choice branch of game 
theory. 
Social capital would seem to be part of a more endogenous preference model. 
When referring to the impact of Norman rule on present day Southern Italy, Putnam 
himself relates how current attitudes are formed by experiences in the past.100 This 
would bring a model such as that of Bourdieu to the forefront. Bourdieu agrees that 
preferences are actively formed and reformed through unconscious reflection upon the 
past. This makes his model for strategic interactions a potential candidate for the 
conceptual lens of this thesis. 
Bourdieu’s model consists of an equation capturing the factors which shape 
human behaviour: [(worldview) (capital)] + field = practice 101 Bourdieu argues that the 
elements of worldview (attitudes to one’s surroundings), capital (availability of 
                                                 
98  T. Idema, private correspondence, (University of Oxford, Oxford, April 2008).  
99  G. Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, (University of California 
Press, 1991). 
100  R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993). 
101  P. Bourdieu, Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste, (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1994). 
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resources) and field (rules and players involved) act together to create actions and 
behaviour. In this, the practice would mainly be defined in terms of public value added, 
while the elements of worldview, capital and field could be measured for each of the 
sixteen cases. 
There are several problems with applying this model as a conceptual lens in this 
thesis. Firstly, it may prove just as hard to provide concrete measurements for 
‘worldview’ as it would be for expectations of relations. Some work has been done on 
attaching indicators to Bourdieu’s concepts, but this has not yet generated polished 
tools.102 This would mean that additional concepts have to be introduced to measure the 
elements of the model, creating yet another layer within the research design. 
Secondly, using a lens from a different sociological model than social capital will 
make it harder to connect the outcomes to the wider literature. The translation of 
worldview, capital and field to the components of social capital would seem to be 
feasible, but would require a careful definition of all the concepts involved. Mutch, 
Delbridge and Ventresca argue for the integration of a sociological perspective into 
organisational analysis, but also caution against ‘easy eclecticism - the mixing and 
muddling—of distinct and complex ideas and concepts.’103 The combination of social 
capital and practice theory may require more work than can be done in this thesis. The 
use of Bourdieu’s framework might so result in easy eclecticism. 
On balance, the need for simplicity rules out the introduction of an extra 
conceptual lens. It would needlessly overcomplicate the analysis. The three components 
of structure, nature and expectations of relations also form a valid framework to 
categorize the observations. These three components are therefore taken as the lens, 
defining them more precisely as the thesis progresses. 
                                                 
102  E. Silva and R. Edwards, Operationalizing Bourdieu on capital, (ESCR Working papers, 2007).  
103  A. Mutch, R. Delbridge and M. Ventresca, ‘Situating Organisational Action: The Relational 
Sociology of Organisations’, Organisation, 2006, vol. 13, no. 07. 
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3.4.2 Data collection 
The fact that this research design is of a qualitative nature, does not mean that it will use 
only one type of data. The ambition is rather to use as much of the information 
available, drawing on the various sources to look at the same dynamics from different 
angles.  
For example, the interactions between a board of directors and a CEO can be 
examined through interviews, newspaper articles and minutes of the meetings. Each 
data source takes a slightly different approach, but together they form a more complete 
picture. King, Keohane and Verba refer to this process as triangulation, ‘the practice of 
increasing the amount of information brought to bear on a theory or hypothesis.’ They 
argue strongly in favour of its applications; ‘The best method should be chosen for each 
data source. But more data are better.’104 
Triangulation is especially valuable when interviews provide one of the chief 
sources of data as is the case for this thesis. There are manifold problems with the 
reliability of interviewees or bias of the interviewer in this method (see the appendix for 
a further discussion). To address this weakness, Davies argues for a continuous 
interaction between observations from the interviews and those from documents, 
memoirs and other secondary sources.105 The aim is to devise a system of checks and 
balances to weigh contradicting pieces of data against each other. By subjecting all 
evidence to the same critical framework, the overall reliability is improved.  
This multi-angled analysis can be taken one step further by bringing together not 
only different sources, but also different disciplines. This can be done through the 
process of consilience, as first developed for the natural sciences by Whewell. 
                                                 
104  H.E. Brady and D. Collier, Rethinking social inquiry. (Rowland and Littlefield, Oxford, 2004), 
p.192. 
105  P. Davies, ‘Doing Politics Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite 
Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services’, Politics, vol. 21, no. 1, 2001, p. 73-
80. 
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Consilience holds that conclusions from different ‘categories of facts’ can jointly form a 
comprehensive explanation for a phenomenon.106 For example, the board room 
dynamics could be approached sociologically by interviewing the members, legally by 
looking at the company statutes and financially by looking at the monetary impact of 
the decisions. Together, these approaches provide a better picture than only one of those 
disciplines by itself.  
Consilience also suits the chosen line of inquiry which moves from looking for 
simple linear relationships (‘the higher the salary of the CEO, the better the company 
performance’) towards exploring how causes work together (‘high salary together with 
legal ability to fire the CEO, increases performance’). If the expectation is that the 
causation will consist of the interaction of different factors, utilizing different 
perspectives may be useful.107 
3.4.3 Analytical tools 
The main job of the analytical model is to determine which behaviours lead to good 
performance. The decision was made to apply the fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis 
as developed by Ragin.108 Fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis has several 
characteristics advantageous to this research exercise. Firstly, it provides a clear hands-
on research methodology, giving guidance on the research path without excessively 
constraining the scope of the investigation. The very structure of this thesis has been 
mapped with the help of the research process of fuzzy-set analysis. 
Secondly, it combines the rigorous structure of quantitative research design with 
the more nuanced considerations of the qualitative method. It draws on numerical data 
through its Data Set Observations and various qualitative insights through the Causal 
                                                 
106  E. Wilsons, Consilience: The unity of knowledge, (Vintage, London, 1999). 
107  H.E. Brady and D. Collier, Rethinking social inquiry. (Rowland and Littlefield, Oxford, 2004), p. 
278. 
108  C. Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy-sets and beyond, (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2008). C. Ragin. Fuzzy-set social science, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000). 
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Process Mechanisms. Jointly, this makes for a rich analytical process, using different 
data sources to inform hypotheses-building, while using logic to check their causal 
relevance.  
Thirdly, it is the expectation that this method is relevant for the empirical 
situation. The clustering of similar utilities does not need to be sharply delineated, hence 
the name ‘fuzzy’, which allows for an appreciation of the complexity of the field. 
Through its use of fuzzy-sets, the more fluid differences between the sixteen cases are 
not needlessly simplified. 
There are some drawbacks to this method as well. The jump from data-set 
observations to formulating causal process observations is still a rather large step. It 
entails the hazardous move from cataloguing behaviours to joining observations 
together and calling it a mechanism. At this stage, it will be tricky to capture all of the 
relevant mechanisms and let them be jointly exhaustive. Equally, it is hard to separate 
all the effects, making it hard to let them be mutually exclusive. Thankfully, the method 
does allow for a couple of test rounds to see whether all relevant mechanisms are 
included or whether some processes are indistinguishable from each other. 
Another problem at this stage is the judgements calls made by the researcher 
when dividing the cases across the set.109 The reasons for putting one case in a ‘strict 
financial management set’ and the other outside of this group, maybe particular to the 
specific researcher and can consequentially not be replicated. Furthermore, even slight 
differences in coding, putting a case a little more towards a certain set, might influence 
the outcomes of the causal inferences. This weakness of the method is addressed by 
being as transparent as possible throughout the analysis and by conducting a sensitivity 
                                                 
109  B. Cooper, ‘Applying Ragin’s crisp and fuzzy set QCA to large datasets: social class and 
educational achievement’, Sociological Research Online, www.socresonline.org.uk/10/2/cooper.html, 
(Retrieved on 30 August 2011). 
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analysis. When presenting the different coding in Chapter 8, some alternative scorings 
will be considered as well. 
A final limitation is the inability to assess mechanisms in motion over time. 
Fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis frames causality as an engine consisting of several 
parts. Yet it does not shows which process needs to come first to set it in motion. Some 
deductive logic might reveal that some processes necessarily come before others, but 
this cannot be derived from the fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis as such. To address 
this omission, Chapter 9 will try to piece together the result into a possible sequence of 
the different behaviours. A certain amount of humility is required here as these are 
based more on intuition than reasoned conclusion. 
3.5 DEFINING THE KEY VARIABLES 
The final part of the methodology focuses on the definition of the key variables. The 
definition of the controlled variables can be derived from the literature. The exact 
measurement of the dependent variable, performance, and independent variables, elite 
behaviour, will have to be constructed specifically for this project. In the case of 
performance, this can be done quite quantitatively, based on the public value framework 
of Moore.  
For the three components of the independent variable, the structure, nature and 
expectations of relations, the measurement will have to remain more qualitative. 
Continuing to build on the concepts of consilience, the three components will be 
considered from different angles through the thesis. The rich description provides a 
strongly qualitative account of their state across the different utilities, while the data-set 
observations look more at their countable attributes and the causal processes consider 
the mechanisms taking place. Together these three perspectives should provide a 
comprehensive insight. 
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3.5.1 Performance 
The measurement of the utilities’ performance will be based on the public value 
framework of Moore, combined with some aspects of Putnam’s own measurements. 
Drawing on Moore, the utility’s performance will be calculated by weighing the 
benefits of the utility versus the costs as experienced by the average individual citizen 
between 2005-2009. Following Putnam, the performance of the sixteen cases will be 
measured at the three stages of policy formulation, announcement and implementation.  
Each of the sixteen cases was evaluated by two external experts and twice by the 
researcher. In each case, the scorer was requested to look at the costs and benefits of the 
utilities relative to their endowment. For example, when assessing the water department 
of St Kitts, it was considered that this organisation draws water from a naturally 
occurring source underground. Aruba and Curacao had to use desalinated sea water, 
which would naturally make it more expensive. Such advantages or disadvantages were 
incorporated in the assessment, as the more expensive utilities may still have been very 
efficient given the circumstances they were in. 
Next to the financial burden, the costs consisted of the loss of control over the 
utility as the task was delegated to the government, and the subsequent loss of insight in 
the policy making and the financial costs carried by the citizens. Depending on the size 
of the cost, points are detracted from the utilities score. The table below provides an 
overview of the coding options. 
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Table 4 Definition of costs 
Component Question – Focussed on 2005-2009 Scoring 
Formulation 
Forsaking 
control 
What degree of influence can citizens 
exert over the policy of the company, 
be it through voicing their opinions, or 
choosing alternatives? 
No influence (-4) 
Little influence (-3) 
Moderate influence (-2) 
Great influence (-1) 
Announcement 
Forsaking 
insight 
How accessible and reliable is the 
information on policy-making to 
citizens? 
No information (-4) 
Little information (-3) 
Moderate information (-2) 
Extensive information (-1) 
Implementation 
Enduring 
financial burden 
Given the circumstances of the utility, 
how do you rate the financial burden 
of the service for citizens (including 
indirect and deferred costs)? 
Very high costs (-8) 
High costs (-6) 
Moderate costs (-4) 
Low costs (-2) 
Next to losing points due to policy costs, utilities could gain points by delivering 
benefits to citizens. The gains were again split into three components of policy 
formulation, announcement and delivery. This translated to the potential long-term 
benefit of a community wide investment in utilities, the gaining of know-how by 
citizens on the use of the service and the quality of the service delivered. The table 
below presented the coding options. 
Table 5 Definition of benefits 
Component Question – Focussed on 2005-2009 Scoring 
Formulation 
Securing long-
term investment 
How do you rate the provisions or 
investments for the long-term needs of 
the island for this utility? 
Very good provision (+4) 
Good provision (+3) 
Moderate provision (+2) 
Poor provision (+1) 
Announcement 
Gaining know-
how 
How clear is the information provided 
to consumers of the service? 
Very clear (+4) 
Clear (+3) 
Moderately clear (+2) 
Poor clarity (+1) 
Implementation 
Benefiting from 
service delivery 
Given the circumstances of the utility, 
how do you rate the value added for 
citizens (including dividends)? 
Very high value (+8) 
High value (+6) 
Moderate value (+4) 
Low value (+2) 
This definition of success aims to join both a process and outcome perspective on 
government performance. However, given the rather goods and services oriented nature 
of public utilities, the policy implementation elements of price and quality were judged 
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to be of greater weight than the other factors, awarding them double the weight in the 
measurement process. This does tilt the measurement towards the outcome perspective 
on government success, but the specific role of public utilities may justify this. For 
example, the loss of democratic control over the police may present greater costs than 
loss of control over a water company. The effect of this doubling will be evaluated 
when discussing the measurement outcomes and the sensitivity analysis shows that its 
effect on the scores was not too dramatic. 
3.5.2 Structure of relations 
The definition of the independent variable will be more difficult. Thankfully, the 
process underlying fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis provides some guidance, 
suggesting diverse view points on the same variables as the analysis progresses. This is 
line with the work of Brady and Collier on the synergy between data-set observations 
and causal process observations, arguing for looking at empirical facts from different 
angles.110 
The definition is executed in three steps. In the first step, the relevant indicators of 
the structure, nature and expectations of relations are derived from the literature. In the 
second step, the countable data on these components is gathered. In the third step, the 
three components are viewed in terms of the concrete causal processes observed in the 
utilities. Where necessary, the definitions will draw on concepts from the literature to 
provide more precision. 
In the case of the structure of relations, social capital theory is firstly interested in 
the form of the networks and the rules that are applied within them. It matters greatly 
whether there are any bonding or bridging ties, determining which groups of actors are 
                                                 
110  H.E. Brady and D. Collier, Rethinking social inquiry. (Rowland and Littlefield, Oxford, 2004). 
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involved.111 Moreover, the type of regimes, or rules of the games, under which these 
structures play out determines whether they are fluid or rigid. Bourdieu would here 
invoke the image of game, where both the number of players and the rules of the games 
are important.112 This exploration generates two initial questions for this variable which 
are defined more precisely as the analysis continues, as represented in the table below. 
Table 6 Definition of structure of relations 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
Which actors are involved?  -Number of actors 
-Diversity of actors 
Relational Distance  
-Involvement of many and 
diverse actors 
What regime types are 
there? 
-Control over tariffs 
-Legal status organisation 
Grid Governance 
-Rigidity in observance of 
governance rules 
In the second step, the data set observations take a more quantitative approach to 
capturing the defining attributes of structure of relations. This part of the analysis aims 
to identify any connections between countable characteristics of the cases and their 
performance. Regarding the first question, the data focuses on mapping which actors are 
involved and how diverse they are. For example, the interviews may show that 
successful utilities generally have more actors involved in their decision-making 
process. The question on the rigidity of rules is addressed through more binary answers, 
checking whether the allocation of the formal control over tariffs or legal status of the 
organisation makes a difference to performance.  
In the third step, the structure of relations is used as the starting point to identify 
the mechanisms which could explain the different performances of the sixteen utilities. 
The definition is here shaped by the possible variation of the potentially significant 
mechanisms. In the case of the structure of relations, an interesting difference was 
                                                 
111  D. Narayan, Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty, (World Bank, Washington, 1999). 
112  P. Bourdieu, Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste, (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1994). 
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observed between utilities that actively worked to involve more actors and those that 
actively tried to exclude other players. The exact measurement of this effect is 
conducted through the concept of Relational Distance, as originally developed by 
Black.113 
The second interesting variation concerned the rigidity with which the rules of 
governance were applied. Some utilities aggressively defended the formal governance 
rules while others took a more relaxed and fluid approach. Again, it needs to be tested 
which approach is more conducive to performance. The characteristics are drawn from 
the concept of Grid Governance, applied from Cultural Theory to the public sector by 
Hood.114 
3.5.3 Nature of relations 
The definition of the second component of the independent variables, the nature of 
relations, again looks at the variables in different ways as the analysis progresses. The 
nature of relations in social capital theory is mainly about the equality of the 
relationships and the impact of these dynamics.  
On one hand, it matters whether one party in the relations possess significantly 
more resources -like money, knowledge or authority- or that the players have similar 
funds of capital. The imbalances could more easily evolve into a patron-client 
relationship, whereas the parity might gravitate to more egalitarian arrangements. 115 On 
the other hand it also matters how these differences in resources are treated by the 
individuals involved. The relationships might be very antagonistic, where the richer 
party hoards all the resources, or more harmonious, whereby both actors consider 
themselves part of a large group with a shared interest. 
                                                 
113  D. Black, The behaviour of law, (Academic Press, New York, 1976). 
114  C. Hood, Art of state, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998). 
115  S. Piattoni, ‘Clientelism, interests, and democratic representation’, in S. Piattoni ed. Clientelism, 
interests, and democratic representation: The European experience in historical and comparative 
perspective. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001). 
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Table 7 Definition of nature of relations 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
Are the resources evenly 
distributed? 
Actor Dominance 
-Presence of actor with 
much larger resource stock 
Are there antagonistic 
divisions between the 
actors? 
Distribution of capital: 
-Economic 
-Cultural 
-Symbolic 
-Network 
Group Governance 
-Degree of communality 
between governance actors 
At the stage of data set observations, an attempt is made to measure the funds of capital 
of the minister responsible for the utility policy and the CEO responsible for its 
execution. These two actors were present in all of the sixteen cases and were arguably 
the two key individuals. Their resources could take different forms. Taking inspiration 
from Bourdieu, an assessment is given of the economic, cultural, symbolic and network 
resources these actors possessed. 
At the second stage, the analysis looks at the mechanisms connected to the nature 
of relations which could be relevant to the performance outcomes. The first mechanisms 
that warrants testing is whether the presence of dominant actors, i.e. those with 
disproportionally more resources, might influence the performance of the public utility. 
This mechanism will be defined by the relative size of the resources of the chief actors 
as compared to his counterparts.  
A second mechanism warranting further attention is whether the performance is 
better if the relations are generally cordial, imbuing a shared team spirit, or whether 
performance is better when the relationships are more business-like. This mechanism 
will be measured through the amount of Group Governance, again taking cues from 
Cultural Theory.116 
                                                 
116  C. Hood, Art of state, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998). 
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3.5.4 Expectations of relations 
The expectations of relations evolve around two elements; the general outlook people 
have on the world and the information they receive which shapes this worldview. One 
on hand, the experiences people have gathered in the past is assumed to have fostered a 
certain attitude towards future cooperation. For example, people being used to work in 
hierarchical organisations would be likely to repeat that modus elsewhere. 117 On the 
other hand, information about the future cooperation will also influence the attitudes of 
the actor. As Bourdieu saw it, the worldview of people will influence how they regard 
their surroundings, but their surroundings will also influence their worldview. 
Table 8 Definitions of expectations 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
What sort of expectations 
do actors have of 
cooperation? 
Engineering Mentality 
-Dominant mindset towards 
organisation 
What informs the 
expectations of actors? 
Actors’ views on: 
-Rules in organisations 
-Dynamics of interaction 
Knowledge Availability 
-Sharing of information 
between actors 
At the second stage of analysis, the data set observations, the expectations of the 
relations as held by the minister and CEO are analysed. Again based on the Cultural 
Theory model, the minister and CEOs were divided according to their view on rules and 
group dynamics. 
At the third stage, the causal process stage, the first mechanism tested was how 
the attitude towards organisation prevalent in a given public utility influenced its 
performance. For example, a strict technocratic approach, rather than a human relations 
approach, may not have worked well in such a small society. The second mechanism 
explored was how the wide availability of knowledge of policy, as opposed to a 
                                                 
117  C. Boix and D. Posner, ‘Social capital: Explaining its origins and effects on government 
performance’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 4, 1998, p. 686-693. 
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restricted access to such information, aided the policy formation process. This addressed 
the doubts about transparency raised in the literature and tests whether more information 
hurts or helps the creation of public value between the actors.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The methodology has the tough task of equipping this thesis for the exploration of a 
previously unexplained phenomenon in a dense field of governance relations. By using 
a combination of approaches and analytical techniques, the methodology aims to 
provide sufficient structure to deliver some relevant and valid conclusions at the end.  
In the final appendix to this thesis, some further reflections are presented on the 
success of this methodology in achieving this aim. These are written with the benefit of 
standing at the end of the analytical process. Specifically, this appendix addresses 
whether the restrictions on the scope of the research question undermined the overall 
thesis ambition, whether the different concepts used –social capital, Cultural Theory, 
public value, etc.- aligned with each other, and whether fuzzy-set analysis provided the 
best possible use of the data. 
For now, the main aim is to keep a consistent focus on the structure, nature and 
expectations of relations throughout the thesis, looking at these same three components 
from different angles. When systematically tracking how different configurations 
correspond to different performance outcomes, it should be possible to pinpoint which 
behaviours contribute to success and which to failure. 
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4. SETTING: CHALLENGES FOR SMALL-SCALE 
DEMOCRACIES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of chapter 
This chapter introduces the research setting of the thesis; the Caribbean islands of 
Aruba, Curacao and St Kitts. The data discussed here should demonstrate why these 
three islands form a good hunting ground for government success in adverse social 
capital circumstances. The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that these islands 
have the challenging social capital conditions that would make the occurrence of 
government success surprising. However, although this thesis focuses on the socio-
cultural circumstances of government performance, it does not ignore the institutional 
and socio-economic circumstances also important for the health of a democracy. Where 
the social capital circumstances should be weak, the institutional and economic 
circumstances should be strong enough not to prohibit failure. All three circumstances 
are therefore discussed in this chapter. 
 
Content of chapter 
The chapter first reviews the institutional design and economic circumstances of the 
islands, followed by an assessment of the social capital situation under the framework 
of Putnam. For each condition, the review draws on both the general literature on island 
democracies, data as available from statistics agencies or international organisations and 
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observations gathered during the research period. Due to the size and development stage 
of these islands, not all data desired was available, but there was enough to make some 
measured judgements. 
When considering the institutional conditions, there was still some concern about 
the strength of these circumstances. All islands operate systems designed for larger 
polities, which seems to create some unwarranted tensions. However, it would seem that 
the wider checks and balances were strong enough to consider these islands strong 
democracies.  
Similarly, from an economic viewpoint, the islands were vulnerable through an 
overreliance on tourism and limited distribution of wealth throughout society. However, 
the income per capita in each of the islands is relatively high when compared to the 
regional averages and tourism generally does spread wealth more through society than, 
for example, diamond or oil mining. 
From the social capital point of view, the data available is very limited, but the 
available sources generally point towards weak conditions. The structure of relations 
was characterized by entanglement and the number of civic associations with the 
community was relatively low. Similarly, the nature of relations was characterized by 
patronage and zero-sum strategies. A direct measurement of expectations of 
cooperation, or interpersonal trust, is not available, yet data on political participation 
and corruption perception shows that people are not without hope. The diversity of data 
shows that a judgment on social capital is not easily made, but that the overall 
conclusion point towards poor social capital circumstances. 
4.2 INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FACTORS 
The quality of the government institutions needs to be of such a standard that it is not 
the main factor for government failure. Based on a brief review of the history of the 
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three islands and a comparison of their constitutional arrangements, the conditions were 
deemed to be satisfactorily. Whilst the institutional design may not have been ideal, it 
did not exclude successful government performance. 
4.2.1 Literature on island governments 
The most obvious characteristic of small-scale democracies is their size. There has been 
much debate on what separates a micro-state from a simply small state. The World 
Bank and Commonwealth issued a joint report in 2001 delimiting small states officially 
to those with less than 1.5 million inhabitants, a consensus that will be followed here.118 
At this figure, the global set covered such diverse small countries as Trinidad & 
Tobago, Vanuatu and Bhutan. With populations ranging between 35,000 and 138,000, 
the islands studied here were at the very bottom of this size range.  
Undeterred by size, most islands have adopted similar government structures to 
much larger polities, usually designing fully fledged legislative, executive and judicial 
branches. This institutional set-up is often a remainder of colonial times or the 
contemporary pressure to follow the institutional arrangements of good governance. 
More subtly, the tendency to adopt overseas institutional arrangements could stem from 
an oft felt sentiment amongst island populations that overseas arrangements must be 
superior to their own native structures.119 Harrigan and Harrigan term this ‘macro-state 
emulation’, resulting in scaled-down yet complete versions of the Western state 
emerging on these islands.120  
The question is whether it was wise to emulate large state institutions. The 
Commonwealth Secretariat warns that the unique ‘micro-state ecology’ must be taken 
                                                 
118  World Bank and Commonwealth Secretariat, Small States: Meeting challenges in the global 
economy, (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 2000). 
119  G. Oostindie and P. Sutton, Good governance and small islands states, (KITLV, Leiden, October 
2006). 
120  G. Oostindie and P. Sutton, Good governance and small islands states, (KITLV, Leiden, October 
2006). 
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into account when copying institutional design as developed overseas.121 Interestingly 
though, as noted by Dahl and Tufte in Size and Democracy, Plato and Aristotle 
designed their political systems for small communities.122 Large Western states still 
draw inspiration from these classic designs, so small countries are perhaps not wrong to 
do so as well. 
On the whole, islands seem to be successful in upholding their democracies over 
time. ‘In a study of 237 nations in the period 1973-1995, [Ott] found [by] that using 
measures for political freedom, political rights and civil liberties ‘small states 
(population under 1.5 million) are more likely to be democratic than large states at any 
single point in time’ across all income levels (i.e. irrespective of levels of economic 
development) […] and that “being an island country has a consistent and positive 
impact on the likelihood of political democracy” at all levels of income […] In sum, the 
prevalence of parliamentarism, coupled with small size and insularity, has supported 
democracy in small states.’123 
When examining the influence of the remaining colonial connections, Watson 
lists the range of constitutional connections employed by small states today, covering 
protectorates, associated states, confederations, etc. On the whole, the evidence 
indicates a positive effect of remaining a dependent territory; dependent territories 
outperform independent countries in terms of GDP/capita.124 
However, one should be careful to distinguish the formal arrangements from the 
informal realities. The above data is about the island success in maintaining the pure 
characteristics of a democracy –competitive elections, rule of law- although this is no 
                                                 
121  Commonwealth Secretariat, Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, London, 1986), p. 7. 
122  R. Dahl and E. Tufte, Size and democracy, (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1973). 
123  G. Oostindie and P. Sutton, Good governance and small islands states, (KITLV, Leiden, October 
2006). 
124  G. Oostindie and P. Sutton, Good governance and small islands states, (KITLV, Leiden, October 
2006). 
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mean feat, it does not mean that they are effective democracies. Beyond the structures 
on paper, relations in small communities may work very differently. 
Simmonds, for example, argues that the very form of the bureaucracies 
transplanted to St Kitts actually perpetuated colonial relationships. ‘Historically, the St. 
Kitts-Nevis bureaucracy is a colonial invention. Its principal purposes were to (1) 
coordinate the political and economic relationships between the colonies and the 
colonial power (i.e., Great Britain); (2) act as an instrument of the law and order - again, 
in the interest of the colonial power. Clearly such functions would qualify the St. Kitts-
Nevis colonial bureaucracy prior to the 1950s as a ruling bureaucracy which then 
operated on the sole basis of a patron-client relationship. The functions and patterns of 
behavior just described are now part of St. Kitts-Nevis' heritage of slavery and colonial 
domination which today exhibit some influence on contemporary bureaucratic 
behavior.’125 
This means that there is generally optimism about the ability of small countries to 
remain democracies. However, the actual performance of these institutional 
arrangements needs to be checked on the basis of the practice, moving beyond the mere 
formalities of democracy.  
4.2.2 Institutional conditions 
Constitutional development 
From the constitutional perspective, it is important that these three islands could be 
identified as stable political entities in their own right. The history of these three islands 
has created certain institutional tensions, yet also provided links that supported stability 
in recent times. All three islands went through similar experiences of conquest, slavery, 
                                                 
125  K.C. Simmonds, ‘The Politicization of Bureaucracies in Developing Countries: St. Kitts-Nevis’, 
Phylon, vol. 46, no. 1, 1st quarter of 1985. 
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decolonization and still had enduring ties to the former imperial powers, the 
Netherlands and United Kingdom.  
Aruba and Curacao were both ruled by the Dutch since the seventeenth century. 
With its large natural harbour, Curacao became the focal point for the Dutch trans-
Atlantic trade routes, while Aruba remained a more peripheral island. Both the French 
and the British colonized St Kitts, using it as an agricultural centre for sugar and 
importing large numbers of slaves to work the fields. The British gained complete 
control of the island in 1783. The massive Brimstone Hill fortress on the island, dubbed 
the ‘Gibraltar of the Caribbean’, still serves as a reminder to the embattled status of the 
island. 
After the Second World War, all islands started a process of decolonization, 
extending to the present day in several forms. The Dutch Caribbean islands were 
formally decolonized in 1954. The Kingdom of the Netherlands, or Dutch 
Commonwealth, was remodelled as a nominally equal federation between the different 
countries in the realm. Over the years, the Commonwealth splintered into smaller parts, 
with Aruba becoming an autonomous country in 1986. Curacao would go on to become 
an autonomous country in 2010, after the research period for this thesis ended. St Kitts 
& Nevis emerged, via several failed associations with other islands, as an independent 
federation of two islands in 1983. 
During the period researched, 2005-2009, the constitutional organisations of the 
islands looked as captured in the figure below. The Kingdom of The Netherlands 
formed a sovereign state with several member countries, the Kingdom taking 
responsibility for foreign affairs, defence and the guarantee of good governance. The 
Netherlands effectively have the role of senior partner through their majority in the 
Kingdom council. St Kitts & Nevis was a fully independent state. 
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Figure 7 Constitutional organisation in 2006  
 
Aruba was an autonomous country within the Kingdom. At the time of the research, the 
autonomy of Curacao was provided through its position as province at the federal level 
within the country of the Netherlands Antilles. The island had considerable sway over 
country policy through possessing half the seats in the parliament of the Netherlands 
Antilles. In addition, the public utilities discussed here were owned by the island 
government and not the country.  
The political entity of St Kitts was delineated by the autonomy of Nevis within the 
federation. The situation of St Kitts and Nevis is roughly similar to that of the countries 
making up the United Kingdom. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have separate 
governments within the United Kingdom in addition to representation at Westminster, 
England only has its share of the British parliament. However, this national parliament 
at Westminster is filled by a majority of English seats. Similar to Scotland, Nevis was 
an autonomous territory within the federation, possessing its own council and 
government with a mandate for many local policies. St Kitts does not have its own 
government as such, but does have a majority of the seats in parliament and controls its 
own public utilities. 
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Government system 
A strong government system is chiefly characterized by a balance of power between the 
legislative, executive and judiciary branch, although many other forms of checks and 
balances are also required.126 The islands had some differences in their political systems, 
remnant of their different colonial rulers, yet the strength of the institutions seemed to 
be similar. 
Table 9 Government system in 2006 
 Aruba Curacao St Kitts 
Legislative Proportional, two 
large parties 
Proportional, many 
parties 
District, two large 
parties 
Executive Constitutional 
monarchy 
Constitutional 
monarchy 
Constitutional 
monarchy 
Judiciary Highest appeal court 
in The Netherlands 
Highest appeal court 
in The Netherlands 
Highest appeal court 
in United Kingdom 
Aruba was a single electoral constituency where the people elected a parliament through 
a system of proportional representation. Curacao also used proportional representations 
for both the elections for the islands council as the Netherlands Antilles parliament. St 
Kitts inherited the British parliamentary system and was divided into constituencies that 
selected a member of parliament through the first-past-the-post system. 
 Both Aruba and St Kitts developed a two-party system. In Aruba, the absolute 
majority had switched between the populist MEP and Christian-Democratic AVP, 
where St Kitts switched between the Fabian Labour party and populist People’s Action 
Movement. In both cases, both parties claimed different ideological roots, yet what 
distinguished them from each other were not so much general worldviews, as specific 
policies and constituencies. Most importantly, these parties tended to address their 
traditional backers and the respective interest of the day.  
                                                 
126  G. O’Donnell, ‘Horizontal accountability’, in A. Schedler et al., The self-restraining state: power 
and accountability in new democracies. (Colorado, Lynne Rieder, 1999). 
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Curacao had a more volatile political environment, producing a great amount of 
parties centred on a few key individuals. This forced the formation of coalitions in order 
to establish governments. As a result, the governments on Aruba and St Kitts were more 
stable than Curacao, both retaining the same party in office for the 2005-09 period 
studied here, while Curacao saw three governing coalitions. 
All three islands had their respective Queen as the nominal head of state, while 
the real power lay with the elected officials. In the case of Aruba, ministers were not a 
part of parliament, but the government had to be endorsed by a majority. In the case of 
Curacao and St Kitts, at the time of research, the ministers were part of the island 
legislatures. Aruba and St Kitts had developed larger roles for the prime minister, both 
domestically as leader of the party and internationally as representative of the country. 
In Curacao, the leader of the biggest party would usually be prime minister at the 
country level of the Netherlands Antilles, yet the role was also used to influence politics 
at the island level as well. 
The judiciary was an independent and separate branch in all of the three 
territories. In the case of Aruba and Curacao, judges and prosecutors were often 
deputised from their positions in the Netherlands. Two layers of courts were provided 
locally, but the final option for appeal could be taken in an overseas court. 
4.2.3 Quality of institutional design 
The key question is whether the institutional circumstances were sufficiently strong to 
allow for government success. The argument is made that the basic constitutional 
arrangements adopted, in combination with international checks and balances, provided 
for sufficient stability and control. 
The islands inherited and adopted constitutional arrangements that proved their 
value across history and topography. Both the British and Continental traditions on the 
 
95
separation of power have been implemented. Furthermore, a wider structure of checks 
and balances had been transmitted; through institutions like ombudsmen, audit 
chambers and rights associated with a strong democracy, such as freedom of expression, 
free press, right to appeal and so forth.127 It is true that certain institutions were not as 
powerful as their counterparts in Europe. For example, the Court of Auditors of Curacao 
did not have the same right to initiative as did Dutch counterpart. In addition, these 
supervising institutions would struggle to receive sufficient budget to effectively exert 
their duties.128 
However, a final safeguard was provided by connecting all the judiciary systems 
to the overseas high courts. The Dutch Supreme Court in The Hague was the ultimate 
opportunity for appeal for both Aruba and Curacao. Several cases were also brought 
successfully to the European Courts in Luxembourg and Strasbourg as Aruba and 
Curacao were associated European territories. Kittitian cases were referred to the Privy 
Council in London, whereas some provisions of the Caribbean Community could be 
brought to the Caribbean Court of Justice.  
These connections came with further involvement of the overseas powers. Based 
on the rules of the Kingdom Charter and its majority in the Kingdom government, the 
Dutch government could intervene if it felt democracy was under threat in any of its 
member countries.129 This has been used as an avenue to influence policies. For 
example, the lieutenant-governor of Curacao was chair of the local government, but also 
a representative of the Kingdom government with a mandate to veto policy to protect 
national interests.130 
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As a fully independent state, St Kitts had less stringent external controls. 
However, it was a signatory of the several UN charters on human rights, a member of 
the Commonwealth, the Caribbean Community and the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States. Several of its institutions were so tied in with international checks and 
balances, In addition to the courts mentioned above, St Kitts is also part of the Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank and shares defence arrangements with several of its neighbours. 
The influence of overseas powers is not necessarily positive. Beyond the formal 
sphere, the United States, Cuba and Venezuela would also strive for influence in the 
Caribbean region. Some would argue that this does not serve the interest of the 
islands.131 However, the aim is not find a perfect institutional system, but one that could 
provide some stability for government to become effective. Given the success of these 
islands in remaining democracies and the checks between the different branches of 
government, the formal institutional setup seems to allow for this. It could therefore be 
expected that the institutional design factors played their usual role in framing and 
enforcing decisions without obstructing government performance.  
4.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The socio-economic conditions should again be such that government performance is 
not ruled out by poor circumstances. One complication could be that the socio-
economic variables are a harder to investigate in isolation of the socio-cultural 
circumstances. Economic inequality, for example, could both be the cause and 
consequence of clientelist patronage. The focus will therefore be on the main 
characteristics of the economies on the island, while the subtleties will warrant further 
discussion when covering the dynamics of the interpersonal relationships. 
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4.3.1 Literature on islands economies 
Island economies are characterized by both a reliance on the outside world and a major 
role for government expenditure. Despite their peripheral position, islands are generally 
open economies. Almost two hundred years ago, Adam Smith praised the island of 
Curacao as a beacon of free trade which generated much wealth for its population.132 
Islands are compelled to openness either by necessity, with the need to import resources 
not available locally, or through their position in the world market. 
Yet having an open economy also brings certain risks. Briguglio argues that island 
states are vulnerable as they are heavily affected by minor changes in the world 
economy. Islands generally have little diversity in their income streams, relying on sole 
contributors such as tourism or oil. In addition, they have to cope with high transport 
costs and difficulties in accessing external capital.133 This means that small changes in 
the world economy can have great impact on local welfare. 
Briguglio argues that these vulnerabilities can be redressed by developing solid 
resiliency strategies. In the case of the Caribbean islands this entails solid protection of 
citizen property rights – be it through cross-Atlantic ties or the strength of the American 
sphere of influence – and the exploration of new revenue streams beyond tourism –such 
as telecommunication services or generating sustainable energy. This requires further 
development of their people as human capital, through good education, health and 
information technology. Such large-scale, collective programmes put the onus for 
development into the sphere of the government.134 
Governments generally tend to have a major role on islands anyway. The public 
sector would usually have a large stake in the overall expenditure, providing a large 
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share of the employment on islands. As summarised by Oostindie and Sutton: 
‘Government […] is often the largest employer of labour. The median wage bill of the 
public sector as a proportion of GDP in small states at 31% is significantly higher than 
in large developing countries where it stands at 21%. Public sector employment in the 
small islands of the Eastern Caribbean ranges between 20% of the workforce in 
Barbados to 40- 60% in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States.’135 
4.3.2 Economic conditions 
Economic development 
Aruba was not a wealth powerhouse during colonial times and was rather used for the 
breeding of horses and share-cropping. On Curacao, the Dutch took full benefit of its 
expansive natural harbour of Curacao and turned the island into a linking pin in the 
Atlantic trade routes. Different products of the surrounding colonies were exchanged 
here and slaves arrived from Africa to be sold on to the other colonies.136 
An oil refinery was built on both Aruba and Curacao at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, respectively by Standard Oil and Shell, to refine the oil found in 
Venezuela. Workers were drawn in from across the region. 137 Near the end of the 
century, both refineries were sold to new owners and continued only with a much 
smaller number of jobs, forcing the islands to find new sources of income. 
St Kitts chiefly relied on sugar cane production. Over the last decades of the 
twentieth century, the government effectively ran this industry, owning the land and 
processing facilities. However, the small scale of the island proved no competition for 
the large-scale production capacity of Brazil, and preferential access to the European 
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market was disbanded over the years. In 2005 the government abandoned its subsidy of 
the industry, forcing a major shift in the economy towards a service economy. 
 
Economic system 
In present times, the islands had reasonably high income when compared to their 
Caribbean peers, ranging between $15.000 and $25.000 per capita. In the case of St 
Kitts, it must be noted that after the survey had been concluded, the national debt had 
actually risen to a 185% ratio to Gross Domestic Product. This depressed the overall 
income towards $13,700 per capita in 2010, although the World Bank still qualified 
them as an ‘upper middle income’ country.138 
Table 10 Main economic indicators for 2008139 
 Aruba Curacao St. Kitts 
GDP $2,724 million $2,840 million  $780 million 
Economy Tourism, oil 
refinery 
Tourism, oil 
refinery, finance 
Tourism, financial 
services, agriculture 
GDP capita $25,831 ~$20,500140 $15,700141 
Inflation 3.4% 6.9%142 4.5% 
Unemployment 6.9% 14.7%143 4.2% 
Going beyond the total production of wealth on the islands, several indicators suggests 
that this money was not equally distributed across the population. In 2003 around one 
third of the people on Curacao lived below the poverty line, which was 60 per cent of 
                                                 
138  CIA, World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook, (Retrieved on 18 
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the GDP per capita.144 St Kitts had similar poverty rates, although it did achieve an 
improvement over the years. ‘[T]he Country Poverty Assessment conducted in 2007 
revealed a national poverty rate of 21.8 of individuals across St. Kitts and Nevis, with 
the situation being worse in St. Kitts than in Nevis. This [was] a marked reduction from 
levels above 30 % seen in 2000.’145 The disparity was probably smaller on Aruba, 
although differences were still significant with the top 10% earning more than five 
times as much as the bottom 10%.146 
These imbalances put questions marks by the economic conditions of the islands. 
High poverty and unemployment rate might increase the occurrence of dependency 
within the community. One redeeming feature of the economies was the presence of 
tourism as the main source of income. An advantage of tourism was that, unlike 
resources such as crude oil and diamonds, tourism seemed to be a better income source 
to spread money throughout the community.147 Both the hotel owner and the taxi driver 
benefit from this sector. 
The islands took slightly different approaches to the tourist market. On Aruba the 
majority of tourists hailed from North America, while Curacao also heavily targeted the 
Dutch market. St Kitts aimed to capture the top of the market, for example it agreed 
contracts with Marriott, rather than Holiday Inn. For all islands, the entry into the tourist 
market lead to a boom of casinos, hotels and other amusement opportunities, spurred on 
by the fierce competition between the different holiday destinations in the Caribbean. 
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Table 11 Main sources of employment148 
 Aruba Curacao St. Kitts 
Agriculture 0.4% 0.5% 10% 
Industry 33% 40% 30% 
Services 66% 59% 60% 
As demonstrated in the above table. Beyond tourism, both Aruba and Curacao retained 
some income from their refineries, with several thousands of people enjoying direct or 
indirect employment as a result.149 Curacao developed a considerable offshore service 
industry, although this is not yet on the scale of the Caymans or the Channel islands. St 
Kitts & Nevis also had a considerable off-shore industry, although most companies 
were registered on Nevis. St Kitts also acquired income through remittance monies, 
with Kittians sending around US$44 million home in 2008.150 
Some final streams of income lay beyond the direct gaze of the government, such 
as those stemming from drug trafficking and money laundering. Positioned between the 
supply in South America and the demand in Europe and North America, Curacao, for 
example, reportedly held a key role in cocaine trafficking.151 The size of the informal 
economy is always hard to assess, but its impact should not be discounted, especially 
when considering the networks in society. 
4.3.3 Quality of economic conditions 
On the whole, the economic conditions of these islands were not ideal, but still strong 
enough to allow for government performance. With the majority of income coming 
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from industries tied to the volatile world market –tourism and oil- these islands were 
susceptible to external shocks. However, many small countries find themselves in a 
similar position and are able to perform. In the case of these three islands, this is 
evidenced by the fact that they developed relatively high Gross Domestic Products per 
capita. 
A more problematic question is the distribution of wealth. On one hand, there are 
large groups of society living in poverty, which could strengthen clientelist dynamics. 
On the other hand, the fact that most money is earned from tourism, rather than capital 
intensive industries such as mining or oil, suggests that it would be possible to achieve a 
fair distribution.152 This is where good economics dovetails with good politics. Effective 
policies could generate wealth for more people, but as evidenced by the high debt ratio 
of St Kitts, the management of public money was not always strong. However, when 
compared to the region, in principle good governance ought not to be significantly 
hampered by the economic circumstances. 
4.4 SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS 
The chapter will now consider the socio-cultural circumstances of the islands. Again, 
the discussion will open with a brief consideration of the literature. Then, following the 
framework within social capital, the socio-cultural circumstances are evaluated in terms 
of structure, nature and expectations of relations. Unfortunately, in many cases there is 
not a large amount of statistical data available. However, drawing on the statistics, 
secondary literature and observations presented here, the argument is made that the 
social capital situation is challenging at the least. 
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4.4.1 Literature on island societies 
There are roughly two schools of thought on island societies: One declares it an ideal 
ecology for great governance, the other is more critical. The optimistic school of 
thought, exemplified by authors such as Lowenthal or Mansbridge, relies on the 
assumption that islands are inherently more corporatist than other societies because the 
interdependence of the community is more apparent due to their isolation and small 
size.153 It surely must be easier for a state to operate if everyone is only one handshake 
away from the minister and can observe directly what officials are doing.  
The underlying assumption here is that visibility and full-disclosure leads to trust. 
Yet, this school of thought equates knowing to trusting. The more pessimistic 
perspective argues that all this information, not tested for validity or relevance, may 
actually hinder trust.154 The positive assumptions mainly focus on the benefits of strong 
ties in a society and ignore the corresponding dangers. Taking a more negative view, 
Sanders concludes that islands have a very confrontational character and that all 
political battles are hard fought, precisely because they include a personal element.155  
The optimistic view also assumes that stability in society equates to fairness. 
Anckar and Anckar observe that island societies have a tendency to enforce a specific 
regime benefiting only a select few, whereby Western-style concepts of justice and 
harmony are actually thinly veiled instruments of coercion maintaining the status quo 
between patrons and clients.156 Regime structures are so powerful that they maintain an 
unfair division of power. 
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Baldachinno, usually quite optimistic about the governance of islands, advocates a 
careful consideration of each island society. ‘Corporatism doesn’t just happen and a 
[common] ethnic [identity] is not exactly a given. It would be wrong to succumb to the 
tempting simplicity of geographic determinism, arguing that smallness and insularity 
per se generate social capital, in some strange, almost automatic or natural manner. […] 
One needs to assess the extent to which an island people are exactly that: an articulated, 
island people.’157 
Generalisations of island societies may also ignore differences within an island 
population. Within a polity, a different group may have developed different forms of 
trust and connections. Ross, for example, observed that the elites in Russia were very 
well intra-connected, just as the people at the bottom knew each other well. However, 
there was no strong link between the top and the bottom, creating an hourglass type of 
society.158 Given this range of community types, the assessment of specific island 
societies should therefore proceed with caution and consideration. 
4.4.2  Structure of relations 
Social capital theory puts several demands on the structure of social relations. Firstly, 
social capital is considered high when there are a large number of associations available. 
Secondly, there should be sufficient ‘weak ties’ to prevent a convoluted and entangled 
social sphere. Thirdly, the ties need to also bind together the community around shared 
interests. The islands studied here seem to fail these three characteristics. 
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Quantity of civic associations 
A measurement of social capital in Putnam’s definition could start with a simple count 
of the associations on each of the islands. Unfortunately, there was no official data on 
the amounts of clubs and associations on Aruba, Curacao and St Kitts. The activity of 
several associations could be observed, including service clubs (Rotary, Lions), sporting 
clubs (football, basketball, cricket) and other types of networks (Carnival Troupes, 
Freemasons). However, a count based on direct observation could not hope to be 
complete and might accidentally count ‘uncivic’ connections. 
A further problem was that many clubs and societies had a religious foundation. 
Church-based groups would organise welfare, sports and education. As discussed 
earlier, Putnam applies a strict rule that certain church associations do not count towards 
social capital. 159 Yet ignoring these religion-based activities would discount a great 
number of connections that may still actually benefit society.  
A final problem is that a formalistic measurement, based on entries in the 
Chamber of Commerce, would constitute a bias towards the professionalised, secular 
organisations as favoured in North-Western Europe and White Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
America. For example, neighbourhood rotating credit unions were a very common 
occurrence in the English-speaking Caribbean, yet they would fail to show up in an 
informal count of associations.160 
While acknowledging these challenges, it would be useful to have an estimate of 
associations for the islands. One concrete measurement was available in the Yearbook 
of International Organisations. This global index lists the local chapters of all known 
international non-governmental organisations such as the Christian Democratic Women 
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of America, International Boxing Association or The International Federation of Trade 
Unions of Transport Workers. This measurement includes organisations with a religious 
tint, but does still ignore informal association activities.  
Next to being the one measurement that can actually be executed, the Yearbook 
has further benefits. International non-governmental organisations generally have strong 
credentials in order to be qualified as civic. Paxton uses them as a proxy for social 
capital because ‘[t]hey are an “idealized” version of all associations – those that would 
be expected to positively affect democracy. [International non-governmental 
organisations] have “resolutely democratic formal structures” […] and represent 
nonlocal ties amongst associations within a country as well as links to the larger global 
community.’161 Although not all organisations fit this rather idealized description, the 
general principle can be supported. The below table presents the results gathered. 
Table 12 Number of international organisations162 
Country Number of 
international NGOs 
Aruba 244 
Bahamas 759 
Barbados 951 
Curacao 130 
Italy 10,032 
Grenada 451 
Netherlands 9,462 
St Kitts 353 
St Vincent 407 
Trinidad & Tobago 1,235 
United Kingdom 10,862 
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If all the 300 countries and territories included were to be placed in a list, Aruba and 
Curacao would rank in the bottom quartile in terms of number of memberships. St. Kitts 
would just make it into the third quartile.163 Much of this low score can be explained by 
the small size and homogeneity of the islands. It is unlikely that the Association for the 
Conservation of Polar Bears has many members in the Caribbean.  
However, differences in size and diversity cannot explain everything. Grenada 
and St Vincent, with populations similar to that of Aruba and Curacao, possess more 
non-governmental activity than either of them. Barbados has only double the number of 
people as Curacao, yet has more than seven times its amount of associations. When 
assuming that the low level of international organisations is mirrored by a low level of 
local organisations, this data would point towards a relatively low social capital score 
for Aruba, Curacao and St Kitts. However, given the assumptions involved, this 
conclusion needs to be substantiated with further evidence. 
 
Bonding ties: Entanglement and personalism 
Social capital relies chiefly on connections that bring together people connected beyond 
close family or clan ties. However, as Coyne observes, such bridging connections rarely 
occur in island societies as political and bureaucratic relationships are entangled in all 
other bonding networks of the community.164 A politician can relate to a political 
adversary who is also a relative, business client, schoolmate and neighbour. From the 
perspective of Granovetter, these islands are awash in ‘strong ties’ which hampers 
effective government performance. 
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People have to navigate between all the different interests involved and, even 
despite good intentions; all professional relations are likely to become captured in more 
personalised attitudes. Beyond the personal problems this entanglement creates, a 
macro-governance complication emerges when the different checks and balances cannot 
move independently from each other. Baldacchino argues that the state and civil society 
on islands are so interwoven that their separation is ‘a mere theoretical quirk.’165  
Relevant for this research project, this entanglement goes directly against the ideal 
types of the Weberian bureaucracy these islands nominally imported. The offices of 
state are identified with their individual bearers, rather than the legal role of the 
position, imploding the private and the public persona in to one.166 The 
interconnectedness of roles makes it risky to counter powerful players. One director of 
the utilities was warned by his own boss not to get into a fight with the CEO of the 
utility. As the same utility was a big client of the company, this would mean trouble for 
the boss.167 It is hard to check abuses of power in such circumstances. 
The combination of personal and public roles nurtured a rather vicious type of 
debate as displayed in the political sphere. Three examples can be given of such 
personal attacks on public figures: The CEO of the telecommunication operator owned 
by the government of Curacao called a press conference to discuss the recent criticism 
on their cooperation with a data centre. He opened the conference with stating that the 
inquisitive Member of Parliament was ‘a coward, abuser and impotent’.168 
On St. Kitts, the opposition had placed a sign right opposite the house of prime 
minister Denzil Douglas, who trained as a medical doctor before going into politics. 
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Appealing to his failure to enact healthcare reform, the sign asked in large letters; ‘How 
many more must die, Denzil? You have failed.169 
An Aruban member of the opposition attacked a member of the ruling party for 
sitting next to the minister for Health: ‘I cannot understand how you can sit next to him, 
even when you know that your father died because of his policies as a minister of 
Health. He sent him to Venezuela, while your father should have gone to the 
Netherlands for an operation and now he is dead.’170 
These statements were fundamentally personal attacks on the opposite number 
made on record and none of the statements were retracted. According to several 
interviewees, it seemed that politicians typically besmirched each other and that no one 
was left untouched. ‘You cannot have an inspirational figure like Obama around here. 
Everything is too personal and they would take even him down.’171 
One could take a more optimistic view and conclude that these societies are both 
very ‘personal and highly transparent’.172 Munneke tries to turn their weakness into 
strengths and argues that one should put this Weberian separation between the private 
and public sphere aside and rely on social cohesion to govern the relation between 
officials and the public.173 An Aruban respondent echoed this sentiment: ‘We are 
sometimes accused of being too top-down on this island, as public initiatives almost 
invariably originate from within government. But the government is the people; 
everything is bottom-up around here because of the scale.’174  
However, this inclusiveness assumes that there is a shared agreement on the 
common good. Actors can also use the proximity within the system to form criminal 
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alliances. As Huberts and Nelen detail, acts of corruption require a lot of trust as well, 
as the partners in crime need to know the other individual is reliable.175 Within small 
societies these pacts can be quickly formed and easily monitored.  
 
Bridging ties: Political schisms 
This turns the discussion from the bonding ties within communities to the bridging 
connections across society. It is important to investigate both, as a plurality of bonding 
ties within a community may not coincide with bridging ties between communities. 
Small countries especially have a mixed track-record when considering their 
cohesiveness. On the one hand, Clarke finds that small-scale countries ‘divided by race’ 
are usually a spectacular disaster, citing the countries of Equatorial Guinea and Fiji as 
examples of bad and unstable government.176 On the other hand, Lijphart notes that 
Mauritius and Trinidad & Tobago are the best performing Third World countries with 
multi-ethnic populations.177  
An important difference between these countries versus Aruba, Curacao and St. 
Kitts, is that the latter did not have several ethnic groupings of equal sizes. Instead, 
there was a large majority of one specific ethnicity and much smaller minorities of other 
groups. For example, Aruba was mostly white-identified with an ethnically mixed 
minority. Curacao was mostly black-identified with several much smaller groups of 
ethnicities. It could be argued that one group could exercise control alone, without a 
need to negotiate with the much smaller parties, there was no need for a society wide 
bargain found under consociational arrangements. 
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St Kitts had a largely homogenous population. There were some division between 
churches and villages, but the main lines did not seem to be drawn on geography or 
ethnicity. By contrast, a myriad of division could be drawn through Curacao, with a 
multitude of lines of separation: Black versus white, white Protestants versus white 
Jews, born islanders versus recent immigrants, Dutch speakers versus Papiamento 
speakers, north side of the island versus south side of the island, etc.178 However, given 
the diversity, it could also be argued that Curacao was rather stable. 
Aruba had a more homogenous population, although the work of Alofs shows that 
ethnic divisions did exist. The main division lay between the white majority on the 
north of the island, and the large group of black people on the south of the island who 
originally had come to Aruba to work at the refinery. The southern town would be 
derogatorily referred to as ‘Chocolate city’ by some other citizens.179  
However, many individuals would still be able to cross these divisions. In the 
political sphere, however, the lines seemed to be drawn more sharply. In both St Kitts 
and Aruba, a two-party system had evolved, with the two alternating in office for the 
last decades. There was a strong culture of ‘either with us or against us’ in both polities, 
with precious few individuals straddling the divides. In Curacao, the factions were more 
fluid, caused by the coalition system, whereby unlikely combinations sometimes had to 
be made in order to establish a government.  
In line with the aforementioned personalism, political grouping tended to organise 
themselves around individuals. Specific party leaders would be able to break away on 
their own and take their followers with them. This is evidenced by the high incidence of 
preference voting on Aruba and Curacao. On Curacao, 50% of the votes would be cast 
for the specific individuals on the party lists, rather than the party and its idea as a 
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whole. On Aruba, this rate stood at 60%.180 Beyond these personal funds of power, the 
main division existed between those in versus those out of power. As will be discussed 
when referring to the zero-sum strategies used, actors in office would ruthlessly 
maximise their returns while in office, disregarding the needs of the minority.181 
4.4.3 Nature of relations 
Next to the structure of relations, social capital theory also places several requirements 
on the nature of relations in order for them to be qualified as civic. Most importantly, 
they need to be of an equal nature, creating an exchange between partners, rather than a 
power relation between master and subject.182 They should work towards the benefit of 
the wider communities, rather than an ‘amoral familism’ hurting the general interest.183 
Again, there are several elements in the nature of social relations on these islands which 
undermine the social capital conditions.  
 
Inequality: The land of the blind 
Next to the socio-economic circumstances discussed, there are other drivers for 
inequality on these islands. Baldacchino suggests that a chronic deficiency of human 
resources in both numbers and quality will also lead to imbalance.184 People with a 
slight advantage in skills can quickly acquire several key positions within society as 
there are few competitors. Unqualified people are awarded with disproportionate 
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responsibilities and authority is concentrated in the few hands of those that have but a 
little extra qualification.185  
For example, it requires well-trained individuals to run the bureaucracies adopted 
from Europe. This would restrict the pool of candidates to those with at least a tertiary 
education, although some self-taught individuals may also qualify. The table below 
indicates the level of educational attainment per island, highlighting how small the 
group of candidates then becomes. 
Table 13 Educational attainment 
 Aruba186 Curacao187 St Kitts188 
Primary 41% 24% 20% 
Secondary 43% 64% 54% 
Tertiary 8% 11% 
University 
16% 
3% 7% 
Based on these figures, around 4,000 people had a university degree on Curacao and 
2,450 actors had a university degree on St Kitts. Assuming a similar division between 
tertiary and university education for Aruba, the specific data was not available, around 
6,000 people had achieved a university education over there. Relative to many 
developing countries, these were certainly not bad figures. However, as discussed, the 
governments on these islands were modelled on countries were the educational 
attainment had risen to higher levels in the recent decades.189  
It can furthermore be argued that the pool of talent was restricted even more by 
further selection effects. A large part of the target audience may choose to avoid the 
political hassle and focus on a business career. In addition, in the factionist nature of the 
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public debate on the islands, many qualified individuals were actively ignored or 
excluded, restricting the scope of people to a limited number of key individuals.  
As a consequence of these effects, people with only a slight edge in skills receive 
a disproportionate amount of responsibility, often staking together different roles. 
Baldachinno refers to this effect as ‘status incongruence.’190 Farrangan concludes 
optimistically that this gives policy entrepreneurs the liberty to shape services.191 
However, this hypothetical benefit should translate to higher quality of service on 
islands, which does not seem to materialize universally. Instead, it seems to become 
rather lonely at the top without any peers. One highly educated government minister 
commented: ‘There is effectively no one who can stop me from doing what I want. I 
have the power and the knowledge. This is a very frightening thought. I should be 
opposed, I cannot always be right.’192 
 
Inequality: Past and present discourses 
In the framework of social capital, the history of power relations within a community is 
said to shape current attitudes to power. Putnam argues that the poor social capital 
setting in southern Italy stems from the feudal arrangement of Norman rule. A similar 
reliance on historical experience would give the islands an even stronger hierarchical 
slant; colonialism, slavery and institutionalised racism played a large role in the 
formation of the island communities. Although there are differences between the 
experiences of the islands, some parallels are significant. 
As previously mentioned, slavery has an enduring legacy in the Caribbean islands, 
along with institutional racism and colonialism. Due to the economic differences, the 
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three islands had slightly different arrangements, but slavery was present on all for 
islands for several centuries. The British passed the Slavery Abolition Act in 1833, 
while the Dutch abolished slavery in 1863. Yet the influence of enslavement, in other 
New World societies of Jamaica, Cuba and Brazil, for example, has also been traced to 
such things as language, family structure and attitudes to employment.193  
One such legacy of enslavement is that skin colour remained a social determinant 
on all three islands. Lipschutz referred to such a colour-based worldview as 
‘pigmentocracy.’194 The interviewees on Aruba and Curacao commented that the 
refineries were segregationist in their employment practices, appointing white 
Americans or Europeans as part of the management and segregating them in gated 
communities on the islands. The black workers were usually given the lowest positions 
on the plant, a situation that only started changing in the second half of the twentieth 
century. 195  
Following Putnam’s approach, religion would also have to be included as a factor 
of inequality. The majority of Aruba and Curacao inhabitants described themselves as 
Roman Catholic, with a sizable population existing on St Kitts. Putnam comments that 
the Protestant ethic, as found in the Low Countries and the United Kingdom, 
encourages a more egalitarian world view.196 However, this approach poses the question 
whether all Protestant organisations were benign and all Roman Catholic arrangements 
malign. It seems harsh and incomplete to ignore the positive effect the Roman Catholic 
Church had. For example, the Roman Catholic Church ran large parts of the schooling 
system in all three islands and also began to de-segregate higher church offices. 
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An observation of Putnam that those seem to hold is that new associations were 
often cast in the mould of the old hierarchical ones. In sync with the wider uprising of 
black minorities in the 1960s, there was a public revolt on the island of Curacao in 
1969, leading to a handover of power to a new generation of black leaders. However, 
some are disappointed by the failure of the promise of such anti-colonial activism. One 
observer commented that little had changed: ‘They merely replaced white power with 
black power. […] When they took their first ride in the government cars after being 
elected in the offices, they waited stubbornly in the back for the chauffeur to open the 
door. “Now it is my turn to be served,” they said, even if that was exactly what we 
fought against.’197 
This brings the discussion to present day perceptions of power and inequality. To 
some extent the old relationships were replicated into new clientelist attitudes as 
physical enslavement became economic dependence. Citizens now had to turn to 
powerful patrons for money and employment. 
It is difficult to provide data on these relations of patronage, figures on corruption 
and preference voting gives some indication, but may only scratch at the surface. In a 
qualitative review of Curacao, Marcha and Verweel argue that the island is ruled by a 
‘culture of fear’, whereby actors are guarded against offending powerful individuals, 198  
An illustration of such an informal but asymmetric relations was provided by one 
respondent who explained why he distrusted politicians: ‘I helped a politician with his 
campaign once; sticking up flyers, making house calls, you name it. In return, I had 
expected he would arrange a private pension for me. But the only thing I got from him 
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was a new shower cabin. He controls all these government funds and he only gives me a 
shower. It shows that you just can’t trust them.’199 
Clientelism here combines with personalism; people think in terms of dependence 
and in addition have a specific name of the individual who should provide for them. 
Van Leeuwen observes that these relationships are still governed by constraints, be it by 
shame rather than guilt.200 This limits the dominant actor in the relationship, yet it is the 
obligation of a lord, rather than a boss. Expectations of cooperation 
4.4.4 Expectations of relations 
The final element of social capital is the expectations actors have of cooperation. This 
interpersonal trust would ideally be measured directly. Unfortunately, the World Value 
Survey or similar data sets did not cover Aruba, Curacao and St Kitts. What can be 
presented is some figures on participation in politics, the perception of corruption and 
own observations on the attitudes towards cooperation. 
 
Participation in politics 
It could be hypothesised that voter turnout reflects a trust in the political sphere.201 If 
this relationship is really so straightforward, a high voter turnout would equate to 
positive expectations of the government. If this is true, the scores of the islands would 
be reasonable, as presented in the table below. 
                                                
For Aruba, Curacao and St Kitts, voter turnout ranged between 66% and 85%. 
There are several islands societies obtaining a lower score, although the Bahamas leaves 
all of them far behind with 92%. However, Barbados has a lower turnout of 63%. Yet 
this relatively low score is contradicted by the excellent performance of Barbados on the 
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Corruption Perception Index (see below). This suggests that the relationship between 
trust and turnout is not so straightforward. 
Table 14 Voter turnout 
Country Voter turnout202 
Aruba 85% 
Bahamas 92% 
Barbados 63% 
Curacao 66% 
Italy 81% 
Grenada 80% 
Netherlands 75% 
St Kitts 84% 
St Vincent 62% 
Trinidad & Tobago 69% 
United Kingdom 66% 
Putnam argues that voter turnout may actually be part of the patron-client system.203 As 
these are secure institutional settings, the international powers and judiciary will 
guarantee free and fair elections, patrons need to bolster their power through the voting 
booth. This means they have to corral clients into voting for them.  
Putnam measures this effect by personal preference voting: Candidates of the 
same party are ordered in one list on the ballot paper, people voting for the number two 
or lower are not voting for the ideas of the party, but for the individual.204. This is 
supported by the great degree of individual preference voting on the island.  
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As St Kitts had a first-past-the-post system, it was not possible to apply this 
measurement. On Curacao, around 50 per cent of the votes were individual preference 
votes.205 Aruba had an even greater number reaching 60 per cent.206 The evidence for the 
other islands seems to support the idea that the voter turnout might actually be a 
manifestation of patronage, rather than trust. 
 
Perception of corruption 
Another approach to the measurement of trust is to look at the Corruption Perception 
Index published by Transparency International. However, in the peer group of islands, a 
complete measurement was only conducted for Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago. 
Aruba, Curacao and St Kitts only had one data point per survey, which Transparency 
International itself did not warrant reliable enough to include the countries in the overall 
index. These numbers, as presented below, are chiefly about the ‘ease of doing 
business’ and the legislation put in place, and not the perception of corruption. 
Table 15 Corruption Perception Index207 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Aruba 3.7 3.5 5.4 6.1 5.6 
Barbados 8.5 8.5 6.7 6.9 7.0 
Netherlands Antilles 3.7 3.5 3.5 5.2 5.4 
Italy 4.8 5.0 4.9 5.2 4.8 
Netherlands 8.7 8.6 8.7 9.0 8.9 
St Kitts 3.7 3.5 3.5 5.2 5.4 
St Vincent 3.7 3.5 3.8 N/A N/A 
Trinidad & Tobago 4.2 3.8 3.2 3.4 3.6 
United Kingdom 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.4 7.7 
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When taking into account the limitations of the observations, two things can still be 
observed. Firstly, although only based on the strength of legislation, these three islands 
improved over the period studied. This suggests that the government system was putting 
measures in place to stem corruption. Whether this actual changed the practice of 
corruption cannot be gleaned from this table. Secondly, through the case of Barbados, 
where business people were actually asked about the practice of corruption, it is shown 
that islands can actually develop trusting environments. 
In the case of Curacao, a separate survey was executed in 2005 which actually 
asked the general public about their perception of corruption. The questionnaire found 
that 64% of the respondents felt that their personal and family life suffered from the 
effects of corruption. The surveyed people felt that 92% of the government and 91% of 
society was affected by corruption, even the business sector was thought to be heavily 
affected with a score of 83%.208 Unfortunately, no similar surveys could be found for the 
other islands, leaving the assessment of corruption open to further speculation. 
 
The winner takes all 
An alternative to trying to measure interpersonal trust is to assess the strategies people 
employ when cooperating. In high social capital environments, the cooperation would 
be geared towards common gain and synergy, as people have learned from earlier 
experiences that this generates the best results. At least within the political sphere, this 
did not some to be case for the islands. 
As referenced earlier, there is great debate between the scholars whether islands 
are not by default more corporatist then other communities.209 Selwyn Ryan refutes this 
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with the title of his standard work on island politics: The Winner takes All.210 Just 
because actors are forced to work together because of the small setting does not mean 
that they will work together constructively. 
As the arena is very small with only a few players, there is a real opportunity to 
dominate everything by making only a few alliances. In a larger game setting, it would 
be very hard for two players to collude in coercing the others, as the majority would 
break them up. In a smaller setting, it is possible to form a cartel and bypass other 
checks and balances. Actors see their particularistic gain within reach, rather than being 
forced to aim for a collectively beneficial compromise.211 This creates an opportunity to 
maximise returns whilst in power. 
This pessimistic view on power does collide with the some causal observations on 
the daily mode of interactions in the Caribbean. An example often given by respondents 
on Aruba and Curacao is that the annual Carnivals, involving several thousands of 
participants and volunteers, seem to demonstrate that the community can also come 
together for a mutual gain. Marcha and Verweel address this discrepancy by suggesting 
that trust may not only be different between groups, but also between settings. When 
people interact in informal settings –bars, shops, neighbourhoods, etc. - there is 
generally a high degree of interpersonal trust. When moving to formal interactions – 
government, offices, courts- this trust evaporates. Potentially, this could relate to the 
fact that these formal settings used to be the domain of the colonial overlords. 212 
In this case, the formal sphere of government would qualify as a low-trust 
environment. Peters supports this view with a poignant description of government in the 
Caribbean. ‘What is peculiar about the Eastern Caribbean political system is the 
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absolute authority that the government somehow inherits. Government officials are able 
to circumvent laws that they have enacted. They are able to use public resources for 
their personal gain.  
While partisan politics is a normal phenomenon in modern democracies, 
Caribbean governments have taken the concept to its zenith. As a result, when a party is 
elected to power it virtually eliminates the opposition through patronage, control of the 
media, and legislative action where necessary.’213 This idea seems to be accepted even 
by the losers of the power struggle. Reflecting on the one-sided approach of the 
government, an opposition member commented: ‘Of course I don’t like it. But you 
know, it is their turn now.’214 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the institutional, economic and social conditions of the three 
islands. From both an institutional and economic perspective, conditions may not have 
been ideal, but were strong enough to at least allow for government success. From a 
social perspective, the conditions were much more challenging. 
The assessment of the structure of relations firstly revealed a low quantity of 
international civic organisations, which could suggest there were a low number of local 
associations as well. In addition, relations were characterized by an overdose of strong 
ties and reoccurring rifts between individuals, groups and parties. The nature of 
relations was influenced by systemic inequalities and patterns of patronage. The 
expectations of cooperation seemed to still be diverse, with some indicators suggesting 
that parts of the population had some confidence in the government. This might suggest 
that the exact form of trust could differ between contexts, an idea which warrants 
further attention throughout this thesis. 
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On the whole, the social capital setting is challenging at the least. The structure, 
nature and expectations of relations do not comply with the ideal standards. The kind of 
government dynamics this situation produces is the subject of the next chapter. 
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5. RICH DESCRIPTION: KNOW EVERYTHING, BELIEVE 
NOTHING 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of chapter 
Before employing more systematic analytical tools later on in the thesis, the current 
chapter will cede the floor to the actors themselves. It aims to capture how the 
interviewed politicians, civil servants and citizens thought about the public utilities. 
Drawing on interview quotes, newspaper clippings and company data, this chapter 
provides a rich sketch or ‘thick description’ of the sixteen cases.215 In the absence of a 
rigid methodology, it is not yet the aim to separate the successful from the failing 
utilities, but rather to understand the daily reality as faced by the officials of these 
organisations. 
 
Content of chapter 
This chapter is divided along the lines of the three main components of social capital; 
the structure, nature and expectations of relations. The broad questions as defined in the 
methodology chapter will function as the guideline in this stage of the exploration. 
Before going through these components, it will first give an initial glimpse of the 
performance of the public utilities. However, without using any measurements, the aim 
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is to give a qualitative account of the biggest questions discussed during the period of 
research in these policy fields. 
The next step is the description of the structure of the relations, surveying the 
different actors involved and the formal and informal rules governing them. This will be 
followed by a review of the nature of the relations, focussing chiefly on the many 
imbalances in resource allocation between the actors as perceived by the interviewees. 
The final part looks at the overall expectations of relations in the governance of these 
utilities, as held by the elite actors interviewed. 
In a reflection of the majority sentiment of the interviewees, this chapter mainly 
describes the many problems encountered by the actors. The governance of utilities 
faces similar challenges to those seen in other countries. As anywhere in the world, 
there are some specific tensions between the aims of the politicians versus those of 
managers, creating conflict around short versus long term interest or general versus 
individual goods.  
However, the extra problems stacked on top of these inherent challenges suggest 
that effective governance on these islands might be an impossible job. In line with the 
pattern of the relationships in the communities, the lines of accountability within the 
governance structure were perceived to be muddled and perverted. The uneven 
distribution of resources between the actors suggests further problems. The overall 
mind-set is one of convolution, dependency and lack of faith in the potential for good 
government. 
5.2 PERFORMANCE: CHALLENGES FOR GOVERNANCE 
Performance within the utility fields can be approached through four key outcomes: 
products, profits, personnel and prestige. This chapter does not yet measure how well 
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the different utilities balanced these ends, but does give a first insight in the issues faced 
by the officials between 2005-2009. 
Firstly, the products provided by the utilities – electricity, drinking water, 
transport, waste collection – are of vital importance to the community These services 
critically affect the health, safety and prosperity of the island. If a democratic 
government is unable to ensure an adequate provision, its very legitimacy as a 
government will be questioned. As a universally desired resource, utility products are 
also susceptible to inclusion in patronage relationships. Free or low-cost electricity, 
landing rights or shipping contracts are potentially valuable gifts to specific clients or 
voters at large. 
Secondly, public utilities can potentially generate large financial profits. For 
politicians, these revenues could be used for other parts of the public budget; like 
pension funds or infrastructure investments. It is also possible to curry some electoral 
favour by keeping the costs down for all citizens or specific sectors of the economy. If 
the management itself controls the revenue, it could employ the money for wider rent-
seeking activities, using it to sponsor social activities or expand its role in the economy. 
Alternatively, the proceeds could be tapped into private pockets by anyone who gets 
their hands on it; through awarding high stipends to friends or straight-out 
embezzlement. 
Warwick here suggests a useful distinction between ‘wet’ versus ‘dry’ agencies. 
The former group (such as immigration services, police, public works) potentially 
generate a strong cash flow and ample opportunities for embezzlement, whereas the 
latter group (education, accounting) provide little of such opportunities.216 The sixteen 
utilities researched here, with their relatively large income streams and procurement 
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budgets, would be part of the ‘wet’ set. However, these large income streams also 
brings along large risks. An ill-advised or badly implemented utility initiative may costs 
the government dearly. 
Thirdly, the opportunities for employment within the utility sector are significant. 
Most of the agencies studied here ranked as one of the largest employers on the islands, 
also offering the highest paid jobs within the public sector. They thereby form a 
valuable way for politicians to quickly generate jobs for their voters, if not for 
themselves after retirement from the political arena. On a more individual basis, a 
patron could hardly do better than to deliver a supporter a comfortable or sought after 
job at one of the utility providers. 
Finally, running the utility gives access to prestige. Status is important to any 
politician, possibly even more so on a small island where everyone is very visible.217 
Controlling the island’s chief oil supplier or main access point for the tourists lends any 
official the mantle of statesmanship. Being seen to control a utility is therefore almost 
more important than actually being in control. 
With these resources at stake, the utility policy fields attract a lot of attention from 
politicians, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and citizens alike. From this it could follow that 
the discussed mix of patronage, power struggles and personalism focuses around these 
utilities, making them an interesting empirical set for this research initiative. The 
paragraphs below give some insight into how these tensions played out within the four 
year period, providing an indication of the size of the organisations and the main 
questions debated. This analysis is chiefly based on the stories as told by the ministers, 
CEOs and directors responsible for the respective public utilities. 
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5.2.1 Airport 
On all three islands, the growth of the airport was an essential part of the development 
of the community. Airports formed the lifeline for these islands; Flights were not only 
the fastest link to the outside world, but also brought in the all-important long-stay 
tourists. While cruise tourists only spend a couple of hours and dollars on the islands, 
long-stay tourists provide a more meaningful income to the local economy.  
Curacao was the busiest of the three airports, closely followed by Aruba, both 
being much larger than St Kitts. In 2008 Aruba processed 18,563 landings and Curacao 
22,373, while St Kitts only received 9,446.218 Equally in terms of passengers, Curacao 
hosted 1,4 million and Aruba 967.710 visitors, while St Kitts processed only 350.727.219 
During the period researched, the attention focussed mainly on the international 
strategy these airports should pursue. In addition, airports were also a focal point of 
more traditional government task such as revenue and security, usually in the form of 
deputising customer officials, security guards and air traffic controllers to the public 
corporation. 
The governments therefore took a keen interest in developing the services and 
international reputation of their airports, although their role was formally only at arm’s 
length. On Aruba, the government invested heavily in a new airport building in 2000 
and was expectant of some return. In 2005 it signed an agreement with Amsterdam 
Schiphol Airport, whereby Schiphol provided a CEO and assistance in promoting Aruba 
airport.220 
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Curacao was then not as big a destination of Aruba and attracted an external lease 
partner in 2000 to build and manage a new terminal building. Many people were 
dissatisfied with the new building and the partnership ended in 2007. A new 
commercial consortium was brought in to take over the management. The other major 
issue between 2005 and 2009 was a tussle over whether Curacao should become a hub 
for flights between North and South America.221 
St Kitts declared its airport key to its shift from the sugar industry towards 
tourism. The airport was much less developed than on the other two islands, receiving 
far fewer passengers. The most important issue was to extend the facilities to 
accommodate wide-bodied aircraft and lure in more flights from Europe and North 
America. 
5.2.2 Seaport 
The ports are the traditional entry point for the islands and still have that function for 
cargo and cruise passengers. As virtually all goods had to be imported – only St Kitts 
had a domestic agriculture of any significance – the tariffs at the ports directly 
influenced the prices paid by the end-consumers. 
Furthermore, cruise tourists provided a growing market for all the islands, 
requiring heavy investment in infrastructure and marketing. There was a strong 
competition between the Caribbean islands vying for the favour of the handful of cruise 
liner organisations. Aruba drew in the most passengers, reaching 556,090 in 2008, while 
in the same year Curacao attracted 355,121 and St Kitts 377,009 visitors.222 
For Aruba, the major challenge between 2005 and 2009 was to get all 
stakeholders to agree on a move of the port facilities. Their location between the city 
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centre and hotel zone had become too small and it was agreed that the area could be put 
to much more lucrative use by developing it as another tourist zone. This move was 
accompanied by a proposal to liberalise the formally closed stowage market. Both 
initiatives required a lot of political energy, but eventually a consensus was reached.223 
Curacao possesses one of the best natural harbours in the world, and this harbour 
is positioned at the heart of the island and its economy. Next to cargo and cruise 
services, a large refinery located on the harbour front generated much traffic. In 
addition, the island also had a dry dock for ship repairs. The central question was how 
Curacao would further capitalize on its natural resources. The long-term future of the 
refinery, which emits a high degree of pollutants, was perpetually in doubt. The port 
authority tried to develop additional activities in the tug boat market, while the oil 
distribution company used the bays of Curacao for oil bunkering. 
St Kitts integrated its policy for the sea port with that of the airport, joining the 
management in one public agency. Since 2005 the main questions centred on extending 
the facilities to make St Kitts a first-class cruise destination, requiring investment in 
marketing, docking facilities and building hurricane defences. The aim of the cruise 
terminal was to draw in high-class cruise ships and thereby had to compete with the 
many other popular islands just nearby.  
5.2.3 Bus system 
The public transportation system was of vital importance to a specific section of 
the population, despite the small size of the island. For those who could not afford their 
own car, buses were the only way to get to work. The weather and the roads were ill-
suited for cycling and there were no other public transport systems on the islands. With 
only a limited constituency of generally poorer customers, the public transport system 
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was vulnerable to neglect. In addition, the minivan drivers were usually quite well-
organised, leading to tensions between the public and private transport providers. 
At the period of the research, Aruba managed around 48 busses and 100 
employees, while Curacao had 40 buses and 150 employees.224 St Kitts had privatized 
its public transport. There was a lively market of private minivans serving the more 
populated parts of the islands.  
Aruba was served by one traffic artery along its west coast and actively tried to 
promote the use of buses by locals and tourists alike to ease traffic congestion. The 
main challenge in the past years was updating the fleet and making the company less 
dependent on government subsidy by exploring additional streams of revenue. A 
recurrent theme was the on-going battle between the minivans and the public buses over 
who could serve the lucrative hotel zone. 
On Curacao, buses were vital to serve the poor and those living in peripheral areas 
where minivans would not go. The bus company was almost bankrupt in the 1990s, but 
was brought back from the brink. The company continued to suffer from structural 
underinvestment and the main priority for 2005 to 2009 was to build a large enough 
fleet to serve all the lines. 
5.2.4 Drinking water 
For all the salt sea water available, drinking water is often not a cheap commodity. 
Historically islanders relied on storing the rain water. An increase in consumption, and 
decrease in storage facilities with the development of modern housing, increased the 
reliance on the public system of desalination. At the time of the research, Aruba 
produced 13.1 million m3 per year, while Curacao went through 12.8 million m3 per 
                                                 
224  Amigoe, http://www.amigoe.com/aruba/80733-gemiddeld-salaris-6000-florin-bij-arubus, 
(Retrieved 31 August 2011). Arubus, http://arubus.com/, (Retrieved 31 August 2011). Autobusbedrijf 
Curacao, http://www.businesscuracao.com/abcbusbedrijf, (Retrieved 31 August 2011). 
 
132
year. St Kitts produced 3.3 million m3.225 As an essential daily product, debates usually 
focused on the reliability of the supply and its price.  
The drinking water on both Aruba and Curacao was provided by the general 
utility company, which also produced the electricity, through the process of 
desalination. As this is an energy-intensive process, the main challenge in recent years 
was the rising oil price. This directly impacted the water price, drawing heavy criticism 
from the population. On Curacao, another major issue was the high amount of water 
loss, either through leaks or illegal tapping, with the corporation being accused of losing 
20% to 30% of the water.226 St Kitts could still solely rely on natural spring water, 
tapping the rainforest on its mountain flanks and underground reservoirs. However, as 
the tourism industry and economic development accelerates, water usage threatens to 
overtake supply.227 
5.2.5 Electricity supply 
As everywhere, the islands relied on electricity to give them access to the production 
means of the twenty-first century, most importantly information technology and air-
conditioners. On all islands, the electricity was chiefly produced through burning oil, 
making the tariffs vulnerable to oil price shocks. As the larger islands and economies, 
Aruba and Curacao had a far greater electricity production than St Kitts. Aruba and 
Curacao produced 790 million kWh and 844 million kWh respectively, while St Kitts 
(even including Nevis) produced 130 million kWh at the time of the research.228 The 
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main challenge for all the islands was to match provisions with the increase in demand 
as new residences, industries and hotels were developed.  
Aruba saw a huge investment in its electricity network in the 1990s, prompted by 
the demand for reliable energy for the hotels. The issues since 2005 centred on the 
rising oil price, made more delicate as the oil was supplied by the refinery on the island. 
In a reaction, the island initiated several wind farms, at one stage declaring their 
ambition to become a carbon-neutral holiday destination. 
On Curacao a similar dynamic played out, with the government opting to involve 
a third party to build a wind turbine park. The most important encounters concerned the 
electricity tariffs.229 The government blocked a rise in tariffs to match the rising energy 
prices, prompting the management to go to court against its own shareholder. Citing 
clauses in the contract made with the external investors – banks and minority 
shareholders – the management won the case. Another problem was the occurrence of 
power cuts. The management argued that this was an improvement from the complete 
blackouts the islands had suffered in the past. 
On St Kitts, the electricity department had to increase its energy production to 
match the needs of the growing tourism industry, opting to buy new diesel generators. 
There was also the intention to corporatise the energy department to allow for more 
external lending. The spike in oil prices forced the government to implement a 
controversial fuel charge. However, the most critical moment occurred when a blackout 
struck just as the entire population was watching the election of the first African 
American president in the USA, Barack Obama. An angry mob gathered outside the 
prime minister’s home and demanded his immediate resignation.230 
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5.2.6 Gasoline distribution 
Curacao was the only island to have government control of the distribution of gasoline. 
The company had previously been owned by Shell and the government bought this 
company to control the gasoline market after their departure. Between 2005 and 2009, 
political debate centred on rising gasoline prices and the good or evil of having a 
government company running this industry.  
Frequently, the government would not raise the tariffs at the pump, forcing the 
company to sell below the price it had bought the oil. To generate extra cash, the 
company started trading oil in the international market. The revenues increased toward 
three to four hundred million US dollars, creating large profits which were paid out as 
dividend to the central government.231 This initiative was discredited, however, when 
two employees were accused of running their own side business undermining the 
corporation.232 
5.2.7 Waste management 
The effective management of waste was vital on these islands that had little space but 
large consumption. This was of even greater importance when considering their reliance 
on tourism, whereby a clean image is everything. Aruba produced around 200,000 tons 
of waste a year, followed by Curacao with around 180,000 ton per year. St Kitts was 
again smaller, collecting around 45,000 tons per year at the end of the research period.233 
Aruba ran its own waste management service through a quasi-independent 
company, which received its budget from general funds. There was precious little 
investment in equipment or personnel, leading to a frequent breakdown of service. As a 
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consequence, Aruba saw the emergence of a private competitor catering to the 
businesses on the island. 
On Curacao, the recently separated government agency went through a major 
move of professionalisation at the beginning of the 2000s. They received their finances 
from separate tariffs collected by the electricity company and were able to invest in staff 
and equipment. As people became accustomed to the present success, there was 
growing public pressure to move forward to more sustainable ways of waste 
management, including recycling and renewable energy. In 2007 a minister was accused 
of trying to appoint a political ally as senior executive to the company. This set of 
counteractions by the crews on the trucks and a successful legal challenge by the 
management.234 
On St Kitts, as the hospitality industry grew, battles were fought over who would 
pay the bill for the extra waste produced by these tourists. This led to the introduction of 
an environmental levy for visitors, although there were some problems directing this 
money to the waste agency itself. There were frequent complaints over faltering service 
and fires on the dumping grounds, which the management blamed on a structural lack of 
funding. The management played into the rising popularity of talk shows, hosting its 
own phone-in programme to discuss policy called ‘Talking Trash’. 
5.3 STRUCTURE: FORMAL SEPERATION AND INFORMAL PROXIMITY 
The description of the structure of the relations aims to describe the different players 
involved and the rules under which they are supposed to play. This begins with a 
description of the formal layout of the utilities and a first exploration of the informal 
experience by the actors. Reaching back to the definition diagram for this variable as 
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detailed in the methodology chapter, the table below indicates at which stage the 
exploration is now. 
Table 16 Definition of Structure of Relations: I 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
Which actors are involved?  -Number of actors 
-Diversity of actors 
Relational Distance  
-Involvement of many and 
diverse actors 
What regime types are 
there? 
-Control over tariffs 
-Legal status organisation 
Grid Governance 
-Rigidity in observance of 
governance rules 
5.3.1 Formal arrangement 
Legal status of utilities 
The sixteen utility fields are listed in the table below, spanning the management of the 
airport, sea port, bus transportation, drinking water, electricity, gasoline and waste 
management. The exact organisational form of all the utilities differed slightly between 
them. 
On the whole, there were four types of legal forms amongst the sixteen utilities 
researched. During the period examined here, thirteen of the utility agencies studied 
were private in the legal meaning of the word, but all or the majority of the shares were 
owned by the government. The organisations were therefore corporatised, but not 
privatised. The central government did retain ultimate control over the agencies. 
Usually being the only shareholder, it appointed the board of directors, which were able 
to hire, fire and sometimes instruct the management. Only in the case of the electricity 
firm of Curacao was a minority stake of 20% actually sold to a commercial party.  
Six of these corporations were nominally placed in different holding companies, 
but as the government owned these holding companies itself, the power dynamics 
remained the same.  
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The water and electricity departments on St Kitts were straight central 
government departments. The waste management organisation of Aruba was nominally 
separated from the government, with its own Board of Supervisors, but did not have its 
own statutory budget. The table below captures the different arrangements. 
Table 17 Forms of organisation 
 Aruba Curacao St Kitts 
Airport BoD Holding + BoD 
Sea port BoD Holding + BoD 
BoD 
Bus transport BoD Holding + BoD Privatised 
Drinking water Department 
Electricity 
production 
Holding + BoD 
Electricity 
distribution 
Holding + BoD 
Holding + BoD + 
20% external 
shareholder Department 
Oil distribution Privatised Holding + BoD Privatised 
Waste Department with 
BoS 
Holding + BoD BoD 
The variation in legal form can be explained by the different histories of the utilities, 
although the arenas were converging towards similar formats in recent decades. As 
detailed in the earlier discussion on the public corporation literature, there has always 
been a discussion on the position of executive services in regards to the central 
government, and how much they should mimic the private sector in their own practices. 
Most of the organisations went through several forms over the years, ranging from 
government department to private company. At one point, Curacao intended to sell the 
services off completely, but later reneged on that course.235  
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Towards the end of the twentieth century, the form of a private company under 
public ownership became the most favoured option. One often cited reason was that this 
would depoliticise the policy field and allow for more rational business practices. 236 One 
further advantage of a corporation is that it can raise its own finances, much needed to 
invest in the infrastructure, and that it has greater control over its expenditure than 
government departments. The corporations were also covered by the commercial codes 
as applicable to private agencies, rather than by the administrative law written for 
government, which could create some flexibility in the employment practices. 
 
Rules of the game 
Moving beyond the legal form of the utilities, some further rules were laid down to 
regulate the behaviour of the different players. These were meant to deal with the 
conflict inherent to the governance of utilities.  
Martina highlights three potential problems between the parties involved in the 
delivery of utilities. Firstly, the government may be at odds with the agency on the 
prices. The government could be tempted to maintain low tariffs in order to appease the 
voters, providing just enough for the firm to survive, but too little to invest. Secondly, 
some consumers may be better organised than others. Large users, such as industrialists, 
may demand special prices, tempting the government to use utility pricing as a tool for 
subsidy. Thirdly, there is a tension between the agency and its customers. Utilities are 
usually full monopolies, which could lead to arrogant hegemonic behaviour on the side 
of the company. 237 
To navigate these tensions, the governance of the public utility would be carefully 
structured to create a system of checks and balances. At the time of the study, a 
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supposedly business-oriented style of management was very much in vogue, with 
watchwords being efficiency, return-on-investment and letting the management ‘get on 
with it’.  
The World Bank would also advocate the organisation of public utilities towards 
the model of businesses.238 Like publicly traded companies, corporations were supposed 
to be steered by representatives of the shareholder, but managed by the CEO. In 
addition, good corporate governance includes interactions without outside stakeholders, 
such as community watch dogs and regulatory agencies. This highlights that good 
corporate governance takes in a broader view of the context of a company.239 
To provide an illustration of the expectations implied here, the below table lists 
the rules of the game as explained by a local governance expert on Curacao to an 
audience of politicians, civil servants and community leaders.  
Table 18 Behavioural expectations of governance actors 
Behavioural expectations240 
Only organisations with significant or strategic societal importance are 
considered to be government utility agencies 
Agencies should be effective, efficient and return dividend to the 
shareholders 
The central government sets the framework for agencies 
The central government determines policy, agencies execute this policy 
Ministers do not sit on the Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors is appointed for three years, extension is only 
possible only after an evaluation 
Shareholders meet twice a year 
The agency regularly informs the minister and council 
There should be clear guidelines for employment policies 
Tariffs are determined by government on basis of costs + margin = price 
There should be clear guarantees for service quality 
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The ideal and smooth exchange assumed in these rules works from a neat principal-
agent division between the central government and the utility.241 The elected officials set 
the policy and the experienced professionals realise these ambitions. The underlying 
assumption is that the democratic mandate flows downwards, but that the information to 
create the necessary insight for further decisions flows back up. The CEO needs to 
inform the Board of Directors to enable it to approve policy. The directors need to 
inform the shareholding minister to make sure he can set the right goals. The minister 
needs to inform the council so it can hold him accountable. This exchange of resources 
for information between the principal and the agent needs to remain constant and 
balanced.242 
5.3.2 Informal realities 
There were significant differences between the formal position of the utilities and the 
reality of the daily governance. Firstly, the assumed distance between actors important 
to ‘rational management’ turned out to be fictitious in reality. Secondly, many actors 
supposed to act as checks and balances were ill-equipped. 
 
Entangled proximity 
The formal governance rules structure the field in such a way that all relations are crisp 
and singular in purpose. On paper; the minister and directors only relate to each other as 
shareholder and representatives, the CEO and an island council member only have 
indirect contact. However, given the small size of the communities, it would not be 
surprising to see these relations being caught up in the general entanglement of 
connections on the islands. Furthermore, the neutrality of positions may be affected 
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when actors were, in addition to being principal and agent, at the same time also fellow 
party members, business relations, friends or relatives.  
Since the Enron affair, industry codes in Europe and North America often prohibit 
people from sitting on too many boards or request them to leave in the case of a conflict 
of interest.243 Few or no guidelines existed on these islands where the social universe 
was much smaller and denser to begin with. Moreover, although these utilities were 
usually nominally separated from the state; they still had several interfaces with the 
central actors, ranging from setting the chargeable prices to appointing the next CEO.244  
Even if the government wanted to respect the distance intended by the statutes, 
there were still compelling reasons to remain involved. As the utilities were 
monopolists, the government needs to provide effective regulation for the utility 
providers. Moreover, the central government is often still a key player in the very 
delivery of the services. In the aviation sector, the government is responsible for the 
customs and security. For the waste sector, it is the government that hires the 
environmental inspectors to enforce the ban on illegal dumping, etc. 
For the ministers, these interactions could form an opportunity to exert pressure 
on the executive to use them to achieve political or personal objectives. The central 
government usually dealt with general policy, very rarely actually commanding control 
over cash hand-outs or individual decisions. By contrast, policy was actually executed 
at the level of the utility field; a little informal pressure could lower a bill, speed up due 
process or overlook an individual transgression. This creates an incentive for politician 
to interfere with the daily running of the utilities. 
It was thought that the corporatisation of the 1990s would strengthen the 
governance of the utilities as more layers were added between the ministers and CEO. 
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The first check is in the role for the board of directors, who were supposed to weigh 
community interests versus the interests of the company. However, in reality, they did 
not seem to always fulfil this role successfully. 
During the time of research, it was standard practice at all the corporations to 
appoint a new board of directors when the party in government changed. A former 
director related: ‘I was asked to be an expert director for an energy company by a 
political party. […] I later heard that the party was angry with me. They had expected 
me to report to them on a monthly basis about company policy. But I am a director, I 
only report to the shareholder. They just wanted a couple of yes-boys.´245 
This highlights the apparent lack of trust in the impartiality of directors. A 
minister explained that political appointments are a necessity: ´I need people there that I 
can trust. The voters will turn to me when things go wrong, so I need to be able to exert 
control.´246 Some ministers even appointed themselves as president of the board. 
Through political involvement with the agencies, all the long-distance relationships 
were collapsed into a direct confrontation.  
Many politicians argued that they were working in the general interest when 
shortening the distance between them and the utilities. They felt that many agencies had 
spun out of control after the utilities becoming corporations. ‘These government 
agencies are legalized form of theft´ commented a Member of Parliament; 
‘Corporatisation is like off-shoring your own infrastructure,’ added another one.  
CEOs did fight off these supposed intrusions. Some hoped to reduce the urge for 
political intervention by denying any differences in opinion; ‘There is no conflict of 
interest, the government set the policy, we execute.´247 Others aggressively defended the 
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rules of separation; ‘I tell them not to sit on my seat, otherwise I will try to sit on their 
seat.’248 
Some observers argued that all this in-fighting took attention away from the real 
problem in the governance of utilities. These actors would feel that the central 
government lacked the information or courage to articulate a clear vision for policy and 
thereby failed to create a framework for the utilities. A frustrated minister confessed, 
‘What we really miss are overall, long-term government policies. What do we want from 
the seaports? We can’t say. What do we want from the energy providers? We can’t 
say.´249 As a result; daily skirmishes over control seemed to be the norm in policy 
making. 
 
Failing checks and balances 
Beyond the interaction between the minister and CEO, there were supposed to be a 
further regime of other actors informing and correcting the policy of the agencies. 
However, many of them were either absent or not fulfilling the role designed for them. 
For example, the role of the board of directors was often side-lined as they were turned 
into extensions of the minister’s political machinery. Other actors were absent as well. 
There were no separate regulatory bodies supervising the sixteen utility fields 
researched here. Either the central government itself would set the tariffs, or the utility 
was able to do it itself. Curacao did have a regulatory body for the telecom sector, as 
this was a market with several players, but its remit was only extended to other utilities 
in 2010. In a comparative study of electricity providers in the Caribbean, Martina argues 
that many conflicts can be retraced to the absence of an independent arbiter on prices.250 
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External investors were also expected to act as disciplinary forces, attaching 
specific conditions on governance and tariffs to their credit. In several cases, the 
external investors called the government to order when minister let the tariffs slip to an 
unsustainably low level.251 However, the role of external financiers did not always turn 
out this way. In one case, a vicious interdependent cycle developed between a president 
of the board and a financier. ‘As president, he would sign another loan with this bank; 
the bank would in return demand that he would remain as president for the loan to be 
granted. There was no escaping either of them anymore.’252 
One other actor, known to influence public utilities around the world, was the 
trade union. Public utilities are generally heavily unionized and due to the nature of 
their services, strikes could do considerable damage.253 There were active unions in 
most of the utilities studied here, although exact figures of organisation were not 
available. In some cases, they were blamed for high costs by driving up salaries.254 In 
other cases, they were credited with defending the corporation against nepotism by 
preventing the outside political appointment to the board.255 However, as will come 
apparent in the latter chapters, the elite interviews did not seem to be overly concerned 
with the role of the unions when reforming their agencies, suggesting that their role may 
not be as large in public utilities elsewhere in the world, or that they were more aligned 
with the objectives of the elite actors. 
                                                
Several respondents argued that the move towards corporations may have given 
the opportunity to involve new players, but also broke the chains of accountability. 
Ministers, CEOs and investors started to behave as though they owned the utility, rather 
than running it for the public good. Despite good intentions and some initial gains, such 
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personalised ownership would usually turn sour over time. The lack of supervision 
meant that they started drafting their own course away from the public interest. As one 
civil servant observed: ‘Everyone needs to be held accountable. Even the pope answers 
to God.’ 256 
5.4 NATURE: IMBALANCED DISTRIBUTION 
The description of the nature of the relations aims to give a first indication of how 
resources are distributed between the actors. In order to provide some further focus to 
these questions, the division of capital devised by Bourdieu will be used here, 
considering resources of an economic, cultural, symbolic or network nature. The table 
below shows at which stage of definition this variable has arrived. 
Table 19 Definition of Nature of Relations: I 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
Are the resources evenly 
distributed? 
Actor Dominance 
-Presence of actor with 
much larger resource stock 
Are there antagonistic 
divisions between the 
actors? 
Distribution of capital: 
Economic 
Cultural 
Symbolic 
Network 
Group Governance 
-Degree of communality 
between governance actors 
5.4.1 Economic capital 
From a macro-perspective, similar economic realities and issues applied to the agencies. 
Most importantly, they all operated in near-perfect monopolies. There were no 
significant competitors aside from some domestic production of electricity through solar 
cells or private initiatives for garbage collection. Furthermore, the main benefit of 
corporation was that they gained an independent income stream, be it through pre-
allocated tariffs or through accessing external loans.  
                                                 
256  Public manager 30 
 
146
This gave them a sizeable and more predictable income stream; as they operated 
in a full monopoly, they could confidently predict the uptake of their product and were 
freed from constant budget battles with other parts of the government. Three of the 
sixteen cases did not have this luxury as their monies were allocated from the central 
budget, which was duly felt through lower salaries and lower levels of investment. 
 The central government was usually involved in setting the tariffs and prices for 
the utilities. As there was no regulatory board working for these utilities on any of the 
islands, the process of price-setting was highly political. An increase in any of the goods 
prices would be felt directly by all voters. The oil distribution company on Curacao, for 
example, had great difficulties in matching of the price at the pump to the upward 
movement at the global oil market. The price was supposed to be based on the sum of 
the costs, plus a margin required for sustainable business development. However, trade 
unions threatened to go on strike if fuel prices went up, forcing the government 
ministers to keep them steady and the agency to eat into its financial reserves.257  
Within the landscape of generally low incomes on the islands, the employees of 
the utility agencies usually stood out: they commanded greater salaries as the 
organisations could usually set their own wages. ‘We call those people civil servants 
that actually get paid´258 commented one observer wryly. This also meant that talented 
people were often drawn to work for the agencies, rather than the central government.  
A high incidence of poverty in society also meant that support was easily bought 
amongst both employees and directors. A former director observes: ‘The support of 
some of the politically appointed directors could be bought with the promise of a free 
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canister of cooking gas. If we can buy them off with such rubbish, we will keep getting 
rubbish people.´259  
It was common practice at most firms that the minister would personally introduce 
suitable candidates for vacancies, ranging from bus drivers to personnel managers. In 
most cases, the CEOs reported that they would still select the most suitable candidates 
of the entire batch. Others said they would take the ministerial candidate if they satisfied 
the minimum criteria. Some admitted to simply taking on the person if the minister 
requested it.  
One such case was observed directly during the interview process for this thesis. 
One minister was interviewed in the morning and swore never to interfere with the 
appointment of personnel. That same afternoon, the interview was taking place with the 
manager of the utility supervised by his minister, halfway through the telephone rang. It 
turned out to be the very same minister who spent five minutes berating the manager for 
failing to hire a constituent the minister had sent his way. The manager promised to 
amend this obvious mistake in the human resource department. 
The matter of personnel was often a breaking point in the relationship with the 
political master, as a former head of department recalled: ‘Everyone gets that call at one 
point in their career: can you place someone for me? If you say yes, your career as an 
independent civil servant is over, because they will come back for more. You have to 
draw the line there and then.’260 
The situation became even more complicated when concerning the use of utility 
money for political ends, be it by the minister or the CEO. Importantly, the money pot 
of the utilities provided a source of financing that did not need to be administered by the 
whole council of ministers. ‘Those accounts become extra resources for the ministers. 
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He would otherwise not have this money to play around with as it would otherwise 
disappear into the general budget.’261 Sometimes the utilities were used to provide the 
cash for other policy initiatives, such as playgrounds or pension funds. One manager 
admitted that he used his marketing budget to influence the newspapers; as a large 
advertiser it is possible to hold a certain sway over the reporting.262  
5.4.2 Cultural capital 
The cultural stock of capital refers to the expertise relevant to the industry and to an 
insight into the dynamics of society. It could be argued that some of the best and 
brightest of the islanders worked in the utility fields, drawn by both the societal 
relevance and higher salaries of these organisations. As a result, the cultural capital 
tends to cluster within the utilities, placing the external checks on the agencies at a 
disadvantage.  
Yet even within the utilities, people seemed to be appointed to responsibilities for 
which they were ill-suited, as observed for islands in more general terms by 
Baldacchino.263 Some would argue that this could increase the risk of corruption or 
undue political influence over policy. As one civil servant argued; ‘The fewer skills and 
capacities you have, the more you have to rely on your own character. And characters 
are ultimately weak so people succumb to temptation.’264 
The thin spread of expertise meant that players with some knowledge often lacked 
counterparts of equal experience or expertise, making it hard to weigh and sharpen their 
judgement. However, a lack of knowledge did often not hinder one’s self-appreciation. 
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‘We have many garden gnomes who think they are policy giants,’265 commented one 
external observer.  
Knowledge was often felt to be missing on the political front as well. There 
seemed to be little investment in training the cadre of political parties to prepare them 
for the responsibilities of office. This potentially created a gap in expertise between the 
civil servants and the ministers. One director admitted: ‘We direct our information at 
the citizens; the ministerial council is just not smart enough to understand it.´266  
A further part of cultural capital is an insight into the dynamic of society. For 
example, some politicians sense which issues will attract attention in the community, or 
some CEOs know what their customers will like. One would expect the politicians to be 
better at it, but the civil servants were also used to working in highly politicised settings, 
often honing their populist skills. Players on both sides of the aisle displayed great 
insight and skill regarding the dynamics of society. Next to maintaining large informal 
networks, some actors would run opinion surveys in order to inform their decisions.267  
However, understanding the public debate did not necessarily equate to being able 
to lift it to a higher level. Although many actors were evidently able to whip up a storm 
of public outrage, few were able to put this popular energy to good use. According to 
one observer, the real missing skill was that of productive debate: ‘We have to learn to 
be critical without being destructive.’268 
5.4.3 Network capital 
Network capital refers to the amount of capital an actor can mobilise via personal 
contacts. For example, a director confided how he could use his board to quickly fix 
things for him: ‘I used to have a board of directors who were all well-known on the 
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island. They could even walk into the offices of the central bank and arrange stuff for 
me. That was great.’269  
It is very difficult to establish the real stocks of network capital actors could 
command. Even in small island communities, it is still difficult to grasp all the different 
networks. Beyond more obvious connections in the professional and family sphere, 
there were also informal networks centred on active chapters of the Rotary, Lions and 
Freemasons. This urges great caution in establishing the network capital. 
Either way, network capital also has it draw-backs when working to fulfil 
personal objectives. Knowing many people also means you have to serve many 
interests. For example, many politicians cultivated support amongst groups of voters, 
hopefully gaining appreciation for his successes along the way. However, this placed 
them in a difficult situation. As a minister related; ‘The people only have a memory of 
three months. The government can fall tomorrow, so we need success today. This makes 
it especially hard to focus on the long run.’270 
5.4.4 Symbolic capital 
Symbolic capital refers to embodied investments of honour (decorations), importance 
(rank of office) or prestige (titles, family names). A first analysis of the islands shows 
how difficult it was to balance symbolic power inequalities. It is hard to argue with 
someone’s idea when he continually emphasises his role as expert, Maecenas or 
righteous liberator. This loud display of credentials frequently led to obstruction of the 
process, as posturing became more important than policy. 
The most visible use of symbolic capital on the islands was the frequent 
employment of academic titles. Individuals with medical degrees or postgraduate 
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education would often make sure to include their titles consistently in their election 
posters, business cards, introductions at speaker events, etc.  
Public figures would also often claim the mantle of benefactors, turning 
government programmes into personal acts of kindness. By opening new facilities with 
great ceremony, or humbly accepting thanks for its delivery from grateful clients, actors 
sought to glean some of its shine for personal prestige. 
Although this may have strengthened the person being seen to do the work, this 
may not benefit the person actually doing the work. One frustrated CEO commented on 
his relationship with the minister; ‘If people have no electricity, they will go to him 
instead of me, expecting to get special and fast service as they know him. I still have to 
do all the work. And when I get it done, they don’t praise me, but him.’271  
Further sources of symbolic power included family connections or religious 
coverage. Some actors would rely on the achievements of their fathers or grandfathers 
to craft their own reputation. This could be a dangerous strategy, as people would also 
know the less savoury side of family histories.  
Unsurprisingly in deeply religious societies, actors often sought higher 
justification for their work. One politician from Curacao, after completing a spell in 
prison, marched from church to church to celebrate his release. Stories circulated that he 
completed the march on bare-foot and was greeted by ringing bells as he and his 
followers approached the churches.272 In general, however, the churches do not seem to 
involve themselves to openly in politics. 
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5.5 EXPECTATIONS: HIGH HOPES AND BITTERNESS 
The description of the expectations of relations aims to give a first sketch of the elite 
actors’ attitudes towards the governance process, covering both the worldviews they 
express and the factors shaping these worldviews. 
Table 20 Definition of Expectations of Relations: I 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
What sort of expectations 
do actors have of 
cooperation? 
Engineering Mentality 
-Dominant mindset towards 
organisation 
What shapes the 
expectations of actors? 
Actors’ views on: 
-Rules in organisations 
-Dynamics of interaction 
Knowledge Availability 
-Sharing of information 
between actors 
5.5.1 Frameworks shaping the world 
Gender: The variable that never was 
One obvious factor determining worldview could be gender, as this might influence the 
person’s outlook on cooperation. However, this variable is unfortunately void due to an 
empirical complication. Of the roughly 100 official roles connected to these sixteen 
utilities, including the ministers, directors and CEOs, only a handful of jobs were 
occupied by women at the time of this research. There were no women CEOs or 
ministers for these utilities. Only a few sat on the board of directors or were managers 
underneath the CEO. Women were quite active in public life on the islands, namely on 
Curacao where the prime minister, minister of finance and lieutenant-governor were all 
women. However, there were still too few women present in this sample of utilities to 
properly test any theory connected to gender. 
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Bureaucratic ideal types 
When talking about their organisations, most respondents seemed to be heavily 
influenced by the concept of Weberian bureaucracy. This vision on public 
administration is ‘characterized by a clearly defined division of labour, an impersonal 
authority structure, a hierarchy of offices, dependence on formal rules, employment 
based on merit, the availability of a career and the distinct separation of members’ 
organisational and personal lives.’273 
In recent times, these values are chiefly heralded by the international actors on the 
islands. Actors reported that the models of good governance of the World Bank and 
IMF chiefly shaped their actions. In these frameworks, people are supposed to think 
according to the position or interest they are officially representing. The CEO should 
look after the company’s interest, the Board of directors after the shareholders, the 
minister after the island’s council instruction, etc. 
It is questionable, however, whether people truly thought in such 
compartmentalised ways. Particularly when considering the great overlap between 
professional and social relations in such a small policy environment as an island.274 The 
problem may sometimes not even be that people are antagonistic, but that they have 
held the position of ownership for too long. ‘Some utility providers are more akin to 
family agencies than government firms. The CEO has been there for so long and takes 
good care of his organisation. But it is not his company.’ As a result, ‘We have all 
gurus in these agencies; they just do what they please.’275 As actors come to identify 
themselves so strongly with the well-being of the corporation, or their interpretation of 
that well-being, the Weberian bureaucratic models may seem to be less relevant. 
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 Social narratives 
In many of the interviews, people used concepts from the islands’ social history to 
explain the current situation. Some of these interpretations could be backed up by 
scientific research, where others could be argued to be constructs of society. Such 
narratives could range from Arubans pointing to their indigenous roots when explaining 
their independence from the Dutch, the people of Curacao analysing the behaviour of 
male leaders through the prism of slavery or the Kittitians explaining rising crime levels 
by pointing to lower church attendance.  
In this view, the horizontal/cooperative modus implicit in the European model 
collided with the vertical relationship pattern dominating society. This becomes 
especially salient during the interactions with the citizens or customers. They might be 
cowed into a submissive mode of begging for services from their patrons, even though 
they are rightfully entitled to them. In this view, people were formed in a mould of 
dependence. This either translated to enduring despondence or an urgent longing for 
complete independence, which ignored the reality of interdependence faced by almost 
all countries today. 
5.5.2 Inputs shaping frameworks 
Worldviews may also change over time, depending on the experiences or information 
actors receive. A powerful part of this influence is the information flowing between the 
actors; be it the latest statistics, policy briefs, argued opinions or whispered gossip. Due 
to its scale and myriad of connections in these islands, information spreads quickly but 
was not always valid, reliable or consistent. People hear opposing views on the oil price 
from the minister, the opposition, the private sector, their friends, family members or 
friends. One director conveys his worry: ‘You have to explain [your policies] well, but 
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that is extremely tough. Even if you get it right yourself, there is always someone in 
your back who will completely twist your stories. People hear all these different stories 
and do not know what to believe anymore.’276 
The system is also swamped with extra observations about the key players 
involved, both relevant and irrelevant of nature. For example, in the context of the 
electricity utility people receive information on the latest power outage on the other side 
of the island, the rising global oil prices and see the expensive new car bought by the 
CEO of the energy company.  
All this information is usually contradicted by other parties – ‘It was not a 
disruption but a scheduled outage.’, ‘The oil price is not really going up for the large 
buyers.’, ‘That car was paid for by someone else.’ – creating a convoluted and 
confusing mix. Although actors in small countries could know everything, they may not 
believe anything. Without enduring consensus on what is a fact and what is mere 
gossip, there is no scope for long-term policy development and government success 
becomes impossible.  
One respondent from the business sector commented: ‘The government never 
develops any policy at all, but is always focused on the short term. This forces the 
utilities to draft their own plans and then they get heavily criticized. In the end, we are 
left with no plans and no policy.’277 
Some authors note that this had led to a general state of disbelief in the Caribbean. 
Marcha and Verweel refer to another mechanism of ‘appreciation of irony’ by citizens 
in Antillean politics.278 People will happily cheer for the grand ambitions of politicians; 
yet will simultaneously acknowledge that they will lead nowhere. They thereby reject 
the credibility of the solution.  
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Further influences 
Beyond these actively explicit streams influencing worldviews, it is also important to 
take into account mental frameworks beyond the conscious elements. Religion, for 
example, was a powerful frame of reference on all these islands. When one of the CEOs 
was criticised heavily by the ruling party, the opposition asked for a delay of his 
dismissal as it was the Holy Week leading up to Easter.279  
Ethnic divisions could also flare up in the debate. One commentator on Curacao 
argued that everything went downhill after they allowed the use of Papiamento in 
parliament. One consequence was that people who did not speak Dutch, usually from 
lower classes, suddenly gained access to the political debate.280 
A further influence of the worldviews was the situation as observed in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands or the USA, often considered to be more relevant than the 
practices on neighbouring islands. Most people had travelled overseas or had family 
there who told stories of alternative way of organising society and governments. They 
started to demand the same. In addition to sending remittance monies, these diaspora 
citizens may have also sent back new expectations of government. As one observer 
commented; ‘The problem is that government success is very subjective; what is your 
standard? We [on Curacao] compare everything to the Netherlands. And we then forget 
the negative things about that country.’281 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
A first glance at the utilities revealed policy fields awash in good intentions yet also 
filled with perverse effects. The microcosm of each policy field could be considered a 
reflection of the socio-cultural challenges at the societal level. 
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There was a great discrepancy with the formal prescription of the structure of 
relations and the actual situation observed. Supposedly singular, rational connections 
were captured in the wider entangled web of obligations between members of the 
community. The nature of these relations showed some worrying signs of imbalance 
and potential conflict over resources, although the exact dynamics need to be further 
investigated. The expectations were on the whole shaped by high expectations based on 
doctrines of bureaucracy and overseas examples, but were also influenced by other 
bitter narratives on dependency and inability to govern effectively. 
This rich description was chiefly based on reports by the actors themselves. This 
rather pessimistic picture should therefore not be taken at face value, as the actual 
performance of the system might be better than expected. What can be said, however, is 
that success would surprise even many of the local actors. Now it is time to see whether 
success actually occurred. 
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6. DATA-SET OBSERVATIONS: SIGNS OF SUCCESS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of chapter 
Where the previous chapter provided a rich sketch of the sixteen cases, the data-set 
observations presented here serve more as a set of photos of the sixteen utilities. The 
most important task is to credibly separate the performing from the failing utilities as 
the later analysis depends on this distinction. The further observations aim to capture 
crucial differences between the utilities in terms of the structure, nature and 
expectations of the relations as observed for each of the cases. Although they are 
presented through graphs, it is important to remember that they are still based on 
qualitative assessments on the respective indicators. The analysis also does not yet look 
at the policy fields in motion, as that will be left to the next chapter on causal process 
mechanisms. The ambition is rather to create to a concrete foundation of static 
observations for the analytical process in the latter chapters. 
 
Contents of chapter 
The chapter starts with a look at the performance of the utilities. Although several 
qualifications and uncertainties remain, it is possible to make a claim about which firms 
are successful and which are failing. The sixteen cases are then compared on the basis 
of their characteristics in terms of the structure, nature and expectations of relations 
between the actors. The chapter will seek possible causal relations between any of these 
variables and the performance of the utilities.  
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In terms of the structure of relations, the slight variations in the institutional 
arrangements seem to make little difference to the performance of the utilities. All three 
islands are represented equally across the spectrum of performers and failures, just as 
the type of industry does not seem to matter greatly. It is interesting to see that there 
could be a possible correlation between the amount of actors involved and the 
performance of the utility. Successful performers were on average involving more 
actors, although very poor performers also had an increased amount of actors involved. 
A similar grouping can be observed when looking at the nature of the relations, 
focussing specifically on the distribution of resources between the actors. Both highly 
successful and deeply failing organisations had CEOs with significantly more resources 
than the minister. It seemed that a powerful CEO could result either in extreme success 
or extreme failure. An imbalance towards the minister would often result in moderate 
failure.  
From the expectation perspective it is interesting to see that all of the ministers 
were strongly oriented towards Group Governance, where CEOs could be either group 
or individual oriented. What seems most significant is that in those cases where both the 
CEO and the minister cared about both group and rules, performance was the highest. 
6.2 PERFORMANCE 
6.2.1 Measurement of performance 
The first step in this research exercise is to estimate the public value delivered by the 
respective public utilities. Drawing on Moore’s and Putnam’s definition of 
performance, it is important to establish which utilities added value to the community 
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and which formed a drag. These estimations will be made in this more quantitative 
chapter as the current template is very suitable for demonstrating the causal effect.282  
The scorings were based on six indicators of cost and gain, drawing on the 
definitions of success by Moore and Putnam. Two senior figures per islands, with 
extensive knowledge of these agencies through auditing or consulting them, were asked 
to score the utilities based on the form presented in the methodology chapter. These two 
rankings were supplemented with two further marking rounds by the researcher. One of 
these was completed at the end of the fieldwork in spring 2010 and one more after a 
‘cooling-off’’ period in spring 2011. The final score for each utility was calculated by 
subtracting the costs from the benefits and taking the average of the four observations. 
This method produced a measurement of the policy fields as presented in the figure 
below. 
Figure 8 Public value scores and confidence intervals 
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Nine of the sixteen utilities were deemed to deliver public value to their community. 
The other six policy fields placed a burden on society which outweighed their 
contribution. For case 10, the first three of the observations were discounted. One year 
after the data was collected; serious financial irregularities emerged at the organisation, 
necessitating a reweighing of the costs scores by the researcher. To still give an 
assessment of the reliability of this data point, the case was awarded the average 
confidence interval of +/- 2.  
6.2.2 Reliability of assessment 
It is notoriously hard to put a reliable number on government success, even when 
considering ‘concrete’ services such as utilities studied here. Jacobs, Goddard and 
Smith discuss some measures to make the measurement more valid, including filtering 
out ‘random fluctuations’ and measurements errors.283 However, the validity problem 
remains even with large data sets such as the UK’s schools rankings. For a small 
investigation of only four observations per case, the reliability therefore deserves due 
consideration.  
The research design provides for three ways to assess and bolster the reliability of 
this data. Firstly, it makes it very clear how the performance data will be used, so that 
the reliability matches the end purpose. Secondly, the quantitative weighing of 
performance is based on a considered range of sources, in line with the consilience 
strategy. Finally, several tests are executed, detailed in the paragraphs below, to assess 
the reliability of this ranking. 
It is very important to be clear about the end to which the data will be used. 
Although first presented in a list or bar chart, the research design does not look for 
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linear correlations. The fuzzy-set method as designed by Ragin and as employed in the 
next chapters rather looks at degrees of membership of a set of successful agencies.  
The question then is whether the cases are put into the right sets. For example, the 
question is whether Case 1 should indeed be a full member of the set of successful 
agencies. Most importantly, the analysis needs to be able to distinguish the successful 
agencies from the failing agencies. Another aim is to pinpoint the exact score of each of 
the agencies, so to be able to distinguish between agencies that perform adequately and 
those that perform poorly. This thesis focuses on getting the overall distinction between 
successful and failing organisations right. 
In order to best fulfil this objective, the research design incorporates several 
consilience techniques. The method brings together observations from different orders 
of facts. In this case, the performance measurements were based on the judgements of 
expert observers –auditors, accountants and ombudsmen- who themselves would glean 
their view from different sources. In addition, the researcher has contributed two of the 
scorings. This draws on in-depth interviews with 107 actors, but also on the information 
available in the public sphere, such as annual reports, newspaper articles, etc. Together 
they should form a rich basis for the assessment of performance. 
 
Confidence intervals 
A first indicator of reliability is the confidence interval for the measurements. The 
confidence interval was calculated for each of the cases, taking into account the sample 
size and standard deviation, while aiming for a confidence level of 90%. It would have 
been possible to run the exercise as well with a 95% confidence level, but it was felt this 
ambition was more appropriate for the small number of observations. The results are 
presented in the table below. 
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Table 21 Ranking of public value scores 
Case Expert 1 
Expert 
2 Res. 1 Res. 2 
Mean 
score 
Stand. 
deviation 
Conf. 
interval 
1. 9 3 5 5 5.5 2.5 2.1 
2. 3 7 2 2 3.5 2.4 2.0 
3. 5 0 2 2 2.3 2.1 1.7 
4. -2 1 3 3 1.3 2.4 1.9 
5. -1 0 2 2 0.8 1.5 1.2 
6. 4 4 -2 -3 0.8 3.8 3.1 
7. -3 -1 3 2 0.3 2.8 2.3 
8. 0 -4 2 3 0.3 3.1 2.5 
9. 4 -4 1 0 0.3 3.3 2.7 
10. 4 -2 -1 -1 -1.0 N/A 2.0 
11. -3 0 -2 -1 -1.5 1.3 1.1 
12. -7 -4 -1 0 -3.0 3.2 2.6 
13. -7 2 -4 -4 -3.3 3.8 3.1 
14. -4 -3 -3 -4 -3.5 0.6 0.5 
15. -6 -2 -3 -3 -3.5 1.7 1.4 
16. -10 -1 -5 -5 -5.3 3.7 3.0 
    Average -0.4 2.5 2.0 
NB: Case 10 has been awarded a score -1 and the mean confidence interval. 
 
The confidence interval of the first three cases entails that the expectation is that 90% of 
additional measurements would also return a positive public value score. For cases 11 to 
16, the expectation would be that the 90% of additional measurements would keep on 
returning a negative score. This means that there is reasonable ground to assume that 
these cases should be in the success and the failure set respectively. Importantly, there is 
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also no overlap between the best and worst agencies. This warrants the identification of 
a significant difference on the dependent variable, or causal effect. Inferences can then 
be made about the impact of variation in the underlying variables. Cases 4 to 10 do have 
a confidence interval covering both positive and negatives scores of public value. This 
shows that the rankings are not strong in providing insights in the ‘muddle in the 
middle’ of the performance ranking. 
As mentioned, the purpose of this exercise is not to identify a linear correlation 
between success and other factors, but rather to distinguish membership sets with shared 
characteristics. This means that the analysis can make the strongest claims about the 
differences between agencies when contrasting the ‘superstars’ cases 1 to 3 with the 
struggling cases 11 to 16.One needs to be more careful when making claims about 
causes and consequences when drawing on the adequately performing cases 4 to 10. 
On the whole, the spread of data is quite reasonable: Eight of the units on either 
side of the spectrum do not overlap with each other. However, it must be remembered 
that half the measurements were provided by the same person, even if this was done 
after a cooling-off period of a year. By retrieving half the measurements from one 
person, the consilience strength of this data is very limited. 
 
Distribution 
A further way of assessing the reliability of the data is by looking at all the observations 
taken together. It must be remembered that this selection of sixteen cases is not meant to 
be a representative sample of all the government agencies on the island. They rather 
represent an opportunity to investigate the roots to success in discrete cases. However, 
as they have been scored together, the distribution of the points may indicate how 
significant differences are within the data set. 
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The average score of all the observations is -0.3 with a rather large standard 
deviation of 3.6. As there are now 64 observations, four per case, the confidence 
interval at 90% now stands at a much smaller 0.7. This means that the scores outside the 
span of -0.3 +/- 0.7 can be considered to be significantly different from the average 
score. The top performers are three confidence intervals above the average. The worst 
performers are more than four confidence intervals below -0.3. Again such an 
assessment is not really suitable for sample of this size, but should give us some more 
assurance about the relative robustness of the measurements. 
 
Coder disagreement 
The reliability of the data can be explored further by assessing the direction of the 
disagreements between the coders. The spread of their judgements is captured by the 
confidence interval per case, but the direction of the bias also needs to be analysed. For 
example, it may be possible that the researcher structurally awarded higher marks than 
the local coders. The figure below presents the four different observations made per 
cases, next to the average of these scores which became the final score.284 
The figure shows that all the four observations agreed that cases 1 to 3 were 
successful, although they disagreed how successful they were exactly. Similarly, the 
observations concurred that cases 14 to 16 were failures, although the evaluators 
differed on the extent to which this was deemed to be the case. The confidence interval 
suggested quite strong disagreements, but this visual representation demonstrates that 
all observations agreed that these cases should be in their respective success or failure 
sets. 
                                                 
284  This could have also been captured in the Kappa co-efficient, more specifically Randolph’s 
free-marginal multirater. However, given the fact that the marks are ordinal, i.e. a disagreement between a 
mark of 3 and 4 is not as large a disagreement as between 3 and -7, these tools are not applicable. 
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Figure 9 Coder disagreement 
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The other cases show a greater differentiation in opinion between the observations. 
Expert 1 usually reviewed external observers stressing the procedural perspective, being 
awarded by accountants or auditors. Expert 2 was usually informed by actors leaning 
more towards the consumer perspective. This might explain the strong disagreements 
between these views for cases 9 and 13, as one might have prioritised good corporate 
governance over good products.  
Differences between the researcher and the local experts could be caused by the 
fact that the researcher visited all the three islands. This may have introduced a more 
comparative perspective on the performance of the utilities, downgrading celebrated 
local success stories or awarding agencies more points for performance in difficult 
industries. Again the difference did not seem to be so great that the validity of the data 
is fatally undermined. 
 
Weighting 
A final way of testing the reliability of the measurement is by changing the weighting of 
the different scoring categories. Because of the goods and services nature of these 
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government agencies, it was decided to award double points for financial costs and 
service delivery. This slanted weighting may have introduced undue biases. When 
equalizing all the scores, giving all six categories the same weight, a large shift may 
occur in the relative score of the utilities. This would suggest that the measurements are 
not very robust. However, the figure below suggests that there are few cases that make 
large jumps. 
Figure 10 Influence of changing weight services 
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Cases 1 and 16 both gravitate quite strongly towards the zero when halving their scores 
for financial costs and service delivery. Yet they are still at their respective ends of the 
rankings. Again, the measurements seem to be the weakest for the middle cases. Case 
10 decreases considerably; from a slightly positive score to a negative one, indicating 
that it service quality forms a great part of its original ranking. By contrast, case 7 and 
13 climb considerably in the new order, indicating that they were being suppressed by 
high costs. However, when looking across the board, the relative performance of the 
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sixteen cases remains stable, there are no cases which make dramatic jumps in their 
score or their ranking. This suggests that the weighting is not influencing the 
measurements too strongly. 
Even after these tests, the robustness of this performance data is still open to 
diverse criticisms. The fundamental problem remains that the thesis relies on a small set 
of cases. However, the data collection for even such a relatively small sample required 
many months in work and increasing the data set would have been very costly. Given 
the span of this thesis, it is therefore best to work with the data set available, while 
keeping in mind the limitations of its robustness going through the analytical process.  
6.2.3 Sources of Costs and Benefits 
The results of the policy fields can be divided according to their specific scores of costs 
and gains, as represented in the graph below. Most policy fields are delivering high 
quality services, with only five cases not achieving a mark of six. The policy fields 
delivering fewer gains are more likely to be in the lower half of the set. Also for these 
cases, it is chiefly the combination with higher costs which creates their poor results 
overall. Six of the policy fields have a high financial burden of -6 or higher, with four of 
the five worst performers placing such a high burden on society. In general, it could be 
said that the good performers distinguished themselves not as much through exceptional 
service as through crafty cost-cutting.  
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Figure 11 Costs and gains 
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Interestingly though, public utility number 3 had high financial costs, but offsets 
this with high gains and low costs in terms of choice and policy insight. In other words, 
the community was making some hefty investment in this area. However, the benefits of 
this approach seemed to be good policy insight and provisions for the long term. 
It is interesting to see that the service delivery is still of a high standard even with 
the poorest performing policies. They do combine this with little benefits in terms of 
insight and long term provisions, while undermining their overall gains with high costs. 
This suggests a type of behaviour characteristic of state monopolists; the management is 
driven by a professional pride to deliver the best results, but fails to account for the 
customers interest overall. 
6.3 STRUCTURE: THE MORE THE MERRIER 
At this point, the analysis of the structure of relations is about the different settings of 
the islands and the different actors that were active in the fields. The data observations 
gathered data on the type of islands, the different regimes types, the tariff-setting 
procedure and the number of players involved. By measuring these against the relative 
performance of the policy fields, the aim is to identify those conditions that help a 
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utility to deliver public value. Some of these observations were not presented in 
separate graphs in order to not compromise the anonymity of the cases. 
Table 22 Definition of Structure of Relations: II 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
Which actors are involved?  -Number of actors 
-Diversity of actors 
Relational Distance  
-Involvement of many and 
diverse actors 
What regime types are 
there? 
-Control over tariffs 
-Legal status organisation 
Grid Governance 
-Rigidity in observance of 
governance rules 
6.3.1 Island setting 
An obvious starting point is to distinguish the islands in which these utilities were 
located. The scoring took each particular island setting into account when awarding 
points, considering what the local challenges were, but some island bias may still have 
crept in. However, the three islands had comparable performance. All islands brought in 
both big successes and big failures, dividing up the middle rankings between them as 
well. This confirms the argument made in the research design that a comparison across 
these islands could be valid. 
6.3.2 Type of industry 
The set of utilities can also be divided along the type of industry the utilities served. 
Again, when distinguishing between energy providers versus infrastructure managers, 
or any other division, there was no clear pattern discernible. It could be said that the 
energy and water policy fields are centred on the middle, neither excelling 
magnificently nor failing miserably.  
Actors in these fields would explain this by pointing to the difficulty of reforming 
in such industries, which prevents great strides; the costs of improving the water 
pipelines are prohibitive even when compared to the costs of an extra runway. The lack 
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of utter failures could be explained by the fact that politicians would not let utilities slip 
so low. Reliable electricity and water supply are considered an essential ingredient for 
the running of society, which would prevent outright failure. Although water might be a 
more vital life need than electricity, no government can expect to remain in office long 
if they fail on either of these fronts.  
This might turn these utilities, in the words of Meyer and Zucker, into 
permanently failing organisations. They are floundering constantly, but established 
constituent interests keep them operative.285 However, in the period studied here, some 
of these policies were able to make significant advances –mainly focusing on 
sustainable consumption and production- which indicates that success could be 
achieved through a wider set of options. 
6.3.3 Regime types 
A next step is to investigate the impact of the variation in legal forms between the 
utilities. Although these were minimal and were kept deliberately constant when 
selecting the cases, even these small variations should be considered. Policy fields were 
either departments within the central government or corporations, often controlled 
through a holding company. There is a strong correlation between the islands and 
organisational structure, with, for example, Curacao administering all its utilities 
through a single holding. 
It was interesting to observe that directly owned utilities tended to do better than 
those managed through a holding company pattern. This mechanism, whereby the 
government owns a company which in turn owns the utility agencies, was devised to 
place politics at arm’s length. However, the high performance of the directly owned 
agencies suggests that some proximity is not detrimental and might even be beneficial. 
                                                 
285  W.R. Nord, ‘Regular book review section: Permanently Failing Organisations’, The academy of 
management review, vol. 14, no. 4, October 1990, p. 706. 
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Alternatively, the holding company structure may have created an additional layer of 
political conflict in the form of the holding company. This might have increased the 
drag on the performance of these organisations. Given the small size of this data set, 
either option should be kept in mind at this point, especially when considering that some 
of the best performers were owned via a holding. 
6.3.4 Population of actors 
Moving beyond the rules of the game, it is time to look at the players. Based on the 
interviews, a list was drawn up of the actors that were mentioned by the respondents to 
have played a role at the governance level. These players included obvious actors such 
as ministers and CEOs, but also representatives of interest groups and specific 
businessmen.  
Figure 12 Population of policy field 
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However, these results were not yet weighed; the relative impact of an actor was not 
taken into account. This more qualitative step will be executed in the causal process 
observations. At this stage, an objective count of the actors mentioned should give a 
fairly reliable representation of who is said to populate the different policy fields. The 
results are presented in the figure above. 
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The first striking result is that, on the whole, there are more actors involved with the top 
performing policy fields than with the low performing policy fields. There is a neat 
drop-off between case 9, which still brings in a positive public value, and case 10, 
which delivers no public value. However, the population of the underperforming policy 
fields seems to be inversely related to their performance; as performance falls, more 
players tend to be involved. 
There are two possible explanations for this, one taking involvement as the 
consequence of success, the other one taking involvement as a cause. The consequence 
perspective would suggest that all these actors were involved in the highly performing 
fields to get their share of the spoils of victory; lucrative contracts from a booming 
utility sector, prestige for being part of this success or simply safeguarding their own 
interests in the face of an expanding field. The poor performers in the middle are 
unsuccessful and therefore unloved, as there is little to be gained. The costly failure of 
the worst performers forms a drag on society and prompts vigilance and involvement of 
the stakeholders. Ministers, directors and interest groups come to the rescue. This would 
suggest that where success has many fathers and mediocrity is an orphan, outright 
failure attracts the same shower of attention as a youth delinquent. 
From another perspective, one could argue that the actor involvement actually 
causes the performance. The public value generating policy fields all have higher levels 
of players involved than the underperformers, except for case 16. The different players 
may be keeping each other at bay through careful protection of their territory, creating a 
system of checks and balances. Phrased more optimistically, they might all bring their 
best intentions and abilities to the table and generate the best result for the community 
as a whole. On the other side of the spectrum, outside actors may circle the struggling 
utilities like vultures, picking off their share of the struggling utilities. 
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Another way of looking at this data would be to assess the mix of actors involved. 
Although the worst performer, case 16, did count the same level of involvement as the 
performing cases, the set of players involved tended to be more diverse for the 
successful utilities.  
Some actors, such as middle managers, investors and community groups, feature 
only with the highest performing agencies. The only external partners involved in the 
three lowest performing arenas were representatives of the businesses on the islands. In 
all these three cases, this refers to specific commercial agents, such as individual firms 
lobbying the government, rather than the business associations such as the Chamber of 
Commerce or the Tourist Board. This might suggest that the all the actors for the failing 
utilities have more particularistic interests than the community-oriented actors around 
the successful cases. 
It must also be remarked that in almost all cases the island council and the 
overseas governments are missing. The island council influence was reviewed for all 
agencies. From the perspective of the senior officials, the council did not have a large 
impact. It was usually deemed to be only the ministers who controlled the debate in 
parliament; the opposition was regarded as merely shouting from the other side. 
Another absentee is overseas government. The Dutch in particular government paid a 
lot of attention to good governance practices in the field of utilities. Their influence was 
perhaps felt more in the general field of governance rules, rather than for specific utility 
organisations. 
The discussion of the impact of these actors follows two extremes; a different 
score for the performing utilities might be a cause or a consequence of performance. 
The missing piece of information here is what these actors were actually doing. All 
these scenarios should be explored further through the causal process observations in 
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the next chapter when the analysis looks for the exact machinations of the elite 
interactions. 
6.4 NATURE: PUZZELING IMBALANCES 
The parameters for the nature of relations look at the resources at the disposal of the 
elite including their economic, cultural, symbolic and network funds of power. This data 
was acquired on basis of the interviews. The most striking result is that strong CEOs are 
found at either very successful or bitterly failing utilities. This suggests that strong 
leadership is required for performance, but could just as easily lead to utter failure. 
Table 23 Definition of Nature of Relations: II 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
Are the resources evenly 
distributed? 
Actor Dominance 
-Presence of actor with 
much larger resource stock 
Are there antagonistic 
divisions between the 
actors? 
Distribution of capital: 
Economic 
Cultural 
Symbolic 
Network 
Group Governance 
-Degree of communality 
between governance actors 
As this required a lot of subjective estimations, the capital scores have only been 
collected for the two types of actors covered for all the cases, namely the minister and 
CEO. The data was created by first constructing a measurement framework for the four 
types of capital and then examining the interviews and coding for relevant references to 
resources. This was then filled out in the score card as presented below.  
 
176
Table 24 Capital scores per case 
Case Economic 
Public 
Economic 
Private 
Cultural 
Expertise 
Cultural 
Societal 
Symbolic Network 
 Min. CEO Min.  CEO Min. CEO. Min. CEO Min. CEO. Min. CEO.
1. 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 2 
2. 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 
3. 3 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 3 3 4 
4. 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 4 2 
5. 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 4 2 
6. 3 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 2 4 2 
7. 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 1 4 2 
9. 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 4 2 
10. 3 1 2 1 3 2 3 2 3 1 3 2 
11. 3 1 2 1 3 2 3 2 3 1 3 1 
12. 3 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 2 4 2 
13. 3 1 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 1 4 2 
14. 3 1 3 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 3 2 
15. 3 1 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
16. 3 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 
 4 = Very large stock of capital 
3 = Large stock of capital 
2 = Moderate stock of capital 
1 = Little or no stock of capital 
The scoring was based on the sample of sixteen ministers and sixteen CEOs. For 
example, if the interviews indicated that a given minister had one of the highest stocks 
of expertise when compared to the other thirty-two actors; he would be awarded a score 
of 4. This process required much qualitative estimation of the resources of the minister 
and CEO, based on incomplete information. The best use of data is therefore not to 
exactly pinpoint the situation of specific cases, but rather to see if there are any trends 
visible between the high versus the low performers. 
6.4.1 Economic capital 
The economic capital indicators, referring to financial means of public or private nature, 
were collected on the basis of questions to the subjects themselves, references to each 
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other and through primary resources like departmental budgets or annual reports. This 
first graph below refers to the public finances the minister or CEOs could freely control. 
The second graph describes their own financial position, inspecting their solvency 
beyond the income of their present jobs. 
Figure 13 Economic Public capital 
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As was to be expected, in most cases the minister controlled the largest set of public 
funds, which could be usually explained by the fact that they would be responsible for a 
set of utility agencies and other public tasks. The cases where the CEO had more public 
money at his disposal usually concerned very large delivery corporations. These would 
be the organisation bringing money to the government, rather than having to ask for it.  
It is interesting to note that there were two groups were the CEO has significantly 
smaller budgets. Firstly, cases 9 to 14 seemed to have little to spend. This could link 
back to the lower amounts of actors involved, explaining why they were unpopular. 
Secondly, the two best performing cases also had lower budgets. This indicates that size 
and performance are not necessarily related. 
The balance between the minister and CEO was by and large tilted towards the 
minister. The imbalance was largest with cases 9 to 14, but it was the CEO who 
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controlled the most resources at the bottom performers. This could suggest that it may 
have created an unhealthy imbalance away from the public interest. 
Figure 14 Economic Private capital 
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The personal financial security of the CEOs was better than the ministers on the whole, 
mainly explained by their higher salaries and better employability beyond their current 
jobs. Most had experience in the private sector to fall back on as an alternative career. 
Again, however, cases 9 to 14 showed the minister having more financial security than 
the CEO. It was also interesting to see that that the CEOs at the better performing 
utilities had, on average, better prospects than their counterparts at the lower performing 
cases. 
6.4.2 Cultural capital 
Cultural capital embodies two elements of interest to the analysis of the nature of 
relations. First, there is the accumulation of relevant expertise –industry knowledge, 
technical knowhow- which could provide a valuable source of leverage for the actors. 
Secondly, cultural capital refers to a broader understanding of how society works –
etiquette, ‘the public pulse’, policy taboos- which could help an actor to get his way.  
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Figure 15 Expertise capital 
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From the expertise point of view, the performing policy fields tended have slightly 
larger stocks of capital available. Yet the overall strength of expertise as an explanatory 
variable is undermined by two issues. Firstly, cases 4, 6, 8 and 14 had the greatest pools 
of expertise but were not able to translate this to the best performance. Other factors 
must have played a role here, explaining what barred this expertise from being put to 
good use. 
Furthermore, the matter of expertise is particularly susceptible to the chicken-and-
egg question; do qualified people create good policy fields, or did good policy fields 
attract good people? This could well apply to cases 11, 13 and 15. It could be argued 
that they were only considered unqualified because they were working in 
underperforming fields. In sum, the interaction of expertise with other factors and the 
direction of its causation should be explored further. 
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Figure 16 Societal capital 
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On the count of societal insight, most actors were thought to have a higher stock of 
societal insight than expertise. This is not surprising, given the very political settings 
these actors were groomed in. Again, it was the minister that often had the advantage in 
the relationship, only to be outstripped by the best and worst performing CEOs. 
However, it is interesting to see that for the first time the difference between the stocks 
of societal capital between the best and worst CEOs is significant. The top three CEOs 
had much larger stocks of insight into the dynamics of society than the bottom ones. 
This might point towards a decisive advantage, although it still raises the question how 
they use the capital.  
6.4.3 Symbolic capital 
The third aspect of capital looks at symbolic power; the signs of prestige in possession 
of the key players, ranging from titles to famed lineage. As this variable is about 
symbols of prestige recognised by others, the many interviews provided good data on 
the CEOs and ministers for this variable.  
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Figure 17 Symbolic capital 
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The most striking observation is that there are no individuals with overpowering stocks 
of symbolic resources, not one actor achieved a mark of 4. There were individuals with 
a long track-record in public life or who were descended from famous leaders. One 
would assume that the leaders responsible for high performing utilities would gain some 
recognition. It is true that there were more individuals with high symbolic status at the 
performing end of the spectrum, but not significantly more so. None of them achieved 
very strong scores and there seemed to be no characters that were able to rise above the 
muddy field of daily interactions. No one seemed to be universally admired or respected 
on the islands, at least not visible in these fields. 
This lack of symbolic capital could be both helpful and damaging to performance 
overall. On one hand, there were no figures that could behave as guru’s, making policy 
pronouncements accepted because of the symbolic capital of the proposer, rather than 
the merits of the suggestion itself. On the other hand, without a unifying figure, it 
becomes in doubt whether one actor could emerge to steer the debate towards a 
conclusion and is trusted enough to take charge of the execution.  
 
182
6.4.4 Network capital 
The final parameter of capital looks at network resources; the amount of leverage the 
individuals could command through their contacts. The data was gathered on the basis 
of the interviews and secondary sources on connections between people. This is a 
notoriously problematic aspect to charter, as key networks can remain invisible or work 
in different ways than observed from the outside. 
Figure 18 Network capital 
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Utilities
N
et
w
or
k c
ap
it
al
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
Minister CEO Capital balance
Large 
Moderate
No capital
Advantage 
minister
Balanced
Advantage 
CEO
 
There is a slightly higher occurrence of network power in the high performing fields. 
The third quartile is characterised by strongly connected ministers, where the first and 
last quartile are again characterized by CEOs possessing more resources. One could 
argue here that politicians were by the nature of their profession more active in the 
recruitment and deployment of network capital, as their survival depends on significant 
pools of support. Once again, the question really is what these people were doing with 
their network power. They all seemed to have their fair share of contacts, but the 
outcomes were radically different. This will be accounted for in the causal process 
observations. 
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6.4.5 Average capital 
Before moving to the next component of relations, a final discussion of the total sums of 
capital is presented. The graph below adds all the capital scores. The top utilities 
generally slightly outrank their counterparts in total aggregated capital, but there is no 
clear trend. The first conclusion must therefore be that although the performing policy 
fields have slightly more capital than the underperforming systems, this did not seem 
significant enough to explain the variation in capital.  
Figure 19 Average capital 
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As with the discrete capital scores, both the best and worst performers displayed a 
capital advantage for the CEO. The third quartile of performers, cases 9 to 13, showed 
an imbalance tilted towards the minister. This variation excludes a straightforward 
relation between capital and performance.  
The prime question in the analysis going forward should therefore be what people 
were doing with their resources. The chief puzzle this exploration should address is why 
the overpowering strength of an actor can have such radically different outcomes. Both 
the top and bottom performers had strong CEOs, but the performance outcome was 
radically different. 
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6.5 EXPECTATIONS: DUAL VIEWS LEAD TO PERFORMANCE 
Table 25 Definition of Expectations of Relations: II 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
What sort of expectations 
do actors have of 
cooperation? 
Engineering Mentality 
-Dominant mindset towards 
organisation 
What shapes the 
expectations of actors? 
Actors’ views on: 
-Rules in organisations 
-Dynamics of interaction 
Knowledge Availability 
-Sharing of information 
between actors 
The expectations of relations are mainly about rules and group dynamics at this stage. 
The data set observations looks mainly at how people structure their world. However, it 
can be hard to compare all the different perspectives of individuals. Cultural Theory as 
developed by Mary Douglas proposes a framework which claims to capture all the 
different worldviews. This was later adapted by Hood for use in the study of public 
administration.286 The data was again retrieved from the interviews.  
Cultural Theory categorizes different forms of organisations by asking two simply 
questions. Firstly, it asks whether people consider themselves part of a group or more as 
individuals. Secondly, it asks whether people consider themselves bound by the rules of 
their social environment. The possibilities create a two by two quadrant mapping four 
different worldviews, as presented in the table below.  
People with a sense of both group and rules are deemed to have a hierarchical 
outlook on life (e.g. military units). If they combine a sense of group without a sense of 
rules, they are more egalitarian (e.g. group of friends). Actors with neither a sense of 
group or rules are called individualist (e.g. competing salesmen), those with no sense of 
group but with sense of rules are fatalistic (e.g. authoritarian regimes).  
                                                 
286  C. Hood, Art of state, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998). 
 
185
Table 26 Cultural theory287 
 Low Group  High Group  
High Grid  Fatalistic  
Low cooperation, rule 
bound  
E.g. Atomized societies in 
routines (Banfield)  
Hierarchist  
Social cohesive, rule-
bound  
E.g. Stereotype military 
structure (Dixon, 1976) 
Low Grid  Individualistic 
Atomized, stressing 
negotiation and bargaining 
E.g. Chicago School (Self) 
Egaliterian  
High participate, 
everything up for grabs  
E.g. Dark green 
alternatives to formal 
bureaucracy (Goodin) 
Cultural Theory aims to capture all main types of organisations that may be 
bolstered by the fact that most theorists which attempted a similar ‘way of life theory’ 
came up with corresponding sets of four to five categories. Pepperday finds that authors 
such as Bowles, Marriott, Ouchi, Merton and Douglas, sometimes disagree on more 
superficial matters, but that they fundamentally share a similar division of four to five 
base types.288 
Hood applies this categorisation to different government organisations as a whole. 
This categorisation will also be applied towards the end of this thesis. For now, the 
focus is on the individual worldviews of the minister and the CEO. Each of these thirty-
two actors was categorised on the basis of the two questions about attitudes towards 
rules and groups. The diagram below presents the assumed worldviews for the minister 
and contrasts these with those of the CEOs. The digit in the squares indicates the case 
number of the officials. 
                                                 
287  C. Hood, Art of state, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998). 
288  M. Pepperday, Way of life theory. (Doctoral thesis for Australian National University, February 
2009). 
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Table 27 Contrasting worldviews 
  Minister 
  Individ. Fatal. Egal. Hier. 
Individ.   14,15,16  
Fatal.  10,12,13 11  
Egal.  7 6  
CEO Hier.  3 1,8,9 2,4,5 
As could be expected, the majority of ministers have a high sense of group, fitting either 
the Egalitarian or the Hierarchical groupings. This might be connected to the nature of 
their occupation; forcing them to interact with wider constituency at all times. It is 
therefore striking to also see a significant amount of ministers around fatalism, which 
stresses rules and disavows the community spirit.  
It is also interesting to see that only three ministers, cases 2, 4 and 5, were 
categorised as scoring high on both grid and group. The rest of the ministers were much 
more polarised in their attitudes, either following only the rules or only the group. This 
might suggest a very narrow, polarised view of what leadership is about: A leader is 
either someone who strictly enforces external rules, or someone sits within the 
community and ignores the rules. 
The CEOs are distributed more evenly amongst the different categories, possibly 
through their generally greater exposure to worldviews in different cultures and 
countries as they often went abroad for their education. Interestingly, very few were 
categorized as egalitarian. Again, this could be shaped by the environment they were 
working in. Possibly they did come in with a greater belief in the amorphous interests of 
the community. Confronted with forceful ministerial bosses when in the job, they either 
succumbed to a fatalistic attitude or bolstered their belief in rules towards a hierarchical 
outlook. 
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Looking at the correlation of worldview to performance, it is striking to see that 
all performing utilities, case 1 to 9, have either egalitarian or hierarchical CEOs. This 
would suggest that a CEO with a strong group spirit is required to create public value. 
The exact mechanisms of this effect should be explored further in the next step of the 
analysis. 
This leaves one category; the mix of individualistic CEOs with egalitarian 
ministers. This mix of attitudes seemed to create the worst outcomes, as the bottom 
cases of 14, 15 and 16 could be found here. In policy discussion, the minister’s plea for 
group interests might have fallen on deaf ears with individualistic CEOs. These 
managers may have seen themselves more as entrepreneurs, than public servants. They 
would then their agency in the direction they thought best. Combined with the earlier 
observation that the CEOs of these same cases also controlled the majority of the capital 
in their field, this could degenerate into the CEO running his utility like a small empire 
beyond the public gaze and interest. Again, this possible causal process will have to be 
explored further in the next chapter. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
The collection of dataset observations present some interesting first pieces of the puzzle, 
but it does not yet seem clear how everything fits together. Most importantly, an 
assessment of the performance of the sixteen cases has been constructed which could be 
argued to be reliable enough for the research purposes of this thesis. 
Furthermore, some first observations have been made regarding the structure, 
nature and expectations of relations. For example, the number and diversity of actors 
seems to have an important effect on the performance of the utility. An imbalance of 
resources towards the CEO could result in either excellent or abysmal performance. The 
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performance seemed to be the highest in cases where the CEO and minister shared an 
appreciation of both group and rules. 
These observations give a first handful of impressions, but these quick tabulations 
of categorisations do not equate to causal inference. The exact mechanisms of how these 
static difference changes the dynamics and impact the performance will be explored in a 
structured manner in the following chapter. 
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7. CAUSAL PROCESS OBSERVATIONS: EXEMPLARY 
BEHAVIOUR 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of chapter 
Following the broad description of chapter 5 and narrow observations of chapter 6, it is 
now time to analyse the sixteen utilities in a manner that combines an appreciation of 
their context with a consistent logic of causality. The aim is to identify those processes 
that can explain the difference between the successful and failing utilities. As a start, 
this chapter will catalogue the various mechanisms observed which could be significant. 
Their actual impact will then be assessed through applying the fuzzy-set analysis in the 
next chapter.  
This chapter is thereby looking for what Brady and Collier refer to as causal 
process observations; ‘insights or pieces of data that provide information about context, 
process, or mechanism and that contribute distinctive leverage in causal inference.’289 
This could be any mechanism that aids the performance of the utility; from the way 
information is shared between key players, the management style of the CEO to the 
composition of the group of actors involved in the decision-making. The aim is to 
identify all those processes, or combination of processes, which could explain the 
difference between a successful and unsuccessful utility. 
 
                                                 
289  H.E. Brady and D. Collier, Rethinking social inquiry. (Rowland and Littlefield, Oxford, 2004), p. 
277. 
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Content of chapter 
The challenge in generating the causal process observations is to ensure that the set 
forwarded to the analysis is exhaustive and covers all of the possibly relevant 
dyanamics. At the same time, these processes still need to be distinguishable from each 
other to assess the precise mechanisms. Once again, the three components of social 
capital -structure, nature and expectations of relations- are therefore used to provide a 
comprehensive but articulated perspective on the actor interactions. 
This exercise will generate a list of six causal processes which are deemed to 
deserve further analysis. For the structure of relations, these processes are the degrees of 
distance between the actors and the ways in which rules are enforced. For the nature of 
relations, these are the degree of communality or ‘team spirit’ amongst the players and 
the presence of a dominant actor. For the expectations of relations, the identified 
mechanisms are the availability of knowledge to the actors and the type of mentality 
prevalent in the governance of the utility. 
For each of these mechanisms, the relevant observations are presented. The 
measurement of the presence of these processes requires some further definition, which 
is addressed by drawing on several concepts from the wider governance literature. The 
final calibration for the different processes will then be presented in the next chapter.  
In the conclusion of this chapter, an overview is presented of how the majority of 
actors thought these six mechanisms would influence performance. For example, it was 
commonly believed that a strict application of rules would lead to a higher performance 
of the agency, whereas the presence of dominant actors would hurt the utility. Whether 
these impressions are actually correct will then be tested in the next chapter. 
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7.2 POSSIBLE CAUSAL PROCESSES 
The distinctive advantage of causal process observations over quantitative data 
observations is that they help researchers ‘to connect the dots.’ An infamous example, 
demonstrating the value of process information over statistical information, is a story 
attributed to Tsar Ivan the Terrible: Russia’s provinces were suffering from a plague 
and the tsar noticed that a lot of doctors were present in the areas affected by the 
disease. He concluded from this that the doctors were the cause of the plague and had 
them all killed.290 Had he observed the precise causal mechanisms more closely, seeing 
that the doctors only appeared after patients got ill, he would likely have taken different 
measures. Similarly, the causal processes observations should here capture how certain 
characteristics are connected to the performance outcomes. 
The ambition is to identify all those variables that shape the outcome, at least 
when looking at the elite actors. If this was a hypothesis testing exercise, it would have 
been enough to merely test whether the researched variable explains all the variation of 
the outcome or not. In this case, it is unknown which variables could affect the outcome 
and all significant variations should therefore be taken into account. 
This is quite a stiff demand of any research exercise, even when restricting the 
scope of observations. The three components of social capital are therefore again used 
as the starting point to at least approach exhaustiveness. The most important check on 
exhaustiveness can be conducted afterwards. If any variation of the performance 
outcome cannot be explained by the configuration in the selected mechanisms, an 
important factor has been overlooked. 
It is also important to consider how exclusive the processes are from each other. If 
variables are closely intertwined it might be better to treat them as a single force. 
                                                 
290  Methodological thoughts, http://www.web-books.com/eLibrary/NC/B0/B56/150MB56.html 
(Retrieved on 29 August 2011). 
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However, the research methodology of fuzzy-sets does allow for co-dependence 
between variables. It explores whether certain outcomes only come up if two conditions 
are fulfilled. Moreover, in social capital theory, the structure, nature and expectations of 
relations are thought to reinforce each other. It may therefore be more appropriate to 
aim for variables which are not as such exclusive but distinct from each other. The 
different processes need to be well defined, but they may well still work together. 
In sum, the six causal processes investigated are therefore the product of the 
following question: Are there differences in the structure, nature and expectations of the 
relations between the elite actors which could explain the different performance 
outcomes of the utilities? The resulting causal processes and their respective definition 
are presented in the tables below. In the following paragraphs, each of the processes will 
be explored further. 
Table 28 Definition of components and causal process investigations 
Structure 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
Which actors are involved?  -Number of actors 
-Diversity of actors 
Relational Distance  
-Involvement of many and 
diverse actors 
What regime types are 
there? 
-Control over tariffs 
-Legal status organisation 
Grid Governance 
-Rigidity in observance of 
governance rules 
Nature 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
Are the resources evenly 
distributed? 
Actor Dominance 
-Presence of actor with 
much larger resource stock 
Are there antagonistic 
divisions between the 
actors? 
Distribution of capital: 
Economic 
Cultural 
Symbolic 
Network Group Governance 
-Degree of communality 
between governance actors 
 
193
Expectations 
Rich description Data set observations Causal processes 
What sort of expectations 
do actors have of 
cooperation? 
Engineering Mentality 
-Dominant mindset towards 
organisation 
What shapes the 
expectations of actors? 
Actors’ views on: 
-Rules in organisations 
-Dynamics of interaction 
Knowledge Availability 
-Sharing of information 
between actors 
7.3 STRUCTURE: RELATIONAL DISTANCE AND GRID GOVERNANCE 
From the perspective of the structure of relations, social capital theory is mainly 
interested in which actors are connected to which, as in bonding and bridging capital, 
and how rigid these relations remain over time. When considering these two questions, 
the sixteen utilities showed interesting variations in the Relational Distance between the 
actors and the rigidity in the application of the governance rules. 
7.3.1 Relational Distance 
The most obvious difference between the sixteen utility fields was the amount of actors 
involved in the governance of the utilities. Beyond the minister, CEO, director or 
permanent secretary, many other actors could be involved as well. The amount of actors 
was measured in chapter 5, yet it did not show a clear-cut relation between amount of 
actors and performance. Both very successful and very unsuccessful utilities had an 
above average amount of actors involved.  
However, that was merely a counting exercise, rather than qualitatively measuring 
the relation between these outside actors. This neglects to check whether these extra 
actors actually represented extra perspectives. It is proposed that the concept of 
Relational Distance as developed by Black would be better equipped to capture these 
subtleties. Relational Distance measures not only the amount of actors involved in a 
field, but also the differences in position and attitude between them. For example, a 
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field with two directors of the same political party will have a smaller Relational 
Distance than a field with two directors from two competing parties. 
 
Observations 
Many interviewees suggested that their performance was positively influenced by the 
role of people from outside their immediate circles. They would argue these outside 
actors provided more effective control of the governance of the utility. Indeed, the use 
of an ‘outside pair of eyes’ is often applied in good corporate governance.  
The application of this principle could be observed when looking at the role of 
outside investors. A prime objective of corporatisation was the ability to attract capital 
to the utilities. When the investor bought an actual share of the company, they would 
gain the right to appoint a director. If banks provided a line of credit, they often also 
demand the right to appoint a director or the opportunity to audit the books. 
The respondents were divided on the benefit of such an involvement of financial 
institutions. It was usually the CEOs that were more positive in their view on outside 
investors, whereas the political actors were less certain. On one hand, the banks 
introduced a level of professionalism to the supervision of the company, forcing the 
politically appointed directors to raise their game. One CEO comments: ‘Some of the 
directors on my board represent overseas investors, whereas the rest are appointed 
locally. I get [the local directors] into my office immediately to educate them on my 
business. I don’t want to them to look foolish in front of the external shareholders.’ 291 
In addition, investors would often stipulate certain conditions before giving their 
money to the government. These guarantees could include that the local commercial 
laws would be respected or promises that tariffs would rise. This could often be used as 
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ammunition by the management in dealings with the government. In one case, a conflict 
erupted over a proposed hike in tariffs. The management wanted to raise the fees to 
cover the rising costs, while the minister feared a public outcry. The lender bankrolling 
the utility then issued a warning to the government that it would be forced to reconsider 
the loan if the tariffs were not raised.292 The minister eventually had to concede defeat 
and the tariffs were increased.  
Respondents within the government and community representatives were less 
satisfied with the role of financiers. They felt intimidated or side-lined by the external 
investors. In one case, the external investor was viewed as a Trojan horse: ‘[The 
external investor] was first welcomed as a white knight rescuing the company. The 
investors then appointed a special representative as chair of the board of directors in a 
meeting behind closed doors. […] Yet this created a vicious circle of accountability. As 
a director, [the chair] would approve further loans between the utility and the financing 
institution he represented. This only increased their hold over the company. In return, 
the lender kept asking for his reappointment. It was impossible to break that connection. 
Even the government [as sole shareholder], was unable to fire him.’293  
Although these interviewees acknowledged that the external investor improved 
the process of governance, they felt this was done as the expense of the outcomes of 
governance. In this view, the investor’s particularistic concern with return on 
investment collided with the general interest of the community. 
Next to external investors, there were other types of actors involved. 
Environmental groups, tourist boards, trade unions and business associations, would 
also play an active part in some utilities. For example, on all islands, the hospitality 
industry was involved in pushing for greater electricity capacity and reliability.  
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Trade unions also had some role to play through their high degree of organisation 
in many of the utility agencies. They would periodically flex their muscles in support of 
better pay. Yet compared to the dominance of trade unions in state enterprises across the 
world, their role seemed to be limited. Some enterprising CEOs or ministers would 
reach out to them, educating and motivating them to contribute towards the health of the 
utility.294 In some cases, the unions would actually start striking when they felt the 
integrity of the governance of the utility was under threat. 
A further group of actors would be experts brought in from consultancies. They 
would be called in regularly to provide expertise or an external opinion. Their 
independence could be disputed as they were all heavily reliant on the repeat custom of 
the government in these small economies. Another set of expert actors were brought in 
from overseas. For example, some utilities worked together with their counterparts in 
the region or in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, exchanging knowledge and 
people. Several respondents were quite positive about these latter connections. ‘The 
control and performance of these agencies improved because of their collaborative 
partners. They have strategic links with actors in the Netherlands, who bring in capital 
or cooperate on strategic issues.’295 
 
Defining mechanisms 
The use of external actors seems to address the fundamental limitations of small 
societies; the lack of expertise and external opinions. It could be argued that through 
tying in these outside actors, the utility was subject to greater scrutiny. However, the 
nature of the relation between these actors needs to be considered as well, evaluating 
their closeness to the other actors also needs to be considered. Otherwise, this causal 
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process does not move beyond the simple headcount executed earlier for the dataset 
observations. 
It is proposed that the degree of distance and diversity of actors in the governance 
of the utilities be measured through the concept of Relational Distance as developed by 
Black.296 A Relational Distance is considered small if two actors have met frequently 
over a long period of time, share many links in their networks and have a broad scope of 
issues covered by their interactions. The Relational Distance is considered large if they 
rarely meet, are isolated from each other’s networks and have contact only on a narrow 
range of issues. 
Rather than suggesting a specific Relational Distance will improve the 
governance, Black merely argues that the Relational Distance will affect the nature of 
the governance. For example, if people are close, their style of supervision is likely to 
be informal, if they are only distantly related, governance would be more formal. 
However, the dominant view of the respondents was that this distance would be 
favourable for good governance, echoing the prescription of the literature. It may 
therefore be worth testing whether a large Relational Distance in this case directly 
translates to better performance. 
7.3.2 Grid Governance 
Next to considering which connections shaped the governance fields, it also seems 
relevant to explore how rigidly these relations were being policed. Many CEOs and 
directors argued that the degrees of separation in the governance model ought to be 
strictly observed, barring the political principals from overstepping their mark. These 
actors would constantly guard their own territory by stringently policing the rules of 
separation.  
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There was, however, a counter-current of the people highlighting how these rules 
serve merely as an inspiration for the overall idea of good utility management and 
consider the actual practice a more amorphous affair. These actors argue that bending 
the rules gives them the flexibility to produce the most public value. Cultural Theory, 
proposes to measure this mechanism by capturing the adherence to Grid Governance for 
all of the sixteen utilities. What is important here is approach generates the most 
success.  
 
Observations 
Many of the CEOs hammered on the special legal position of their organisation, arguing 
that the private status of the public utility should keep direct political involvement out. 
‘There is no such thing as a public utility on this island. We are a private company 
whose owner happens to be the government,’ commented on CEO.297 These respondents 
argued that the rules, often laid down in the statutes or a Code of Corporate 
Governance, were the one barrier between the island and anarchy.  
Other actors argued that a more flexible approach was required to negotiate the 
difficulties of utility policy. This often took the form of a shortcut method, whereby the 
CEO and minister would work directly together, devising an informal cooperation 
contract bypassing the board of directors that formally stood between them. The actors 
involved with these arrangements argued that they had to take into account the needs of 
the other party and therefore needed to work closely together to create synergy.  
From a structure of relations perspective, this shortcut method recognizes the 
proximity of the players within such a small community. It also deals with the paradox 
that these agencies are nominally privatised, whilst the minister will still be held 
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accountable for their performance. On one hand, this then fits with a more hybrid view 
of civil servants, allowing them to step across the line between policy and politics to 
create a smoother interaction.  
On the other hand, letting go of the rules of good governance, could also mean 
that all checks and balances fall by the wayside. A problem would to be that such 
shortcut methods may exclude other rightful stakeholders. The rules were often 
designed to create a system of checks and balances that urge or compel the processes 
towards serving only the general interests. A distancing from the formal rules of 
engagement could lead to private interests taking over the policy process.  
 
Defining mechanisms 
In sum, the impact of the way rules are used could have different consequences: Actors 
could ignore the rules and exclude, for example, the shareholder out of all business 
transactions. Or actors could ignore the rules and use that flexibility to work in different 
ways than strictly envisioned. Several authors have indeed proposed ditching the formal 
rules of governance when working on small islands, better whether that actually 
generated better results needs to be tested here.298  
It is proposed to use Cultural Theory again, but this time for the whole set of 
actors per utility, rather than the individual ministers and CEOs. If the group of actors 
involved in the governance of one utility can be described as being strictly bound by the 
governance rules, the field could be typified as high Grid Governance. If actors feel less 
bound by the rules, they have developed a low Grid Governance style. 
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7.4 NATURE: GROUP GOVERNANCE AND ACTOR DOMINANCE 
From a social capital perspective, the nature of relations is about the kind of cooperation 
actors practice and the degree of equality in the connection. From these questions, it was 
interesting to observe that different sets of actors had different beliefs about the 
cooperation. Some governance fields denied a shared interest, where others explicitly 
aimed for a positive sum outcome. Furthermore, some of the utilities were governed by 
individuals who control significantly more resources, whereas others groups were more 
egalitarian. The impact of these differences warrants further analysis. 
7.4.1 Group Governance 
It was striking to observe the differences between the sense of communality or ‘team 
spirit’ across the sixteen utilities. Some sets of actors constantly considered their shared 
interest and were willing to share resources amongst each other. In other cases, there 
seemed to be a constant battle over the spoils of policy. Using the other axis of Cultural 
Theory, on belonging to groups, it is proposed to measure this sense of communality by 
looking at the Group Governance. 
 
Observations 
Some CEOs went quite far in placing themselves in the position of the minister. ‘You 
have to recognize the responsibility of the political sphere. If the island is dirty, people 
will blame them, therefore you should work as closely as possible together.’299 Visiting 
European auditors were often quite uncomfortable with these sentiments, expecting that 
these sentiments equated to a tendency of civil servants to help and protect the minister 
beyond the realm of propriety and legality.  
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However, the identification of a shared interest was not without reason. With the 
corporatisation of many of the utilities, the minister had nominally delegated most of his 
responsibilities. However, as evidenced by earlier quotes, the people will still hold the 
politicians accountable. At some utilities, the CEO would recognise this difficulty and 
work to help the minister where possible. This could range from having weekly phone 
conversations to update the minister on possible political flashpoints, to financing 
policy plans of the minister out with public utility revenue. They thereby went beyond 
their formal interactions, arguing that this would improve the policy outcomes overall.  
Other actors felt that this identification with each other’s interest would only lead 
to inefficiency and corruption. They argued that an intimate contact between CEO and 
minister was bound to degenerate into swapping favours, rather than building 
sustainable policies. The governance regimes would become governance cliques. 
 
Defining mechanisms 
The rules of good governance seem to be written with a singular principal-agent relation 
in mind. Beyond that, some stakeholders may be involved, but it ultimately concerns 
line of command between individual players. However, as Talbot discusses, a more 
realistic perspective would be to acknowledge the complexity of the governance 
environment and its amorphous nature.300 This would frame the governance relationship 
as a regime; a combination of actors which jointly steer the policy field.  
It is again possible to use the Cultural Theory framework of Douglas and measure 
to what extent the set of actors form a group through the degree of Group Governance. 
This would draw on the frequency of actor’s interactions, mutuality of relationships, 
scope of activities and tightness of the group boundaries. This causal process then 
                                                 
300  C. Talbot, Theories of performance, (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 
202
divides those fields where a majority of the elites think about their interaction from a 
broader sense of interdependence versus those was they are only concerned with the 
strict delineation within the legal principal. The question is then which of these 
configurations produced the best results. Although a strong team spirit may be 
welcome, it may also further entangle already convoluted relationships. 
7.4.2 Actor Dominance 
Another frequently mentioned effect was that a utility was said to be improved by a 
strong leader. A positive view would suggest that leaders with a large amount of capital 
at their disposal might bring their utilities to perform better. Although it may not explain 
how leaders end up at those positions in the first place, it may provide a key insight into 
how utilities turn from failures into success stories. The presence of strong actors could 
be measured via the distribution of resources between the people involved. 
 
Observations 
The reputation of strong leaders seems to be mixed. In the negative scenario, most 
respondents would argue that a dominant actor would take over the reins and forget 
about the general interest. For most of these cases, they were described either as 
political takeovers or bureaucratic hijacks, depending on whether it was the minister or 
CEO dominating the field. Either way, the nature of interactions becomes dominated 
once more by the hierarchical relations of the past. 
Even when the strong player did not seek total dominance, they may still have it. 
The presence of constraining forces is sometime direly felt by unexpected sources, as 
one minister confessed: ‘Nothing in the system withholds me from asking private favour 
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in return for my public service. It is only my own values which prevent me from doing 
that.’301 
The presence of dominant actors, however, is not solely associated with failing 
fields. Some success stories where ascribed to specific individuals. A fellow manager 
observed how a single official dramatically improved one of the worst public agencies 
on the island. ‘He found the organisation as a dumpster full of losers with nowhere else 
to go. He was able to bind them to his vision of creating a better company.’302 The 
corporation referred to was indeed one of the top performers in this data set. 
The same civil servant actually argued that strength was a requirement for a 
success, reasoning that a strong leader could afford to be honest. ‘The fewer 
competencies you have, the more you need to compromise on your character. I want 
CEOs that are a master of all trades that would so turn around all the utilities.’303  
 
Defining mechanisms 
The literature is divided on whether the presence of disproportionally strong actors is a 
good or a bad thing. The negative view of actor dominance is a carbon copy of 
Putnam’s description of the Mafia-like relationships dominating Southern Italy. This 
power-driven mentality leads to a scramble to acquire the most capital. When a player 
has established himself on top of the pyramid, he can continue to make demands across 
the field, leading to an omnipresent and ominous role for politics. 
From a positive view, Collins argues that a selfless leader can raise a company 
from good to great.304 Although highly qualified, these business leaders put the 
organisation first and bring their environment up to their level. The presence of strong 
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leaders also relates to the entrepreneurial advocacy as described by Moore when 
detailing strategies to create public value. However, Moore cautions that even when the 
intentions are good, the performance may still suffer when these strong leaders lose 
their sense of perspective.305 It remains to be seen whether this occurred here. 
The presence of a Dominant Actor can most conveniently be defined by looking 
at the distribution of resources between the actors. Taking cues from the measurements 
in the earlier chapters, it could be possible to distinguish utilities where all actors have 
similar amounts of capital from those where one actor has a distinct surplus over the 
others.  
7.5 EXPECTATIONS: ENGINEERING MENTALITY AND KNOWLEDGE 
AVAILABILITY 
7.5.1 Engineering Mentality 
The expectations of relations can be dissected into how people view the world and what 
information shapes their perspectives. Looking at the worldview, the Cultural Theory 
framework already captures most of the possible variation in how actors view their 
peers and the group. One further element that still needs to be addressed is how actors 
looked at the business of government specifically. Within the interviews, there were 
those that took a very positivistic, techno-centric and rational viewpoint on the running 
of the utilities, and those who had a more organic mentality. 
 
Observations 
Many CEOs seemed to value a distinct approach the governance of their organisation: 
‘The first thing you need to do is plan: What do you want, what is your vision, mission? 
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We drafted five years plans, all centred on that one question; what is our core business 
and how do we become excellent at it?’ 306 
 This planning approach was mirrored by some of the perspectives of political 
actors: ‘You could say the CEOs were the main contributors to the successes, but I think 
that the politicians systematically delivered a good brief, saying; “This is your budget 
and you may do what you like.” There was a shift in focus from throughput to results. 
This created a more professional relation with the government.’307 This would argue 
that setting clear goalposts for success, performance become more attainable. 
                                                
Yet other CEOs would take a more nuanced perspective on the establishment of 
value in the public sector, arguing that ‘Success is a deliberative concept.’308 This moves 
beyond the more rational and positivistic mind-set that success is a goals that can be 
described fully in numbers. It rather argues that success is a target which is susceptible 
to change as the times, viewpoints and actors change. 
Each mindset could potentially contribute to better performance. An Engineering 
Mentality may be required in the delivery of utility, especially in such a chaotic 
environment. A lack of planning and rationalisation may open up the policy to a 
destructive process of perpetual tinkering. On the other hand, such flexibility and 
sensitivity to the context may actually be required in the given political context. 
 
Defining mechanisms 
The contrast between two types of thinking touches on the juxtaposition often made 
between European versus non-European styles of thinking. Levi-Strauss, for example, 
famously distinguished the planning cultures of North-Western Europe from 
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improvising cultures (bricoleurs) of societal organisation.309 Hofstede provide a 
measurement of cultural characteristics on a wider range of axis, but also points to 
cultural differences as the root of many management conflicts.310 
This thesis does not aim to deconstruct the differences of thinking between 
different parts of the world, but merely hopes to capture the variation in how a small set 
of individuals approached their organisations. It may therefore be wiser to take a crisply 
defined perspective on the different worldview, capturing the essential differences. 
Harvey, for example, defines modern management thinking as ‘[t]he belief in ‘linear 
progress, absolute truths, and rational planning of ideal social orders’, characterised by a 
worldview that is ‘positivistic, techno-centric and rationalistic.’311 
For the application to this causal process, which essentially about the distinction 
between organic and engineering approaches to governance, this definition seems to be 
workable. The prevalence of such an Engineering Mentality can be captured by 
measuring the degree of positivism, techno-centricity and rationalism amongst its 
actors. If these elements are weak, the worldview could be described as more organic 
and deliberative.  
7.5.2 Knowledge Availability 
Next to the worldviews people already have, it is also important to measure what is 
changing their perspectives. Across the utilities, there seemed to be a marked difference 
between the amounts of knowledge actors could access. Listening closely to the stories 
of the elite players, their attitudes to information sharing seemed to vary greatly.  
 
Observations 
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Some respondents argued that information should only be communicated on a need-to-
know basis to the other stakeholders. ‘I tried explaining my policy to these people, but 
they just will not understand and get upset. Now I just keep a low profile.’312 Other 
actors sought to actively stimulate an open flow of information between the actors. ‘The 
first thing there was that we had to get with the board and we needed a way of, you 
know, get the information flowing. Not only to the top, but also down and in.’313  
The cases which would be included for this process observation would be 
characterised by an open flow of information between the actors going beyond the mere 
formal requirements. However, this raises once more the questionable track-record of 
transparency. More information can also lead to more confusion, as contended by the 
likes of Fung and Tsoakas.314 This brings to mind the comment referenced earlier of the 
director who felt that all his information was being spun around until the public was left 
more confused than before.315 
The key difference might be whether people trust or value the expertise on offer. 
As a director put it; ‘Very often, we have someone that knows what he is talking about, 
but the political guys will just shout him down.’316 By contract, a public manager from 
another utility observed ‘We do well because the minister knows the business. This does 
not only mean that he understands what we are doing, but he also understands the 
limits of his own expertise and values the opinions of others.’317 
 
                                                 
312  Public Manager 18 
313  Director 7 
314  A. Fung, M. Graham and D. Weil, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007). H. Tsoukas, ‘The tyranny of light: The temptations and 
the paradoxes of the information society’, Futures, Volume 29, Issue 9, November 1997, Pages 827-843. 
315  Director 6 
316  Director 14 
317  Public Manager 5 
 
208
Defining mechanisms 
Describing the flow of information can be a tricky affair, mainly because knowledge is 
so elusive. It is proposed here to measure the knowledge sharing between the key 
individuals. This entails first detailing whether there is a lot of expertise or societal 
insight present in the system –drawing on the data set observations- and then to see 
whether the individuals holding this knowledge were actively sharing it. 
The quality of the information here is important. Adler developed a system of 
knowledge hierarchy, holding that data is not information, information is not 
knowledge, and knowledge is not wisdom. The underlying idea is that the higher parts 
of the knowledge hierarchy are about pieces of insight that increasingly reduce more of 
the uncertainty while increasing the guidance on what actions should be taken.318  
For example, different publications on pollution published by the electricity plant 
versus those of the environment agency might be contradictory and initially increase the 
debate. As the policy process confirms, weighs and prioritizes these inputs towards 
information and knowledge, the system generates a common wisdom on what to do 
with the air quality. 
The idea is that the actors are bringing together knowledge to so create a better 
insight in the utility and foster consensus of what should be done. In the process of 
knowledge management, they are effectively pooling the information resource; 
‘coordinating, assembling and retrieving knowledge’. 319 The cases with a high 
Knowledge Availability are then those where information would be actively pooled 
with other actors. Whether this effect actually took place and positively affected the 
performance outcomes will have to be assessed next. 
                                                 
318  See, for example: M. Adler, Dialectic, (Kegan Paul, London, 1927). 
319  N.I. Boer, Knowledge sharing in organisations, (Doctoral thesis for Erasmus University, 2005). 
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7.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a first analytical look of the sixteen policy fields in motion, 
aiming to identify the processes which could potentially be significant for obtaining 
success. Two mechanisms were identified for each of the respective components of 
structure, nature and expectations of relations. 
Each of the causal processes could theoretically have both a positive or negative 
impact on performance. The table below presents all of these processes again, but adds 
the effect on performance as predicted by the majority of the respondents. In sum, it is 
anticipated by most of the actors that utilities with a high incidence Relational Distance, 
Grid Governance, Engineering Mentality and Knowledge Availability, are more likely 
to produce government success. In reverse, cases with these effects absent and a high 
degree of Group Governance and Actor Dominance are more likely to fail. 
Table 29 Propositions for causal processes 
Component Causal process Proposition 
Structure Relational Distance ↑ Distance = ↑ Value 
Structure Grid Governance ↑ Grid = ↑ Value 
Nature Group Governance ↑ Group = ↓ Value 
Nature Actor Dominance ↑ Dominance = ↓ Value 
Expectations Engineering Mentality ↑ Engineering = ↑ Value 
Expectations Knowledge Availability ↑ Knowledge = ↑ Value 
The significance of this list should not be exaggerated, the majority opinion might be 
wrong. Moreover, it is expected that it will be the interaction between the processes that 
determine the performance outcome. For now, the main aim is to provide an easy 
overview useful for later reference. Whether any of these effects actually took place, , 
will be explored in the next chapter. 
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8. FUZZY-SET ANALYSIS: RECIPES FOR SUCCESS 
AND FAILURE 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of chapter 
Having identified the causal processes that might potentially explain the differences 
between the successful and failing utilities, it is now time to put these intuitions to the 
test. This causal inference process needs to first categorise precisely which causal 
processes took place at which utilities and to provide clear measurements across the 
cases. It then needs to be assessed what the influence is of each of the processes on the 
outcome, or how they work together to create public value. 
Fundamentally, this chapter seeks the recipes for creating government success at 
these public utilities. These should reveal what dose and combination of Relational 
Distance, Knowledge Availability, etc. was able to contribute to an effective service 
delivery. Conversely, it should also reveal what combination of ingredients creates 
failure. 
The fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis as developed by Ragin will be used to 
generate these recipes. It is felt that this method both allows for the rigid causal 
inference, as for the conceptual subtlety to capture all the nuanced differences between 
the sixteen utilities. However, there some weaknesses remain in the method, principally 
the danger of reversed causality and the lack of insight into development over time. 
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These weaknesses require some sensitivity analysis in this chapter and further 
exploration in the next chapter. 
 
Content of chapter 
The method of fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis is built on the theory of sets. The 
first step is therefore to determine which utilities are members of a set of successful 
utilities and which are outside this group. Using the public value scores generated in 
chapter 5, the sixteen cases are divided in- and outside this ‘success set’. 
Fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis is called ‘fuzzy’ because cases can also 
belong partly to a set, rather than being either in or out. For example, a case with a 
public value score which is only just positive, Case 9 with a score of 0.3, should belong 
to the set of successful utilities as it does generate some public value. However, it is not 
as successful as Case 1, with a public value score of 5.5. To allow for this difference, 
Case 9 can be awarded a lower degree of membership than Case 1, reducing its impact 
on the causal inference, while still counting towards the set. This nuanced approach is 
felt to be specifically appropriate for the complex world of governance. 
After determining the membership of the success set, the chapter moves on to 
consider how far the utilities were members of the sets of Actor Dominance, 
Engineering Mentality, etc. by weighing how strong these processes were at the 
respective utilities. In a similar manner to the success set, cases are awarded various 
degree of membership for each of the six causal processes. 
This then clears the way for the actual casual inference, using the Boolean algebra 
central to fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis. In essence, this method counts how often 
a causal process occurs when a positive outcome is also present; giving an assessment 
of how necessary this given process is for the generation of public value.  
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The analysis gives both a recipe for success and failure, detailing the processes 
that strengthens or undermines the creation of government success. The most important 
route to success seems to be the combination of Relational Distance and Knowledge 
Availability, although an absence of Dominant Actors and Engineering Mentality could 
also lead to success. Failure mainly seems to stem from a lack of Group Governance 
and/or Relational Distance between the governance actors. 
8.2 CONSTRUCTING THE TRUTH TABLE 
8.2.1 Turning performance into sets 
The first step of the fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis is to arrange the outcome 
variable into sets. Ragin suggests a number of different ways of categorizing fuzzy sets, 
awarding them different degrees of membership.320 The most rudimentary forms would 
be to consider all cases either wholly in (1.00), wholly out (0.00) or neither in nor out 
(0.5). A more advanced form would be the four point fuzzy set, where cases are either 
fully in (1.00), more in than out (0.66), more out than in (0.33) or fully out (0.0). 
Finally, cases could be arranged along a continuous scale, whereby the small differences 
between cases are translated to different degrees of membership (i.e. 1.00, 0.93, 0.34, 
etc.).  
The most important thing is to first consider the quality of the data available and 
select the scale accordingly. Very precise data would allow for the use of a more 
intricate scale, whereas a smaller data base suggests a rougher division into sets. 
However, this provides no guidance yet for how the cases should be distributed across 
the case. Case 1 and Case 2, for example, have a public value score of 5.5 and 3.5 
respectively. Would this mean that Case 1 should be more a member of the success set 
than Case 2, even though both generate a lot of public value? 
                                                 
320  B. Rihoux and C. Ragin (editors), Configurational Comparative Analysis, Sage Publications, 
2007, chapter 5. 
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Ragin addresses this problem specifically; ‘When constructing ordinal scales, 
researchers do not peg categories to degree of membership in sets; rather, the categories 
are simply arrayed relative to each other, yielding a rank order. For example, a 
researcher might develop a four-level ordinal scheme of country wealth, using 
categories that range from destitute to super rich.’ 321 However, as Ragin explains, this 
sample might include the countries of Qatar and Luxembourg. Although there are 
considerable differences in their GDP per capita, both would arguably qualify as super 
rich countries. In this case, the researcher could say that any country with an income 
above USD50.000 GDP per capita per annum qualifies as super rich or 1.00 
membership. Equally, both Liberia and Zimbabwe might qualify as destitute or 0.00 
membership, as both their income is under USD1.000. 
In a ranking exercise, rather than a set exercise, the cases would just be ranked 
according to their relative position. However, it is not important whether Case 9 is 
better than Case 10, but whether Case 9 adds public value and should therefore be taken 
into the success set. This means that there is an outside opinion on what constitutes 
good or bad performance, which needs to be introduced by the researcher, rather than 
deduced by ranking. 
As Ragin continues ‘the specific translation of ordinal ranks to fuzzy membership 
scores depends on the fit between the content of the ordinal categories and the 
researcher’s conceptualization of the fuzzy set. This point underscores the fact that 
researchers must calibrate membership scores using substantive and theoretical 
knowledge when developing fuzzy sets. Such calibration should not be mechanical.’322 
                                                 
321  Benoit Rihoux and Charles Ragin (editors), Configurational Comparative Analysis, Sage 
Publications, 2007, p. 71-103. 
322  Benoit Rihoux and Charles Ragin (editors), Configurational Comparative Analysis, Sage 
Publications, 2007, p. 71-103. 
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In other words, the awarding of set membership requires due consideration by the 
researcher. 
Ragin calls upon the researcher to first define three anchors in the process of 
calibration; the criterion for fully-in membership, fully-out membership and the tipping 
point. The tipping point is easily defined in the case of public value; if a utility attains a 
performance score of zero, it is neither successful nor a failure and should get a 
membership of 0.5. It is proposed to award full membership at a score of 3 or higher 
and award fully-out at a score of –3 or lower. This means that case 1 and 2 receive a full 
membership of the success set at 1.00, whereas case 12 to 16 receive membership of 
0.00. The other cases receive a score proportional to their public value attained, as 
presented in the table below. 
Applying the fuzzy set along this scale has two advantages. Firstly, all of the cases 
classified as fully successful, have a score above zero even when taking their confidence 
interval into account. Similarly, all of the cases classified as fully failing, would not 
come close to a neutral score even with their confidence interval. In other words, there 
is a 90% certainty that further measurements would confirm that these cases are in the 
right set. 
Secondly, the fuzzy membership of the cases in the middle reflects the degree of 
uncertainty over the public value delivered by these utilities. Case 9, for example, 
attained a public value of 0.3. However, a comparatively large confidence interval of +/- 
2.7 spanned both positive and negative public value scores. Its membership of the 
success set is 0.55, only a little more in- than outside the performance set, which reflects 
this uncertainty. This will in turn limit the weight of this case in the ensuing causal 
inferences. 
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Table 30 Performance in sets 
Case 
Mean 
score 
Confidence 
interval 
Membership of
success set 
1. 5.5 2.1 1.00 
2. 3.5 2.0 1.00 
3. 2.3 1.7 0.88 
4. 1.3 1.9 0.72 
5. 0.8 1.2 0.63 
6. 0.8 3.1 0.63 
7. 0.3 2.3 0.55 
8. 0.3 2.5 0.55 
9. 0.3 2.7 0.55 
10. -1.0 2.0 0.33 
11. -1.5 1.1 0.25 
12. -3.0 2.6 0.00 
13. -3.3 3.1 0.00 
14. -3.5 0.5 0.00 
15. -3.5 1.4 0.00 
16. -5.3 3.0 0.00 
8.2.2 Relational Distance 
The next step is to convert the causal process observations from the previous chapter 
into sets. However, the data is here less precise than for the success set, suggesting a 
scale with fewer markers. Ragin proposes to use a four-point scale when the researcher 
has a rich set of data, but cannot be too precise in his allocation of membership. This 
scale of fully-in (1.00), more in than out (0.66), more out than in (0.33) and fully-out 
will therefore be used for each of the causal processes. 
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For each of the six causal processes, the membership per case will be determined in a 
similar manner. The calibration resumes from the more general discussion of the causal 
process in the first chapter. It then draws on concepts in the literature to provide a 
precise definition and measurement of the strength of the process.  
In this case, Black suggests four indicators for the measurement of Relational 
Distance; Scope of contact between two actors, frequency of contact, age of the 
relationship and shared connections in the network.323 These indicators could be applied 
to all of the actors involved in the respective cases and then added up per utility. For 
example, a politically appointed local director adds only little Relational Distance to the 
utility, because he meets frequently with the minister, discusses a large scope of issues 
and they share a lot of political connections. A director from overseas may score much 
higher on Relational Distance. 
Table 31 Relational Distance 
 CPO Full inclusion 
(1.00 member) 
More in than out 
(0.66 member) 
More out than in 
(0.33 member) 
Full exclusion 
(0.00 member) 
Relational 
Distance  >15 score on all 
actors involved 
11 to 15 score on 
all actors 
involved 
6 to 10 score on 
all actors 
involved 
<6 score on all 
actors involved 
For the calibration of the scores, it was then decided when a utility could be said to 
contain a lot of Relational Distance within its system and when not. The scores ranged 
from 4 to 18 Relational Distance characteristics, with an average of 11,4 per utility and 
standard deviation of +/- 4. It was therefore decided that utilities with over 11 
characteristics were counted more in than out (0.66), with those over one standard 
deviation or more receiving a fully in score (1.00). A reversed pattern was set for those 
under 11, receiving (0.33), or one standard deviation below the mean (0.00). 
                                                 
323  D. Black, The behaviour of law, (Academic Press, New York, 1976), p. 41. 
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8.2.3 Grid Governance 
Table 32 Grid Governance 
 CPO Full inclusion 
(1.00 member) 
More in than out 
(0.66 member) 
More out than in 
(0.33 member) 
Full exclusion 
(0.00 member) 
Grid 
Governance 4 characteristics 3 characteristics 2 characteristics 
Less than 2 
characteristics 
Douglas and Mars developed four indicators for Grid sentiment; the degree to which 
classes of people are insulated from each other, the amount of autonomy they possess, 
the span of control over other people and the degree to which there is a negotiation over 
the rules. 324 If there is little space between the actors, yet a great deal of autonomy, 
control and rule negotiation, the Grid sentiment is considered weak.  
For each of the sixteen cases, it can be assessed to what extent any of these four 
characteristics apply. The average score was 2.1 characteristics, with a standard 
deviation of +/- 1. It is therefore proposed that a case with all four of the Grid 
characteristics is marked as applying high Grid Governance (1.00 membership), 
decreasing the degree of membership with every characteristic they lack. 
8.2.4 Group Governance 
Table 33 Group Governance 
 CPO Full inclusion 
(1.00 member) 
More in than out 
(0.66 member) 
More out than in 
(0.33 member) 
Full exclusion 
(0.00 member) 
Group 
Governance 4 characteristics 3 characteristics 2 characteristics 
Less than 2 
characteristics 
Douglas and Mars also developed four indicators of Group Governance; the frequency 
of the interactions between the actors, the mutuality of their relationships, the scope of 
their activities and the tightness of the group boundary. If actors interact often, have a 
                                                 
324  Spickard, ‘The Background of the Grid Dimension’, Sociological Analysis, vol 50, no. 2, 1989, p. 
171-176. 
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two-way relationship, work together in a great variety of activities and in a group with 
clearly defined memberships, the governance system could be defined as High Group.  
It was assessed for each the cases to what extent the four indicators applied. The 
average score was 1.8 characteristics, with a standard deviation of 1.4. If they have all 
four characteristics, the case will be categorized as High Grid, decreasing the set 
membership with ever characteristic missing. 
8.2.5 Actor Dominance 
Table 34 Strong leaders 
 CPO Full inclusion 
(1.00 member) 
More in than out 
(0.66 member) 
More out than in 
(0.33 member) 
Full exclusion (0 
member) 
Actor 
Dominance 
>29% capital 
difference 
20-29% capital 
difference 
10-19% 
difference 0-9% difference 
The measurement of capital in the data observations already indicated that there were 
significant differences in the amount of capital actors had at their disposal. It is 
proposed to divide the membership based on the capital gap between the strongest actor 
and the underlying party. On average, there was a gap of 17% between the dominant 
actors and the other party, with a standard deviation of +/- 13%. 
If an actor had a more than 29% higher stock of capital than the surrounding 
players, the utility would be qualified as a fully-in Actor Dominance (1.00). If the 
difference was between 20 and 29%, the utility would be classified as more in than out 
(0.66). If the difference was only 10 to 19%, the case would be marked at more out than 
in (0.33). If the difference was smaller than that, it would be deemed insignificant and 
classified as fully-out (0.00). 
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8.2.6 Engineering Mentality 
Table 35 Engineering Mentality 
 CPO Full inclusion 
(1.00 member) 
More in than 
out (0.66 
member) 
More out than 
in (0.33 
member) 
Full exclusion (0 
member) 
Engineering 
Mentality 3 characteristics 2 characteristics 1 characteristic 
No 
characteristics 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Engineering Mentality of some of the utilities 
will captured by indicating the prevalence amongst the actors of positivism (belief in 
one truth), techno-centricity (breaking down problems to material issues) and 
rationalism (use of logic and planning to attain goals). The data was again drawn from 
the interviews and tested against the documents about the utilities when available. 
On average, policy fields had 1.8 of the characteristics of Engineering Thinking, 
with a standard deviation of +/- 0.8. It was therefore decided that a policy field would 
be qualified as fully Engineering Mentality (1.00) if it had all three characteristics. With 
the decrease of every characteristic, the degree of membership would also decrease.  
8.2.7 Knowledge Availability 
Table 36 Knowledge availability 
 CPO Full inclusion 
(1.00 member) 
More in than 
out (0.66 
member) 
More out than 
in (0.33 
member) 
Full exclusion (0 
member) 
Knowledge 
availability 
Much knowledge 
shared 
Some knowledge 
shared 
Little knowledge 
shared 
No knowledge 
shared 
The measurement of knowledge sharing requires two steps. It first needs to be assessed 
whether the expertise and insight is available. It then needs to be evaluated whether the 
knowledge is actually shared. The amount of knowledge was measured by adding the 
societal insight and expertise capital scores from the data observations. If the actors 
possessing this knowledge had a high Group worldview, it is argued that they could be 
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expected to also share this knowledge. To strengthen the consilience of these scores, 
they were tested against direct observations from the interviews.  
This resulted in a sum of knowledge availability for each of the utilities. On 
average, the utilities shared 8.1 of knowledge, with a standard deviation of +/- 4.5.  
The membership criteria were then calibrated around the fully-in, fully-out and cross-
over point. 
8.2.8 Filling in the truth table 
With the calibration of the different sets completed, all of the utilities can be awarded 
their memberships for the public value set and the respective causal processes. These 
results are captured in the table below. On the left hand side, the case numbers are 
listed, with their membership of the success set listed on the right hand side. The degree 
to which these cases displayed any of the causal processes is captured in the columns in 
between. 
 
221
Table 37 Overview of membership 
Case Relational Grid  Group  Dominant Know. Engine. 
Public 
value 
1. 1 0.66 1 1 1 0.33 1 
2. 0.66 0.66 1 0.66 1 0.33 1 
3. 1 0.33 0.66 1 1 0.66 0.88 
4. 1 0.66 0.66 1 1 0.66 0.72 
5. 0.66 0.66 0.33 0.66 1 0.66 0.63 
6. 0.33 0 0.33 0.66 0 0.33 0.63 
7. 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.66 0.55 
8. 0.66 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.66 0.66 0.55 
9. 0.66 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.55 
10. 0 0 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.33 0.33 
11. 0 0 0.33 0.66 0 0.33 0.25 
12. 0.33 0 0 0.66 0.66 1 0 
13. 0.33 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.66 0 
14. 0.33 0.66 0 1 1 1 0 
15. 0.66 0.66 0 0.33 0.33 1 0 
16. 0.66 0.66 0 1 0 1 0 
8.2.9 Relations between causal processes 
A final step before commencing the actual analysis is to check how distinct the 
variables are from each other.325 This means that there should be no complete overlap 
between the effects of the variables, as they should simply be joined together in that 
case. It is still allowed for them to correlate, but this relation should not be 
deterministic. For example, it is acceptable for Engineering Mentality to be often high 
when Knowledge Availability is high. However, if Engineering Mentality moves up in 
                                                 
325  C. Ragin, User’s guide to: Fuzzy-set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis, September 2008, p. 48. 
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the very same steps as Knowledge Availability, these variables should be joined 
together in one causal process. 
Tests have therefore been run on all the six variables and their respective 
relations. There were no correlations of note between most of the causal processes. 
However, the relation between Group Governance and Knowledge Availability and that 
between Grid Governance and Relational Distance did warrant extra addition. The 
figure below illustrates the relation between the two causal processes. The cases are 
mapped on the two axis of membership, if the cases overlap, their position was adjusted 
slightly to make them visible in the graph.  
Figure 20 Correlation between causal processes 
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In the case of Knowledge Availability and Group Governance, it seems that cases with a 
great amount of information available to the actors necessarily had a high degree of 
Group Governance. It is possible to hypothesise about the underlying causation of this 
effect. Possibly, a greater amount of information is made available when actors share 
their knowledge more freely with the group. Taking the causation the other way, it 
could be the case that better informed actors choose to work together in groups.  
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The presented X/Y graph indicates a necessary-relationship between Group and 
Knowledge.326 It is necessary to have Group Governance in order to have a high 
Knowledge Availability. However, as indicated by the cases in the lower-right corner, it 
was also possible to have a high degree of Group Governance without a corresponding 
high level of Knowledge Available. This means that high Group Governance is not 
sufficient to guarantee high Knowledge Availability.  
This does not disqualify the two processes from the Truth Table, as there is still 
variance in Knowledge Availability even if Group Governance goes up, but does mean 
it should be remembered that Group Governance is necessarily present when 
Knowledge availability is high. 
A more nuanced conclusion has to be drawn about the relation between Relational 
Distance and Grid Governance. Cases with a higher degree of Relational Distance are 
more likely to have a high degree of Grid Governance. Again, as indicated by the case 
in the lower-right corner, it is possible to have a low amount of Grid Governance while 
having a high degree of Relational Distance. 
A closer look at the dynamics within the cases does not point to any clear answers 
yet, as it is hard to distinguish what the exact link is between Relational Distance and 
Grid Governance. Narrowly defining the relationship in necessary/sufficient terms 
seems to be too presumptuous at this point, the test on the distinct cases in the Truth 
Table will have to shed more light on the matter. 
8.3 RECIPE FOR SUCCESS 
8.3.1 Truth table for success 
After having completed the preliminary steps, the fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis 
can now turn towards the construction and analysis of the truth table. This tool allows 
                                                 
326  C. Ragin, User’s guide to: Fuzzy-set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis, September 2008, p. 48. 
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for the consideration of two important effects. Firstly, the interaction between the causal 
processes might be more important than simply their singular presence. ‘How each 
piece of the puzzle is situated in a particular system matters greatly—far more than any 
individual piece.’327 Jervis refers to it as the system effect; ‘The importance of 
interactions means that the common habit of seeing the impact of variables as additive 
can be misleading: the effect of A and B together is very different from the effect that A 
would have in isolation and added to the impact of B alone.’328 By being able to track 
the importance of all the processes at the same time, it is possible to assess how they 
influence each other. 
Secondly, the previous calculations did not yet take into account whether a 
possible combination of factors actually appeared in reality. Mathematically speaking, it 
is possible to have 26 = 64 different types of configurations; every one causal process 
could be absent or present while the other five or also either absent or present.329 In 
reality, the variance will be limited by the number of the cases, in this case sixteen, and 
on whether each configuration of variables is actually a feasible occurrence. 
The truth table, presented below, addresses these effects by putting the sixteen 
cases and the six causal processes in a variable. Every instance of a case belonging more 
than 0.5 to a causal process set is counted as 1, anything below that as zero. This reveals 
that out of the 64 configurations possible, only 14 are present in this sample. For 
example, at the top of the table is one case which is part of all the casual process sets. 
There was no case which was outside of all of the causal sets, so that configuration will 
not be tested. 
                                                 
327  C. Ragin, User’s guide to: Fuzzy-set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis, September 2008, p.19. 
328  R. Jervis, ‘Timing and interaction in politics: A comment on Pierson’, Studies in American Political 
Development, vol.14, no. 2, 2000, p.95. 
329  C. Ragin, User’s guide to: Fuzzy-set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis, September 2008, p.37-
38. 
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Table 38 Truth table for success 
Rela. Grid Group Dom.  Know Engin. Case 
Pub. 
value
Raw  
consist 
PRI  
consist Prod. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 100% 100% 100% 
1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 100% 100% 100% 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 100% 100% 100% 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 83% 51% 42% 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 78% 19% 14% 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 78% 19% 14% 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 77% 43% 33% 
0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 74% 25% 19% 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 60% 0% 0% 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 58% 8% 5% 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 57% 0% 0% 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 57% 0% 0% 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 50% 0% 0% 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 50% 0% 0% 
           
Frequency cut-off: 1        
Consistency cut-off: 77%        
The third column from the right indicates the raw consistency of the configuration with 
the membership of the Success Set. This consistency is an important measure for the 
reliability of the data. A low consistency shows that the case bears little relations to a 
positive outcome of the dependent variable, i.e. they should not really be considered as 
examples of successful utilities. For example, the first case is a member of all of the 
causal process sets and also happens to be a 100% member of the Success Set. The last 
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case in the list, which only qualifies for four of the six processes, is only a member of 
the Success Set for 50%.  
Ragin recommends discounting any cases with a consistency lower than 75% or 
80% as they are too unreliable.330 For this exercise, the cut-off has been set at the lower 
end of this margin, translating to a consistency cut-off at 77% in this Truth Table, as 
that is the first configuration with a consistency higher than 75%. This level was chosen 
because it still includes seven different cases, whereas tighter boundaries would have 
only included four different cases which could have led to too little variation. In the 
sensitivity analysis conducted at the end of each solution, it will be shown what 
difference it would have made if another consistency cut-off had been chosen. For now, 
it means that these seven cases will be counted towards the Success Set and the other 
ones will be ignored as not being successful enough. 
8.3.2 Solution for success 
The analysis of the Truth Table delivers a solution, which is best understood as a recipe 
for membership of the Success Set. Each recipe contains a description of which 
combination of ingredients could provide the best formula for success. The procedure 
developed by Ragin generates three solutions, distinguished by the amount of possible 
pathways to success they provide. The Complex Solution presents all the possible ways 
a result could be generated by the causal processes. A Parsimonious Solution tries to 
filter out as many of the terms unnecessarily complicating the recipe. The Intermediate 
Solution relies on some input by the researcher, indicating whether or not a certain 
variable is expected to aid a certain outcome. 
The best recipe is primarily selected on the basis of its consistency. A recipe with 
a higher consistency, i.e. a great likelihood of finding success when selecting on this 
                                                 
330  C. Ragin, User’s guide to: Fuzzy-set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis, September 2008, p.46. 
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recipe, is deemed to have the greatest validity. It was the Intermediate solution which 
had the highest consistency at 78%. The Complex and Parsimonious Solutions are 
presented in the appendix. The Intermediate Solution is presented below. 
Table 39 Intermediate Solution for success 
 Cases 
raw 
Cov 
unique 
Cov Consis
Knowledge*Grid*Relational 1,2,4,5,8 59% 7% 84% 
Knowledge*Dominant*Group*Relational 1,2,3,4 56% 9% 100% 
~Knowledge*Engine*~Dominant*~Grid*Relational 9 22% 8% 78% 
Knowledge*Engine*~Dominant*Group*~Grid 
*~Relational 10 23% 5% 83% 
     
Solution coverage 81%    
Solution consistency 78%    
The intermediate solution attains a total coverage of 81%, which means that it accounts 
for 81% of the total public value produced by the sixteen cases. It also attains a 
relatively high consistency at 78%, meaning that 78% of the cases with one of these 
four formulas present would be successful.  
The first thing that becomes apparent is that the combination of Relational 
Distance and Knowledge Availability seems to be particularly advantageous to 
obtaining success. These two elements are part of the first two formulas, which cover 
the most successful Cases 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. In these recipes they do not create success 
just between themselves; they are supported by either Grid Governance or Group 
Governance in combination with Actor Dominance. 
These causal processes could strike at the heart of the problem of governing in 
small-scale democracies. An increased amount of Relational Distance eased the 
constraints of working in a ‘strong ties’ environments. These utilities were building up 
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checks and balances around them in the governance by involving a rich diversity of 
actors. The role of Knowledge Availability might address the issue of information 
overkill and disbelief, aiding the creation of shared perspectives and knowledge which 
form the base for solid policy building.  
However, Relational Distance and Knowledge Availability are also the two 
variables that related strongly to Grid and Group Governance respectively. They might 
be compound variables whose mechanism are quite complex. In this light, it is also 
interesting to see that the last two formulas do not have the combination of Relational 
Distance and Knowledge Availability. Instead only one of them is present together with 
a rich combination of other processes. Admittedly, this refers to the Cases 9 and 10, 
which attained a negative public value score and had the lowest consistency indicators. 
When looking at the cases this recipe refers to, it must be noted that Case 6 and 7, 
with a respective public value of 0.8 and 0.3 are not covered by this solution. In other 
words, their specific configuration of factors could not be captured into a satisfying 
solution which was consistent enough. If the explanatory power of this recipe is taking 
at face value, it would suggest that Case 6 and 7 are only successful by chance. 
However, given the limited consistency of the solution, it may be more appropriate to 
conclude that the current solution has not yet revealed all possible pathways to success. 
8.3.3 Sensitivity analysis for success 
As discussed, fuzzy-set analysis is not without its critics. Next to the issue about tracing 
variables over time, another set of criticism looks at the calibration of the data. Cooper, 
for example, argues that awarding of membership to cases is a subjective process, 
introducing the risk of cases being assigned to the wrong set. 331  
                                                 
331  B. Cooper, ‘Applying Ragin’s crisp and fuzzy set QCA to large datasets: social class and 
educational achievement’, Sociological Research Online, www.socresonline.org.uk/10/2/cooper.html, 
(Retrieved on 30 August 2011). 
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One feasible way of testing against this effect is to change the level of consistency 
required in the truth table in order for cases to qualify as successful. If the consistency 
threshold is lowered, more cases can participate and the variance in the independent 
variables will increase along with it. This allows for a better test of which variables 
truly have an impact. Conversely, increasing the thresholds will eliminate cases on the 
basis of the dependent variable, removing cases that should not have been considered a 
success. Admittedly, this is still based on the scoring awarded by the same researcher, 
however, coding by other people was not possible for this thesis. 
Although a full run-down of the alternative calculations will not be presented here 
due to the word limit, some highlights will be presented. In the current setup, seven 
cases qualified for the success set as they had a consistency higher than 75%. When this 
threshold is lowered to 70%, 65% and 60%, the amount of cases expands to eight and 
then nine cases. As expected, the Complex Solution and Intermediate Solution begin 
returning more formulas for attaining success. Relational Distance and Knowledge 
Availability do still seem to be the strongest combination when taking in the extra cases. 
Yet the predictive power of the formula quickly falls as well. One interesting note is 
that, at a threshold of 65% and 70%, the absence of an Engineering Mentality is a 
powerful precursor for success. At these thresholds, two-thirds of the public value 
created comes from cases without Engineering Mentalities. 
When increasing the thresholds by one step to 80%, the selection of cases drops to 
four. The outcomes are also not significantly different. Relational Distance and 
Knowledge Availability retain a strong role, although the added benefit of also having 
high Grid or Group Governance becomes more pronounced. When increasing the 
threshold to 85% and higher, only three cases remain which are all 100% members of 
the Success Set, yet the results remain very much the same. The higher threshold means 
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that only 4 out of 64 possible process configurations are tested, which makes for a 
rather narrow view on routes to success in these circumstances. In addition, these four 
cases only cover about half of the public value produced which means that half of the 
local success is ignored.  
On the whole, this sensitivity analysis gives credence to the observation that the 
combination of Relational Distance and Knowledge Availability is strong. The extra 
results did point out that the absence of an Engineering Mentality also seems beneficial 
to the utility. An analysis of the Failure Recipes might shine more light on this 
phenomenon. 
8.4 RECIPE FOR FAILURE 
8.4.1 Truth table for failure 
Just as a recipe can be distilled to capture the causes of success, so one can be drafted to 
capture the causes of failure. The difference is that rather than looking at the shared 
characteristics of the successful utilities, it looks at the properties shared by the failing 
cases, comparing this group to the successful cases. The truth table and analysis is 
otherwise processed in a similar manner, as displayed in the table below. 
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Table 40 Truth table for failure 
Rela. Grid Group Dom.  Know Engin. Case 
No  
value
Raw  
consist 
PRI  
consist Prod. 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 100% 100% 100% 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 100% 100% 100% 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 100% 100% 100% 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 100% 100% 100% 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 100% 100% 100% 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 92% 83% 76% 
0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 90% 72% 65% 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 90% 61% 55% 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 89% 61% 55% 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 83% 49% 41% 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 81% 54% 44% 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 53% 0% 0% 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 52% 0% 0% 
1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 47% 0% 0% 
           
Frequency cut-off 1        
Consistency cut-off 81%        
Again, all cases with a consistency of 75% or higher with the absence of Public Value 
are counted as outside the Failure Set. For this truth table, this translates to a 
consistency cut-off of 81%. Only four cases are not counted, this being the top Case 1 to 
4, which all had a Public Value membership higher than 0.72 in the initial Success Set. 
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8.4.2 Solution for failure 
The intermediate solution is again the solution with the highest consistency and the 
other two have been copied to the appendix. This solution again builds on the intuition 
of the researcher that the lack of Group Governance and presence of Engineering 
Mentality will result in failure. This solution is built out of five formulas and achieves 
an overall coverage of 80% and consistency of 80%. The Parsimonious Solution 
obtained a consistency below the threshold, but the Complex Solution actually received 
the same score as the Intermediate Solution. However, because it contained one more 
formula than the Intermediate Solution, and was therefore more complex, it was 
discounted. 
Table 41 Intermediate solution for failure 
 Cases 
raw 
cov 
unique 
cov Consis
Engine*~Group*~Relational 12,13,14 56% 4% 100% 
~Knowledge*~Group*~Grid*~Relational 6,11,13 46% 4% 93% 
~Dominant*~Grid*~Relational 10, 13 46% 4% 92% 
Engine*~Group*Grid 5,8,14,15,16 43% 13% 83% 
~Knowledge*~Dominant*~Group*~Grid 7,9,13 41% 2% 89% 
     
Solution coverage 80%    
Solution consistency 80%    
When considering failure, it seems to be that the absence of Relational Distance and the 
absence of Group Governance are the most powerful factors. Referring to Cases 12, 13 
and 14, the absence of this processes combined with a prevalence of an Engineering 
Mentality actually leads to failure in 100% of the occurrences. Engineering Mentality is 
the only process which presence is actually associated with failure, rather than success, 
all the other processes leading to failure when they are absent. 
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The fact that an absence of Relational Distance leads to failure may not be 
surprising, as it is an expression of the stifling effect of the many strong ties on policy 
making. The strongly negative effect of the absence of Group Governance is a little 
more surprising, as a clearer distinction between individuals could have potentially cut 
through all the amorphous interests. The negative impact of an Engineering Mentality, 
notably active in the worst cases of 14, 15 and 16 might suggest that these utilities are 
nominally regarded as machines, but that the governance structure does not match this 
efficiency. 
Again, some successful cases are covered by the current recipe. Cases 5, 6, 7, 8 
and 9 are covered by some of the process configurations. Admittedly, these are not the 
best performers and the listed factors may explain why they are not amongst the top. 
Conversely, it may also be that they are moving up or down the performance scale. 
Possibly, the effect of these negative processes was stronger in the past and they were 
succeeding to break free. Alternatively, these negative processes might be encroaching 
on these cases, dragging their performance down. 
8.4.3 Sensitivity analysis for failure 
As for the recipe for the success, a sensitivity analysis can be conducted for the formula 
for failure. There were four cases not counted towards the failure set at the current 
threshold of 75% consistency, this would have to be lowered all the way to 50% to 
include anymore. As a result, the alternative solutions are not nearly consistent enough, 
as they include both successful and failing utilities. This suggests that the current 
threshold is low enough. 
 When bringing the threshold to a higher level, in effect focusing on the utilities 
that were heavily failing, only seven causes are processed in the analysis. As a result, 
they cover on two-thirds of all the failures produced. Again, the results remain similar, 
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although the absence of any of the processes other than Engineering Mentality becomes 
a contributing factor towards failure. This suggests that all processes have at least some 
importance, albeit not always a positive one in the case of Engineering Mentality. 
8.5 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
The formulas presented above are precise in their reflection of the analysis outcomes, 
but can also be quite impenetrable when aiming to relate them to the research questions 
asked. There are several alternative ways of presenting the data, three of which are 
applied below. However, the emergence of these mechanisms over time will be 
considered in the next chapter. 
8.5.1 Explored propositions 
The chapter on causal process observation identified the six mechanisms that were 
thought to matter most to the performance outcomes of the utilities. At the end of the 
chapter, a rough list of propositions was generated, reflecting what influence these 
mechanisms were thought to have. As demonstrated in the fuzzy-set analysis, it is 
actually the interaction between the variables which is most important, rather than their 
effect in isolation, but a brief reflection on each distinct variable might still be 
appropriate. The results are presented in the table below. 
Table 42 Propositions revisited 
Component Causal process Proposition Outcome 
Structure Relational Distance ↑ Distance = ↑ Value True 
Structure Grid Governance ↑ Grid = ↑ Value True 
Nature Group Governance ↑ Group = ↓ Value False 
Nature Actor Dominance ↑ Dominance = ↓ Value Undecided 
Expectations Engineering Mentality ↑ Engineering = ↑ Value False 
Expectations Knowledge Availability ↑ Knowledge = ↑ Value True 
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The process of Relational Distance was thought to have a positive effect on 
performance and it was indeed often associated with successful cases. However, this 
effect was only a strong predictor of success when combined with a high Knowledge 
Availability. Both the propositions for these two variables were right, but their 
interaction was very important. 
Grid Governance was thought to positively influence performance and a rigid 
application of rules was indeed present at many successful utilities. Interestingly 
though, some success was also produced in cases that were less strict. This might relate 
to the positive effect of Group Governance. Although the expectation was that this 
blurring of interests and boundaries might be disadvantageous, the effect of Group 
Governance seemed mostly positive. 
The effect of Engineering Mentality was often observed at the poor performers; it 
was the only variables which was present, rather than absent, at failing utilities. This 
mindset was thought to help with effective management, but the opposite was true. The 
role of Dominant Actors, thought to be a real problem for these utilities, was not so 
pronounced as anticipated. Dominant Actors showed up in both good and poor 
performers, which may indicate that there might still be a role for strong individuals. 
8.5.2 Proportional Venn-diagram 
A more appropriate way of presenting the results might be the use of Venn-diagram. 
Firstly, this is consistent with the logic of sets underpinning fuzzy-set Qualitative Case 
Analysis as overlapping circles make it possible to show how various variables interact 
to create a certain effect. Secondly, the area of the different circles could also illustrate 
how important the role of different variables is.  
One problem is that a presentation of the Intermediate Solution, with its many 
formulas, might be too complex. Instead, the Parsimonious Solution has been selected 
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to be translated to a Venn-diagram. This solution had a consistency just below the 
threshold at 72% and consisted of two pairs of explanations. 
Figure 21 Parsimonious solution for success 
Not Engineering* 
Not Dominant
SUCCESS
12% unexplained success
16% success from  no 
Engineering Mentality 
and no Dominant Actor
48% success from 
Relational Distance and 
Knowledge Availability 
24% success from  no 
Engineering Mentality and no 
Dominant Actor, plus 
Relational Distance and 
Knowledge Availability
Relational* 
Knowledge
 
The figure above presents the Venn-diagram for the Parsimonious Solution for the 
membership of the success set. It shows that the combination of Relational Distance and 
Knowledge Availability alone applied to 48% of the success set. The absence of 
Engineering Mentality in combination with the absence of a Dominant Actor can on its 
own explain 16% of the success. There is an overlap between these two configurations, 
the combination of all these factors accounts for 88% of the public value created. On the 
whole, this leaves 12% of the success set unexplained, meaning there are still 
alternatives routes to success not covered by this recipe. 
The figure below shows a similar diagram for membership of the failure set. This 
figure is again based on the Parsimonious Solution, which had a consistency of 74%. 
The absence of Group Governance alone explains 30% of the failure members, whilst 
the absence of Relational Distance explained an additional 1% of the failure. A further 
65% of the failure can be explained by both Group Governance and Relational Distance 
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being absent. In total, this leaves only 4% of the failure unexplained, suggesting that the 
causes of faltering performance are relatively well-understood now. 
Figure 22 Parsimonious solution for failure 
FAILURE 4% unexplained failure
1% failure from  no 
Relational Distance
30% failure from lack of 
Group Governance
65% failure from  no Group 
Governance and no Relational 
Distance
No Group
No Relational
 
8.5.3 Case-based Venn-diagram 
A final way is to base the diagrams on the presence of the actual cases. This also gives 
the opportunity to integrate the different variables with each other, like revealing the 
overlap between Group Governance and Knowledge Availability. This form of 
presentation also makes it possible to look at the causes of success and failure at the 
same time.  
Again, one limiting factor is that the diagram cannot be too complex, meaning 
that the processes of Engineering Mentality and Actor Dominance have been left out as 
they bore the least relevance for attaining success. 
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Figure 23 Case-based Venn-diagram 
 
The distribution of the cases across the circles shows up certain clusters of effects, 
although allowances have to be made for the fact that the lower degrees of membership 
could not always be mapped. At the heart of all four processes, lie the very successful 
Cases 1 to 5. Cases 7, 8 and 9 all have quite strong Group and Grid Governance, but 
were not yet able to convert this to strong Knowledge Availability and Relational 
Distance. Case 10 and 11 are weak on Relational Distance and Grid Governance, but 
have developed some Group and Knowledge dynamics.  
Cases 12 and 13 are hardly covered by any of the processes, which could explain 
their poor performance, although Case 6 is in a similar situation. Cases 14, 15 and 16, 
the very worst performers, have no sense of Group Governance or Knowledge 
Availability and instead rely on much Grid Governance and a little Relational Distance. 
This rather strict approach to governance did seem to hamper their performance. 
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8.6 CONCLUSION 
The application of the fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis framework has allowed for 
the identification of causal relations between the processes and the public value 
delivered. Importantly, this is not understood to be a linear connection –i.e. more of 
ingredient X means more success- but rather in terms of conjunction - different 
variables are required to act together in order to achieve a better performance. The most 
powerful combination seems to be that of Knowledge Availability and Relational 
Distance. Conversely, a lack of Group Governance and Relational Distance translated to 
poor performance. In addition, an Engineering Mentality seemed to have a markedly 
negative impact on public value. 
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9. DISCUSSION: STRATEGIES FOR PERFORMANCE 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of chapter 
This chapter takes the results from the fuzzy-set analysis and relates them to the three 
principal components of social capital theory. Putnam gave some prescriptions on how 
the structure, nature and expectations of relations should be configured for government 
success to occur. It can now be demonstrated how the utilities followed or deviated 
from these guidelines, and whether the alternative arrangements might have been key to 
achieving success. One disadvantage of this compartmentalised discussion is that the 
three components have to be discussed separately, although the effects are very much 
co-dependent. These strands will therefore be drawn together in the next chapter. 
 
Content of chapter 
The chapter looks respectively at the expectations, structure and nature of relations in 
these utilities. In all cases the question is how governance was organised for each of 
these components at the successful utilities. For each of these parts, the discussion will 
first restate the ideal situation as detailed by social capital theory and the actual 
problematic situation as encountered on these islands. The discussion will then show 
through the evidence of the fuzzy-set analysis how alternative arrangements could still 
secure government success. After relating these finding to some concepts in the 
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literature, these mechanisms will be defined more precisely by outlining their critical 
distinctions from similar behaviours. 
For the component of expectations, a high Knowledge Availability seemed to 
make the most difference; distinguished by a constant effort to upgrade the information 
in the policy field, active framing of contradictions and push to convert words into 
action. 
For the element of structure of relations, it was Relational Distance that was 
instrumental to success; defined by a use of rules to include as many people as possible, 
involvement of a diverse set of stakeholders and active support for opponents.  
The element of nature of relations was most affected by the Mentality and actions 
of the Dominant Actors; characterized by an emphasis on strengthening the system, 
reflexive engagement with stakeholders and use of several policy languages to bring the 
message across. The table below presents these three components and their distinctive 
characteristics. 
Table 43 Components of social capital and strategies for success 
Component Key mechanisms Critical distinctions 
Expectations of 
relations 
High Knowledge 
Availability 
Keep adding better information 
Frame contradictions 
Actions speak louder than words 
Structure of 
relations 
High Relational 
Distance 
Strive for distance through diversity 
Use rules to include, not to exclude 
Distinguish opponents from enemies 
Nature of 
relations 
No Engineering 
Mentality 
Strengthen the system 
Reflexive policy languages 
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9.2 EXPECTATIONS: USING RULES TO CREATE ROLES 
9.2.1 Effect of sharing information 
In Putnam’s framework, the key strength of social capital societies is that their citizens 
have good expectations of cooperation.332 Due to their positive experiences in earlier 
interactions, they expect to benefit from a fair interaction with other people. By contrast, 
the expectations of the actors of the utilities of Aruba, Curacao and St Kitts were often 
quite negative; anticipating rampant nepotism, harsh treatment by superiors and overall 
poor outcomes for the collective. The results of the analysis suggest that these negative 
expectations could be addressed chiefly by upgrading the level and amount of 
knowledge available. 
In combination with Relational Distance, the presence of Knowledge Availability 
was a clear prerequisite of success. An 82% share of the public value was created by 
utilities which had high Knowledge Availability in combination with high Relational 
Distance. The top five cases all had a ready supply of information available to their 
governance actors, whereas the poor performers of Case 9, 11 and 13 were hampered 
chiefly by a lack of knowledge. This effect clearly deserves some further attention, 
although its intrinsic connection with Relational Distance must not be forgotten. 
Knowledge Availability may be so powerful because it is the only way to address 
the negative expectations of people. Ideally, the memory of negative experiences can be 
countered by new positive experiences. However, those are hard to realize in such 
politicized settings and will take time to materialize. Moreover, the financial and 
political cost of any new policy will also be carried by all actors, which often means that 
their support needs to be secured first. This leaves information as the starting point of a 
pathway to improvement. As one CEO commented; ‘The management of perception is 
                                                 
332  C. Boix and D. Posner, ‘Social capital: Explaining its origins and effects on government 
performance’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 4, 1998, p. 686-693. 
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the only lever [public utilities] can really work. Those that have done this well, were 
guaranteed a stable position.’333 
New and credible information might convince actors that something is to be 
gained from working together, dissuading them from opting for the old patterns of 
patronage. This information could directly attack the underlying despair with the 
performance of government: If actors have low expectations they will still opt for the 
relative predictability of the patronage system. When actors believe that they could win 
more by different means, they might make an attempt. As Bernanos observed; ‘The 
power and weakness of tyrants is that they have made a contract with the desperation of 
the people.’334 When the desperation is broken down, the patron might come down with 
it. 
9.2.2 Related concepts 
However, ready availability of data does not have a universally strong track record in 
the government literature. As Tsoakas argued, more information will simply lead to 
more confusion.335 Indeed, as discussed before, many of the actors complained about the 
flood of irrelevant, unreliable and contradictory data washing over the policy fields. 
Respondents complained that their expert opinions were twisted or ignored in the 
political debate.336 It then seems likely that a new reasonable voice, spreading the good 
tidings of more gain through fair cooperation, will just drown amidst the cacophony of 
political and societal debate. 
The emerging study of the role of knowledge in democracies addresses these 
problems in two ways. Firstly, rather than aiming to ignore the seemingly trivial 
                                                 
333  Public manager 30 
334  ‘La force et la faiblesse des dictateurs est d'avoir fait un pacte avec le désespoir des peuples’ G. 
Bernanons, Nous autres Francais, Gallimard, Paris, 1982. 
335  H. Tsoukas, ‘The tyranny of light: The temptations and the paradoxes of the information society’, 
Futures, Volume 29, Issue 9, November 1997, Pages 827-843. 
336  See earlier quote of Director 6 
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information of local sources, an effective knowledge system incorporates these voices 
into the dialogue. As observed by Turnhout, effective knowledge production 
emphasizes ‘the importance of so-called lay or local knowledge next to scientific 
knowledge. […] Stakeholders should be allowed to have a say not only in the decision-
making process, but also regarding the knowledge relevant to those processes.’ 337 Rather 
than wasting time on fighting all the myths or gossip, effective actors integrate the 
different stories. 
Yet this model is not intended to illustrate one harmonious dance by unified 
actors, but rather to examine the points where there is friction. Effective knowledge 
systems should avoid an unproductive exchange of facts. 338 To achieve this interaction, 
knowledge democracy is also about participation. As Turnhout continues; ‘Participatory 
knowledge production produces knowledge that is seen as legitimate by all involved 
and that is more likely to be used. […] So what the concept of knowledge democracy 
does is supplementing the speaking truth to power model with a participatory ideal.’339 
Knowledge Availability is therefore not only about producing more information, 
but creating a good system to generate and combine information. This could be why 
Knowledge Availability had to be combined with Relational Distance in order to have 
the best outcomes. This might shed new light on the fundamental problem of agencies 
in small-scale societies: In the absence of a network of civic associations transmitting 
positive experiences, they need to develop a network of knowledge building positive 
expectations. 
 
                                                 
337  R.J. In ’t Veld (ed.), Knowledge democracy, (Routledge, London, 2010), p. 23. 
338  R.J. In ’t Veld (ed.), Knowledge democracy, (Routledge, London, 2010), p. 5-6. 
339  R.J. In ’t Veld (ed.), Knowledge democracy, (Routledge, London, 2010), p. 23. 
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9.2.3 Critical distinctions 
The above discussion is somewhat imprecise in its definition of good information 
sharing. The final part of the discussion therefore focuses on the critical distinctions 
between effective and ineffective strategies for strengthening Knowledge Availability. 
 
Keep upgrading knowledge 
As observed, all sixteen policy fields were awash with irrelevant or contradictory 
observations, gossip, statistics, stories and memories. Yet in order to form decisions, for 
example, on the investment into a new electricity generator, there needs be at least some 
consensus on certain facts between the key actors involved. Admittedly, some 
contradictions are allowable, as parties may arrive at the same conclusion from different 
angles, but these perspectives needs to be integrated at some point. 
Increasing the Knowledge Availability is effectively not just about adding new 
information. It is rather about making sure that the information process brings forwards 
the pieces of knowledge which are relevant for the decision and the motives of the 
actors involved. This requires hard work and constant reflection on what is going in the 
information field. It was the CEOs of the failing agencies who confessed in the 
interviews that they had given up on ‘explaining it every time.’ The CEOs of the 
performing agencies would stress that they would always be ready to ‘go through it one 
more time.’ 
In this process, it is important to realize that all information going around the 
policy field has to be dealt with. Some CEOs take a very narrow view on their role in 
the debate, arguing that ‘[the constant provision of knowledge] is way too broad; it is 
about corporate governance and looking at what the rules say about whom you have to 
 
246
inform.’340 Yet the debate over a public utility will not be based on the annual report 
alone, it is more likely that the latest news report, talk show broadcast or political clash 
will provide the frame for the presentation of the numbers. The constant work of the 
effective actors seems to suggest that the policy makers should manage the flow of 
information at all times. 
 
Framing contradictions 
The availability of knowledge does not necessarily mean that one story has to win the 
debate. In most of the best performing utilities, there was still disagreement on certain 
facts or even on the direction an organisations should take. The key difference with the 
underperforming utilities was that the officials knew what they were disagreeing about.  
In these policy fields, it was clear which were the different policy options 
available. For example, in the case of one of the waste management corporations, all the 
actors spoke about finding the right balances between the environment –keeping the 
island clean- and the economy –applying a low levy on each household. They mostly 
disagreed on where the organisation should place its emphasis. However, when the 
debate has been captured between these poles, the discussion focuses on finding the 
right balance, rather than on what the question should be. 
Naturally, there are some dangers to this approach. The contradiction between the 
two goals might be false. For example, in the case of touristic islands, a clean 
environment is a requirement for the tourist economy, not a competing goal. 
Furthermore, an effective orator could hijack the policy debate by forcing it into a 
certain direction under the cloak of framing contradictions. This might explain why 
Dominant Actors and a strong Engineering Mentality, where one actor could force 
                                                 
340  Public manager 15 
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through a singular worldview, were often associated with failure. Good knowledge 
systems rely on strong systems of diverse actors. 
 
Actions speak louder than words 
Having spent all these words on words, it is important to stress that the successful 
utilities were very active in achieving and promoting tangible successes. New 
information and structured arguments may go a long way to change expectations, but 
actions still seem to speaker louder than words. However, as the large policy outcomes 
–moving the port, constructing a new terminal, buying ten new trucks- might require a 
lot of investment and take time to materialize, the emphasis on small wins is important. 
The key is to change the vicious cycle of underperformance: Actors have low 
expectations of cooperation and opt for clientelist arrangements. This leads to a poor 
collective outcome which reinforces the negative expectations. Starting with knowledge 
of possible or achieved success, actors learn about better possibilities and heighten their 
expectations. This may lead to a small cooperative overture and a corresponding 
collective success, which bolster expectations once again. In this way, ‘small wins can 
churn old routines into new learning.’341 
Naturally, changing the negative patterns demands great efforts and the 
consequences of disappointment may be large as well. This might explain why 
performing utilities often had Dominant Actors, as they had the skills and resources to 
deliver upon their word. Yet a key part of this was to convince others to take the first 
step with them. As Marcha and Verweel argue, government success in the Caribbean 
does not require more reform skills, but rhetorical aptitude.342 
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9.3 STRUCTURE: FIRST ROLES, THAN RULES 
9.3.1 Effects of inclusive governance 
Social capital theory prescribes that the relations within a polity should count many 
‘weak ties’ cutting across different groups. This sentiment is echoed in the good 
governance literature by the concern with supervision from a distance. The policy 
settings studied were chiefly characterised by entangled and convoluted relationships, 
where politicians, civil servants, public managers and external actors would form one 
amorphous heap of connections. Successful utilities added extra players for more 
accountability, but interestingly, distance was not the key element. 
In combination with Knowledge Availability, Relational Distance was the most 
powerful process for creating public value. Next to producing 82% of the success, the 
absence of Relational Distance was also heavily associated with the occurrence of 
failure. However, the lack of Group Governance, whereby actors do not consider 
themselves part of a collective with shared interests, was more strongly associated with 
failure. This might suggest that Relational Distance is a good thing, but that a strong 
shared spirit of co-dependence is also important to public value. 
Increasing the Relational Distance in such small societies seems an obvious 
remedy for nepotism and clientelism. However, the exact mechanism might be different 
than expected. Firstly, it seems not as much to be about introducing distant actors, like 
auditors from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, but about involving diverse 
actors from the local communities, like trade unions, community watchdogs, tourist 
boards, etc. Both successful and failing utilities had on average more actors involved in 
the governance, but this group was much more diverse at the performing agencies.  
Secondly, the involvement of so many actors could also degenerate into a free-
for-all, where the lack of separation means that everyone can barge in to take their 
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share. Instead, the successful utilities seemed to address this by applying a combination 
of tough Grid Governance with communality oriented Group Governance. Giving all 
these actors specific roles turned them from a mob into a governance regime. 
9.3.2 Related concepts 
The involvement of many actors links to several themes in the literature on governance. 
Primarily, it fits with the age-old concern with checks and balances, usually constructed 
by spreading different roles across different people. However, this usually works on the 
assumption that distance will create more effective forms of control.343 In this case, the 
actors still had a direct interest in the policy, but it was the increase in numbers of the 
actors that did the trick. 
The configuration of actors, with their underlying emphasis on Group 
Governance, seems to relate more closely to Talbot’s recent work on performance 
regimes. Rather than conceptualising governance in terms of a single chain of principal-
agent transactions, it looks at all the surrounding actors jointly creating a regime to 
support the organisational performance.344 For example, a utility does not need to be 
governed only by the shareholder and the directors; customers, employees and 
concerned citizens have a role as well. These were not people who stood at a distance 
from the utility, but rather represented the diverse interests of the community. 
This wide range of actors involved might make the field ungovernable, especially 
when they are all seeking to safeguard their interest. Alternatively, it could be argued 
that all these diverse interests should just focus themselves on the island council as the 
designated political arena. However, Linksky and Heifetz advise public sector leaders to 
keep ‘thinking politically’ and appreciate that their policy execution is still part of the 
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political game. A difference is perhaps that they are not as such focused on winning 
specific battles, but rather ‘orchestrating the conflict’ as a whole.345 This might explain 
why CEOs of strong utilities continued to emphasise Grid Governance, in the 
expectation that observance of the rules prevents a free-for-all and raises the quality of 
the game overall. 
9.3.3 Critical distinctions 
Strive for distance through diversity 
As emphasised above, Relational Distance was not increased through introducing 
overseas actors, although this was done as well, but by increasing the diversity of the 
actors. Every small step removed from the utility or different perspective added to the 
overall high score of Relational Distance.  
The key actors were drawing in representatives from across the community into 
the management of the utility. They hereby address the lament of Baldachinno that there 
is little separation between civil society and government in small islands.346 Yet rather 
than creating an artificial distinction between people, who are in any case connected by 
several relationships, they involve everyone directly in the governance of the utility. 
There are two possible problems with this approach. The first problem might be 
that there are still selection effects on who is allowed to contribute. Participation tends 
to be the domain of the organised and leisured classes who have the resources and time 
to involve themselves with governance.347 Even worse, the patronage formula may be 
replicated between these supposed external actors and their own clients.  
It could be countered to this point that, for example, trade unions leaders, 
community activists, represent the wider interests of the people who could not make it 
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to table. Moreover, when the electricity corporation, for example, polls all of the 
households it services, it will actually reach more people than come to vote. 
Importantly, the successful utilities with strong senses of Group Governance would still 
have low boundary permeability, meaning that new actors could join quite easily. 348 
This suggests that the governance style was truly inclusive. 
Unfortunately, the current research design does not investigate the constituencies 
of the different leaders, so the exact mechanism remains obscure. What can be noted is 
that the diverse groups of actors created more public value than those utilities with 
fewer and more homogenous representatives. In a optmistic assumption, the continuous 
encounter of all these other perspectives, like the trade union talking to the business 
community about rising electricity prices, will balance out policy overall. This may 
explain why Relational Distance must coincide with a high Knowledge Availability in 
order to create the best effect.  
A second problem could be that, as Rhodes notes, ‘accountability disappears in 
the interstices of the webs of institutions that make up governance.’349 The diverse web 
of actors makes the arrangements so obscure that it is no longer clear who is responsible 
for what and who should take the blame when things go wrong. This might be one of 
the reasons why strong utilities with many actors involved, scored high on Grid 
Governance as well. A clear explanation of the rules may have kept the lines of 
accountability visible. 
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Using rules to include actors, rather than to exclude 
Across the sixteen cases, all CEOs would stress the importance of the rules of good 
governance. What was strikingly different though, was that all the CEOs of failing 
organisations, stressed the private legal status of their utility. To repeat the words of a 
CEO of a failing corporation: ‘There is no such thing as a public utility here on the 
island. We are private agencies whereby the shareholder happens to be the 
government.’350 These CEOs would turn to the use of private corporate governance rules 
to minimise the role of outside actors. This then left little scope for involvement for the 
government in its limited capacity as shareholder. 
By contrast, all the leaders of the high-performing utilities recognized the public 
nature of their utilities and realised their actions would have to take place in a public 
arena. Rather than taking a limited view of the potential partners, they were keen to 
involve as many actors as possible. 
Interestingly though, these same CEOs would still emphasise the importance of 
the rules of governance. However, instead of using them to push actors out, they were 
employed to give as many actors as possible a clearly defined role. For example, one 
CEO spent a lot of time explaining to dissatisfied customers which avenues they could 
use to pressurise the government and the company.351 Again this could be interpreted as 
crafty rent-seeking, but the higher public value scores would contradict this. 
 
Distinguishing opponents from enemies 
It would be naïve to say that only actors with the best of intentions would try to exert 
influence in the governance process. Many might be motivated by the more malign 
motive of solely benefitting personally. However, it is equally short-sighted to assume 
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that everyone with a deviating opinion is a crook. However, the public discourse on the 
islands tended to degenerate into the first of the oversimplifications. In failing utilities, a 
war of all against all seemed to dominate. Everyone was regarded as a threat, and 
voicing a different opinion was a betrayal. Disagreeing actors were therefore removed 
from the debate by Dominant Actors as quickly as possible and by any means 
necessary.  
Yet senior officials at the performing utilities were able to work with, or even 
mobilize, opponents. For one successful utility, the company actually sponsored a 
citizen watchdog to scrutinize the utility’s performance, with interesting effects. When 
talking to various respondents in 2007 about the performance of this company, the 
general opinion was that they performed admirably. Yet with the visits in 2009 and 
2010, the view seemed to have deteriorated.  
A closer look revealed that actual performance had not fallen, but that the 
expectations had increased. People expected this company to move to a new level of 
quality and work still greener, cheaper, etc. Interestingly, people echoed the sentiments 
broadcasted by the company-sponsored interest group, including their demand –and 
here is the nub- for more investments in the utility. By facilitating citizens in raising 
expectations, the company actually strengthened the importance of this policy field. 
This could be cynically labelled as rent-seeking, where the enterprise uses citizens to 
expand its remit. Although this may have played a part, the overall public value was 
higher.352 
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9.4 NATURE: STRONG PEOPLE IN STRONG SYSTEMS 
9.4.1 Effect of dominant actors 
From a social capital perspective, the nature of relations should be characterised by an 
egalitarian division of rights and duties, combined with a shared pursuit of positive sum 
outcomes. On these islands, the real situation was characterised by grave imbalances in 
the resources of different actors. In addition, there was a tradition of Dominant Actors 
claiming all the spoils, a skewed division which was accepted even by the underlying 
party. 
When looking at the analysis, the track-record of Dominant Actors remained 
mixed. The three bottom cases all had strong CEOs and the three next worst all had a 
strong minister. However, the three best performing utilities also had Dominant Actors. 
Looking more closely at their mentality might reveal the critical differences. Especially 
when lowering the thresholds for public value, paradoxically both the absence and 
presence of Dominant Actors became precursors of success.  
This paradox could be explained by the fact that both the very successful and 
deeply failing utilities had strong CEOs. On the whole, there was then a 50/50 chance, a 
mere coin toss, of a utility with a very strong leader being very successful or being very 
flawed. The effect could be predicted more accurately when taking into account the 
prevalent worldview of the utility. If the prevalent mindset was an Engineering 
Mentality, the strong actors seemed to steer their utilities towards failure. When the 
system emphasized involving and informing other actors, the outcomes were generally 
better. 
9.4.2 Related concepts 
On one hand, the story of strong CEOs turning the utilities into little empires resonates 
with the mechanisms predicted for low social capital settings. The old patronage 
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relationships are recast into the arrangements around the dominant CEO or minister. On 
the other hand, the fact that strong actors could also steer the organisations the right 
way, over an extended period of time, might suggest that the patronage formula is not 
always replicated exactly as social capital theory suggests. 
The negative effect of strong leaders can be explained through two concepts. 
Firstly, good kings may turn bad. As all power corrupts, the license on offer may lead to 
arrogance and bad decisions. As they seized large part of the government during their 
expansion, the cost in terms of public value of their fall will also be greater. Secondly, 
there is the dilemma of the empty throne. Even if a CEO or minister rules as a benign 
king, he will expire eventually and leave the throne empty. In a system emphasising the 
power of certain offices, this position can now be seized by lest qualified individuals. 
Even if the court jester could so come to rule.  
In the light of the supposed determinism of such vicious mechanisms, it remains 
strange that some systems with Dominant Actors were still performing. Moore provides 
one possible narrative by showing how managers of organisations who are also leaders 
of their communities can generate the most value. 353 However, this does not yet capture 
the differences in mindset, signalled by the strongly negative effect of an Engineering 
Mentality on performance. 
Helgeser argued that this may come down to clash of leadership cultures, whereby 
the European norms were applied to the Caribbean without considering what works. ‘If 
benevolent leaders and devoted (but) demanding followers are the accepted social 
relationships, what reason is there for pushing an impersonal, legalistic system forward, 
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insisting on individualistic participation? If it is to "pass the exam" of practicing 
Western democracy, it is hardly worth it.’ 354 
It does seem strange indeed than many formalistic measures are applied to keep 
strong individuals in check while society could also monitor them by more direct means 
of observations and participation. By shackling these skilled individuals, the islands 
may lose some of the few individuals that could make government work for the 
community. Instead, rather than only looking at the individual, it may make sense to 
look at the place of strong leaders within their larger systems. 
9.4.3 Critical distinctions 
Strengthen the system 
When Dominant Actors occurred in high performing utilities, they were always 
accompanied with high scores in Relational Distance and Knowledge Availability. In 
other words, although these actors would often command the most resources within the 
set of players, these actor groups would be large, diverse and well-informed. This 
addressed the concern voiced by several strong actors that there was no-one to 
contradict them, making it lonely on the top. 355 By introducing Relational Distance and 
Knowledge Availability, they are in effect introducing their own opposition and 
strengthening the system. 
One CEO of a successful utility explained that he worked hard on creating an 
environment where one’s own power is checked and even employees are no longer 
afraid. ‘I couldn’t do something to them anymore; that is the culture we jointly created. 
Furthermore, if you are not afraid of the big men outside, they will not be so either.’ He 
did caution, however, that fear could still come back easily; ‘Even though fear has little 
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place, it is easily reinstated; if someone from a different status or colour comes in, 
people will defer to that perceived rank.’ 356 
An obvious benefit of a strong system is that strong actors did not have to police 
the governance by themselves. In one example, a mechanic of one of the utility’s truck 
workshop reported that all of the agency’s trucks were in a state of disrepair. This was 
based on his observation that he kept having to fix cars all day (an academic might have 
remarked that there was a certain bias in his sampling as he worked in the garage). 
Rather than the CEO having to correct the story, a neighbourhood group phoned into a 
radio show to tell them that the service was still fine, while the foreman quietly resolved 
the issue with the mechanic in question. 
A further benefit could be that the system will groom their successor. This harks 
back the observation of humanist scholars that good leaders create strong laws which 
will go on to produce new good leaders. At several of the performing cases, a change of 
the CEO took place during the period researched, with little difference in the policy 
process. By contrast, the dominant actors in the poor utilities would usually have to be 
forced out, after which the direction of the utility would usually change radically. 
 
Reflexive policy languages 
The emphasis on strong systems does still leave the question of the negative influence 
of an Engineering Mentality. This was the only process which presence, rather than its 
absence, was a precursor for failure. It poses the question what type of mentality is 
useful for elite actors in the governance of these agencies. 
The alternative view to Engineering Mentality holds that success is a more 
deliberative concept, which had to be constructed time and again from the different 
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preferences of the actors involved. However, even the actors which would be 
characterized by such an organic approach would still qualify as ‘planning officials’, 
one of the sub-categories of an Engineering Mentality. This might suggest that they 
were able to mix both planning and organic views on the world. Perhaps effective 
operators were those that could command several sorts of policy languages; speaking 
technology with the engineers, policy with the politicians and business with the bankers. 
Beyond reflecting the style of their interlocutor, they might also be better at taking 
in the opposite perspective, rather than just explaining their viewpoint. A distinction 
might be the difference between a preaching versus a reflexive leader. A preaching 
leader nearly emits all the opinions he has, where a reflexive leader will also take on 
board what he hears back.357 This switches the emphasis from leading to responding. 
This leader is constantly in doubt and dares to share that sentiment with his followers. 
As one respondent put it, referring to his role as a community leader; ‘I do hope to be an 
apostle. But more precisely to be the apostle Thomas; the one who was always in doubt 
and asking questions.’358 
9.5 CONCLUSION 
When expanding on the outcomes of the fuzzy-set analysis, it emerges that the 
successful utilities found different ways of filling in the components of expectations, 
structure and nature of relations. 
From the expectations perspective, negative experiences were countered with a 
steady stream of knowledge, which was supported by a strong system of actors. From 
the structure perspective, successful utilities actually opted not to cut through all the 
convoluted relationships. They rather strengthened this dense network by involving 
diverse actors and through the inclusive application of the governance rules. From a 
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nature perspective, dominant actors were not the universal culprits as they were 
sometimes branded, being instrumental to the success of the higher performing utilities. 
What distinguished them from failing utilities were their efforts in strengthening the 
system around them and the ability to consider diverse perspectives on policy. 
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10. CONCLUSION: TURNING THE TIDE 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of chapter 
Having completed the analysis and discussion of the empirical data, it is time to return 
to social capital theory and its unanswered question: How can public value be created in 
weak social capital settings? The empirical results generated by this thesis identify some 
alternative pathways to success as developed by local officials. In the case of these three 
islands, it emerges that the traditional designs of government are not able to hold back 
the flood of disinformation unleashed upon small-scale societies with weak social 
capital. Only those senior officials that devised a flexible and inclusive style of 
governance managed to turn the tide and create public value. The question then is 
whether these processes may have some relevance for the concept of social capital at 
large. 
 
Contents of chapter 
This chapter is structured around the three main contributions the thesis hoped to make. 
The first goal of the thesis was to provide a systematic analysis of the conditions for 
success in public utility performance under challenging social capital conditions. 
Drawing together the discussion from the previous chapter, the outcomes of this 
analysis are presented by dividing the observations between four types of governance 
arrangements. Each dealt differently with the structure, nature and expectations of 
relations. 
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The second aim of the thesis was to contribute new knowledge towards a 
perceived gap in social capital theory. Taking cues from the dynamics observed, the 
second part of the chapter discusses what the research outcomes mean for the 
understanding of social capital. This introduces a fresh diagnosis on what is happening 
in societies without social capital, emphasising the role of information, and debates 
whether the current concept of trust used by social capital theory is still appropriate. 
The third ambition of this thesis was to link the literature of social capital theory 
to that of public management. After a brief evaluation of the results of this approach, 
some further research questions are formulated for future endeavours. These questions 
all focus on the way public service organisations deal with their societal setting. 
10.2 MAKING GOVERNANCE WORK IN SMALL-SCALE DEMOCRACIES 
The first aim of this thesis was to provide a systematic analysis of the conditions for 
effective service delivery under challenging social capital conditions. Beginning with 
the literature on social capital as defined by Putnam, the thesis identified the three main 
components of the socio-cultural circumstances; the structure, nature and expectations 
of relations. The research design then traced these components at the sixteen cases and 
assessed which configurations best served the creation of public value.  
Having discussed the impact of different processes for each of the three 
components separately in the previous chapter, these themes are brought together here 
one last time. It is proposed that the different arrangements observed can be captured in 
four images of governance styles. The four types each arranged the structure, nature and 
expectations of relations in different ways, and subsequently achieved very different 
performance outcomes. Some utilities did not fit neatly into one type, but the overall 
division does shed some light on the main differences between the cases.  
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10.2.1 Ideal picture: Dam good governance 
The first image of governance arrangements is not a representation of what actually 
happened on the ground, but rather a mirage considered to be the ideal standard by 
many of the actors. In this ideal type of governance, government was viewed as a very 
clear structure; each actor, rule and structure formed part of a seamless system of 
service delivery. 
A clearly-structured system of connections guides the relevant information 
towards the pool of knowledge from which the policy makers draw their conclusions. A 
large dam separates the politics from the execution. It prevents irrelevant information, 
or information deemed irrelevant, from passing through. A carefully filtered stream of 
valid and consolidated information surges through the policy process, powering the 
flow of the state. Invisible to the public eye, officials work hidden away in the control 
room, addressing any glitches which may arise. 
Table 44 Ideal type of governance arrangements 
Expectations 
Only relevant & valid facts are considered 
Contradictions are quickly resolved 
Structure of relations 
Actors are distinct from each other 
Actors are considered complimentary 
Nature of relations 
Strength of actors is defined by rules 
Public value 
Not applicable; fictional arrangements 
 
Expectations of relations 
The overall characteristic of this model is clarity. Actors are assumed to have clear 
expectations of the cooperation around the utility. The different briefs for the 
government as shareholder, directors as representatives and CEOs as managers are 
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considered to be clearly defined and distinct. The system is quite hierarchical in the 
sense that the positions are clear, but is also egalitarian as each player has a clearly 
defined mandate and competency.  
On the whole, there is a strong Engineering Mentality towards the running of the 
government. The policy debate only considers facts which are of a technical or 
economic nature, all in pursuit of the most efficient delivery of the public service. When 
contradictions do arise, these are believed to be based on a lack of knowledge. The well-
structured network of channels then brings forward the relevant information, making for 
high overall Knowledge Availability. 
  
Structure of relations 
As envisioned by Putnam’s civic associations, a dense network of interest groups, 
community clubs and professional organisations feed into the management of the utility. 
With the various actors sticking to their formal briefs, the overall Relational Distance 
between the owner, supervisors and agents is deemed to be high.  
This system is functions through a strict adherence to the corporate or 
administrative governance rules, making for a high degree of Grid Governance. Actors 
are not considered to collide with each other, but complement one and other in the 
governance system. To repeat one CEO’s words; ‘There is no conflict of interest; the 
government sets the policy, we execute.´359 Should disagreements over decisions still 
arise, these conflicts are resolved through the appropriate legal mechanisms.  
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Nature of relations 
Within this clearly defined structure of government, actors are not unequal to each other 
as such, but simply positioned in a clear hierarchy of rights and duties. The rules of 
corporate governance or administrative law delineate the power base of the different 
actors. As a result, there are no Dominant Actors, but rather individuals who have the 
mandate over a given question. The ideal official is then a technocrat who calmly does 
his job and irons out any glitches. As convoluted mission briefs are avoided in order to 
minimise conflict of interests between parties, which would make for a low overall 
Group Governance.  
 
Public value 
This mirage of well-structured governance was never actually observed in any of the 
cases studied here. It did feature prominently as the ideal standard for utilities in the 
interviews with many respondents. Even though it bore little relation to the actual 
situation on the ground, some conceptual problems of this model can still be identified. 
Firstly, even the most avid preachers of this governance model would often have a 
rather narrow understanding of it and use it as an excuse to exclude stakeholders. For 
example, even though the World Bank pleaded for a clear hierarchy in governance 
matters, it also emphasised that a lively civil society is required to counterbalance state 
institutions.360 Similarly, the orthodox supporters would argue that the government 
should leave the utilities alone because they are nominally private companies. Others 
would argue that these monopolies required at least the supervision of a public 
regulator.361 
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Secondly, this stylistic view of governance ignored many of the political and 
business realities of the islands. By transplanting a large bureaucratic apparatus to a 
small-scale democracy setting, the machinery of governance would be disconnected 
from the actual sources of power in the local community. The governance structure 
could be so detached that the local streams of politics simply flowed past them. This 
effect was already visible in how the board of directors was frequently ignored. In many 
utilities, most decisions would be made directly between the minister and the CEO. 
Only when a board represented a wider segment of society, including members of the 
opposition and industry experts, did they actually feature in the governance process. 
However, the ideal type did have one positive effect, as it raised the expectations 
of the actors. Even if the daily reality was different, the ideal enshrined the standard of 
fairness and due process within the governance mindset. ‘Of course it is difficult to get 
good governance here, but there is no reason why it shouldn’t still be of high quality. 
We just have to find our own way of achieving it,’ commented one local observer.362 
However, without such a translation to the local circumstances, this ideal type of a dam 
of separated governance comes under increasing pressure from local circumstances. 
This may actually lead the dam to burst. 
10.2.2 Actual situation: Data deluge 
Moving into the reality of the sixteen utilities, it seems that in many cases the dam had 
indeed collapsed. Entangled connections, rather than the orderly channels imagined, 
brought in too much information, which also was of a highly variable quality. As a 
result, the policy fields were flooded with a torrent of invalid and irrelevant data. Rather 
than a neatly ordered process of interaction between distinct actors, everyone and 
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everything was drawn together in a maelstrom of confusion. Amidst this deluge, the 
senior officials of the utilities were left clinging on for dear life. 
Table 45 Actual situation: Data deluge 
Expectations 
No distinction between valid and invalid  
Structure of relations 
Clinging to rules or discarding them 
All other actors are threats 
Nature of relations 
Continuous struggle from all against all 
Public value  
Negative results  
 
Public value 
Several cases seemed to fit this description; in particular cases 10, 11, 12 and 13 could 
be categorized as policy fields flooded by a stream of unstructured information. 
However, the threat of confusion and anarchy was never far away for all of the utilities. 
As even a CEO of a very well-structured governance field admitted; ‘The politics will 
always keep on trying to take over.’363  
For the utilities without an effective mechanism to counter this flood, a negative 
public value score followed. However, perhaps surprisingly, the very worst performers 
of Cases 14, 15 and 16, had different arrangements altogether. They seemed to suffer 
from something else than a flood, something creating much more damage. It might have 
actually been a saving grace for the flooded policy fields that little gets done, which also 
meant that little harm can be done.364 
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 Expectations 
Ironically, even though the field was awash with data, there was a perceived shortage of 
information. The main problem was that actors were unsure which information was 
reliable. To repeat the lament of one director, ‘People hear all these different stories 
and do not know what to believe anymore.’365 As a result the Knowledge Availability 
was low. 
Different types of Mentality were found amongst the officials, ranging from 
engineering to organic, but that seemed to make little difference. Outside circumstances 
dictated their actions. There was no clear narrative as to what the utility was doing or 
what it was supposed to do. The different actors of these organisations would contradict 
each other in the interviews and even external auditors would be unsure of what was 
going on. This left little option for the senior officials but to work on incomplete 
information, scooping up any random fact to support the argument they were trying to 
make. 
 
Structure of relations 
There was often little system to the relations in this field, with formal connections either 
entangled with other interests or wholly ignored. Very few actors were actually closely 
involved, possibly because there was little to gain. With a low overall Relational 
Distance in Cases 10, 11, 12 and 13, these utilities were left unloved and 
underperforming. The policy field resembled a flooded area with a few officials 
scattered and isolated across different rooftops. 
                                                 
365  Director 6 
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The remaining officials would usually either cling to governance rules as life buoy 
or discard them as ballast. Those who stuck to the rules saw it as the one way out of 
their troubles. They argued that if only the institutional setup would be respected, the 
misdemeanors would disappear. As one public manager commented, ‘The problem is 
not institutional corruption, but undue institutional influence. Through friends, people 
get things done with the minister that shouldn’t be done.’366 Other parties simply gave 
up on the idea of order in these circumstances, arguing that the islands were just not cut 
out for good governance. The belief in Grid Governance could be either high or low, but 
the actual observance of rules was still low in practice at these organisations. 
 
Nature of relations 
Amidst this confusion, the position of officials was extremely precarious. Amidst all the 
confusion, it was hard to link effort to impact, reward to achievement. The information 
and relations were so distorted that the likelihood of reward following resorts was very 
slim. One CEO complained; ‘I still have to do all the work. And when I get it done, they 
don’t praise me, but [the minister].’367  
Amidst this confusion, the daily concern was with staying in office, rather than 
working towards public value. As a result, few strong Dominant Actors would emerge 
in these fields and little sense of Group Governance remained. As a result, the senior 
officials in these circumstances were mainly concerned with managing their own 
reputations. Their constant window-dressing would then add even more opinions to the 
swamp of data, perpetuating the problem. 
                                                 
366  External actor 5 
367  Public manager 23 
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10.2.3 Worst case scenario: Monopolizing information 
As mentioned above, the worst performance did not occur in the aforementioned data 
swamps, but in fields that had degenerated one step further. Amidst a flood of invalid 
data, high quality knowledge becomes a precious good. In this worst case scenario, a 
few selected actors had been able to monopolize key sources of information and 
takeover the entire policy field. These actors would tightly control the release of data, 
using their knowledge advantage as a bargaining chip. Information on public utilities so 
became a private resource. 
Table 46 Monopolizing information 
Expectations 
Valid information is jealously guarded 
 
Structure of relations 
Rules are used to keep others out 
Other parties are seen as threats 
Nature of relations 
Persisting patterns of patronage 
 
Public value  
Strongly negative results 
 
 
Public value 
The worst performing cases where those where one actor had seized full control of the 
information source. For Cases 14, 15 and 16, the CEO capitalized on his industry 
knowledge and assumed complete control of the business processes. As discussed in 
chapter 9, this initially led to quite efficient business processes, yet ultimately their 
decision-making would stray from the public interest.  
Often enough, the utilities with information monopolies maintained a clean and 
stable reputation over sustained periods of time. However, as could be observed in two 
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of these worst performing cases; when negative information was released accidentally, 
this would typically open the floodgates. The problem was that, even in a time of crisis, 
the CEOs attempted to limit the flow of information and lost control over the debate. 
Without a system ready to deal with the information, there were no commentators 
available to separate fact from fiction or frame the debate. The onslaught of bad news 
would force the politicians to intervene, often quite disproportionally, sending the 
governance of the utility into a tailspin.  
 
Expectations of relations 
Case 14, 15 and 16 were characterized by CEOs with a strongly business-oriented view 
on the running of a utility, epitomising an Engineering Mentality. These managers 
would consider it their mission to obtain the largest share of the market while 
minimizing the costs, although some defined their mission as attracting new business to 
the island. As the utilities were already full or near monopolies, such ambitions often 
led to abuses of market power. 
As said, the chief characteristic of these utilities was restricted Knowledge 
Availability. These cases would fence off large parts of their business from the public 
eye. For example, they would conduct consumer surveys or regional benchmarks, but 
not share this information publicly. Commenting on how little was known about the 
running of these utilities, one expert sighed; ‘They are running it as a family 
company.’368 
 
                                                 
368  External actor 26 
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Structure of relations 
Interestingly, there were more actors involved with these worst three utilities than with 
the mediocre performers of Case 5 to 10, making for a slightly higher Relational 
Distance. However, these actors were far less diverse, presenting more narrow interests 
in the utilities. For example, this included specific businesses looking after their own 
bottom line. As hypothesised earlier in Chapter 5, these might form a part of the 
patronage structures, circling the failing utilities like vultures. 
Outwardly, there was a strong emphasis on the governance rules and therefore a 
high Grid Governance. Yet it seemed that these rules were implemented mainly to keep 
unwanted onlookers out, using the private status of the organisation as tool to avoid 
public scrutiny. To repeat one CEO of such a utility; ‘There is no such thing as a public 
utility here on the island. We are private agencies whereby the shareholder happens to 
be the government.’369 
 
Nature of relations 
These three worst performers all had strong Dominant Actors. In addition, there was a 
small sense of Group Governance, illustrated by how little information was shared 
between the actors. Sometimes, there was some fraternity between the actors, but this 
more resembled being partners in crime than a benign collective. In effect this ‘team 
spirit’ usually amounted to buying support through some minor payments in money or 
products.370 As in other patronage relationships, this was rather a mark of the inequality 
of resources between the Dominant Actor and the follower, rather than an equal role in 
the governance process. 
                                                 
369  Public manager 31 
370  Director 5 
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10.2.4 Best case scenario: Delta of governance 
Between an ideal governance type that is not attainable and two types that actively harm 
the public interest, one could be forgiven for despairing whether success can be 
achieved at all in these poor social capital circumstances. However, public value 
creation did occur. This was not achieved by reducing the governance system to rigid 
structured as prescribed by the ideal type, but rather by nurturing a rich delta of 
information and actors. 
 In this governance style, the data channels are not neatly ordered. Instead official 
streams of information are mixed up with streams of gossip and opinions. Equally, the 
relationships are not always distinct from each other; involvement is applied more often 
than exclusion. Quite often, part of the policy system goes out of bounds, yet the aim is 
not to achieve progress through stability, but through a dynamic equilibrium between 
the different actors. The opposing forces were not locked into distinct positions, but 
allowed to quite vehemently counteract each other. The resulting overflow provided the 
fertile ground for the creation of public value. 
Table 47 Delta of information 
Expectations 
Keeps adding information 
Frames the contradictions 
Translates debates to actions  
Structure of relations 
Uses rules to include 
Distinguishes opponents from enemies 
Nature of relations 
Strengthen the system 
Reflexive in dialogue 
Public value 
Positive public value 
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Public value 
The successful Cases 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 corresponded to a large degree to this model, 
whereas Cases 7, 8 and 9 approximated some of its principles. The high performing 
cases were not only successful in creating an efficient business process, but also in 
directing this value towards the community at large. They achieved their high scores not 
only by attaining good levels of service and insight, but also by keeping to costs down. 
Possibly, the involvement of these many actors allowed for the stability and synergy 
needed to minimize the draw on society. 
 
Expectations of relations 
These cases distinguished themselves through a high degree of Knowledge Availability. 
There was no strict separation between the valid and invalid data, as in the ideal type. 
Neither was there a restriction of the flow of information, as in the monopoly scenarios.  
Instead, all information was involved in the debate. The main aim was not to filter out 
what was relevant, as within a small intra-connected community anything was deemed 
to be relevant, but to upgrade the quality of the discussion overall.  
An additional difference with the flood image was that the broadcasting of 
information was always combined with a constant cultivation of the environment in 
which the knowledge had to be received. The officials of these utilities would be 
comfortable working across different networks, ranging from meetings with the Central 
Bank to participating in the local Carnival Troup. They hereby acted as boundary 
spanners between different settings.371 Moreover, they created new networks to increase 
the flow of information. For example, the community watchdog founded to monitor the 
                                                 
371  See: P. Williams, 'The Competent Boundary Spanner', Public Administration, no. 80, 2002, p. 
103-24. 
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utility not only harvested extra information, but also educated its followers on how this 
data should be interpreted. Information was therefore closely married to participation. 
This model in some ways also resembles the ideal type of the dam, through its 
wide network of information channels across societies. There is an important difference, 
however, in how the delta dealt with truth and consensus. Different opinions were not 
allowed to fest in isolation, leaving ‘to each its own’, but actors were encouraged to 
confront each other. As one CEO said, ‘success is a deliberative concept,’ and effective 
officials would constantly engage in this deliberation with all the actors.372 This meant 
that they did not expect to arrive at one consolidated view on the utilities, as someone 
with an Engineering Mentality would, but rather anticipate that the expectations of the 
utilities change depending on time and perspective.373 
Despite its organic appearance, this approach only seemed to be successful 
through effective planning. Although the effective officials all scored low on 
Engineering Mentality, they did all spend a lot of time planning. Next to planning the 
production and distribution of their goods, this was also about ‘orchestrating the 
conflict’; planning when which parties should or will collide over the policy.374 The 
model so created public value through friction rather than smooth interaction. 
 
Structure of relations 
The information initiatives described above were accompanied by efforts to widen and 
structure the participation of other actors. The successful cases all had a high Relational 
Distance, with many groups of actors contributing to the policy streams. They were 
                                                 
372  Public manager 15 
373  This relates closely to the recent work of Verweij and Thompson on formulating clumsy, multi-
interpretable solution for complex problems, rather than looking for one silver bullet. See: M. Verweij and 
M. Thompson, Clumsy solution for a complex world, (Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2006). 
374  R.A. Heifetz and M. Linksky, Leadership on the line, (Harvard Business Press, 2002). 
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involved across the different stages of policy execution, and did not strictly distinguish 
between politics and execution. 
Importantly though, especially in Cases 1, 2 and 3, this inclusive style of 
governance was combined with a strict observance of the rules, scoring high on Grid 
Governance. However, in contrast to the monopolizing governance systems, these rules 
were used to give as many people as possible a role, rather than to exclude them. Actors 
who wanted to join the debate were welcomed, but there was explicit discussion about 
what their legitimate role would be. 
 
Nature of relations 
The maintenance of Knowledge Availability, Relational Distance and Grid Governance 
required a lot of skills from the officials. The successful utilities did indeed have strong 
individuals, with some Dominant Actors possessing considerably more expertise and 
resources than their peers. The fact they were strong would probably make it easier to 
navigate the many temptations and pressures on the road to success. To repeat the acute 
observation of one civil servant: ‘The fewer skills and capacities you have, the more you 
have to rely on your own character.’375  
However, even from these positions of strength, the Dominant Actors would still 
seek to nurture their own countervailing powers. This could be done by nurturing 
opposing actors, such as community watchdogs or competent colleagues, or through 
creating an overall culture of rights and respect. As one strong CEO commented; ‘I 
couldn’t do something to them anymore; that is the culture we jointly created.’376  
This overall strengthening of the system addresses the main weakness in the delta 
systems. As opposing forces are allowed to roam relatively freely, the governance 
                                                 
375  Public manager 30 
376  Public manager 20 
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arrangements are still relatively unstable. To avoid some forces gaining too much 
momentum, as they did in the case of the data deluge, there needs to be an extensive, yet 
dynamic, system of checks and balances. It may be tempting to still opt for the 
relatively predictability of the ideal type or the data monopoly. However, considering 
the consistently better performance of utilities which followed this recipe, the evidence 
indicates that a more dynamic system generated better results. 
10.3 REVISITING SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY 
The second aim of the thesis was to address a perceived lacuna in the social capital 
literature. More specifically, the thesis wanted to answer a cry of frustration of an 
official of a regional government in Southern Italy. He considered Putnam’s diagnosis a 
‘counsel of despair’, as it basically meant that certain communities were condemned by 
their histories to underperformance.377 The paragraphs below first present the evidence 
that public value can be created, but also reiterates the many limitations of this research 
design. The final paragraphs summarize what the result may show about the 
mechanisms of social capital, focusing mainly on the role of information and trust. 
10.3.1 Creating public value in adverse social capital conditions 
The research project found several public utilities that overcame their limiting social 
capital circumstances and added significant public value to their communities. As 
detailed in the chapter on data observations, at least three utilities were successful, even 
when taking into account a 90% confidence interval. Further evidence for success was 
found for another six utilities, although the large confidence interval suggests that their 
performance was less strong.  
                                                 
377  R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton University Press 
Princeton, NJ, 1993), p. 183. 
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However, even when only considering the top three cases as successful, the results show 
that success is attainable in these circumstances. Revisiting the diagram as drafted in 
Chapter 1, the different variables can now be filled out as done in the figure below.  
The institutional, economic and societal circumstances formed the controlled 
variables and were kept as constant as possible for the sixteen cases. The dependent 
variable of performance was then measured through applying the public value 
framework, generating the scores of the utilities as detailed above. The independent 
variables focused on elite behaviours. 
Roughly speaking, it can be concluded that failing utilities were hampered by an 
exclusion of outside actors, prevalence of an engineering approach to management and 
monopolization of information. By contrast, successful utilities used the governance 
rules to include as many actors as possible, were led by more reflexive officials and on 
the whole improved the quality of information available. 
Figure 24 Testable theorem 
Strong institutions
Strong economics
Weak social capital 
Low public 
value
Structure: Excluding actors
Nature: Engineering
Expectations: Holding info
Controlled 
variables
Dependent 
variable
Independent 
variables
Government 
organizations
Cases
=
High public 
value
Structure: Rules to include
Nature: Reflexive actors
Expectations: Building info
=
 
10.3.2 Limitations of the research design 
As already discussed in the opening and methodology chapters, there are some 
important limitations to the validity of these results. A first restriction is that it is still 
possible that the analysis overlooked the effect of an unknown variable. A relatively 
small sample of sixteen agencies across three islands is not yet sufficient to rule out the 
importance of other circumstances. For example, focusing more on path dependency, 
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the success of these utilities may have been based on events beyond the timeframe of 
this research exercise. 
However, the consistency of the fuzzy-set analysis was quite high. This suggests 
that the main variables were mostly captured. The formula for success obtained a 78% 
consistency and failure 81%. This suggests that the mechanisms identified would lead to 
the predicted results in four out of five times. Admittedly, adding more cases would 
have increased the solidity of this analytical process. Although adding an additional 
sixteen cases would have required another hefty investment considering the amount of 
time it took to collect the present sample.  
Another limitation is that the research design looks at a specific part of 
government. General pronouncements about the state as a whole may therefore not be 
appropriate. As discussed earlier, public utilities are a particular type of government due 
the more goods and services oriented nature of their product. The fact that most of the 
agencies were nominally private entities may have made a fundamental difference as 
well.  
A final question would be what the relevance of these findings is for other 
societies. The Caribbean mix of factors might have been unique. The subsequent 
strategies to create public value may not therefore work in other settings. An obvious 
next step would to see how comparable these dynamics are to Pacific and Indian Ocean 
island communities. It is possible that similar patterns could also be observed in larger 
scale polities, as the data flood problem may also be a problem there as well. However, 
these mechanisms have been put to the test different circumstances, great caution is 
warranted. 
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10.3.3 What goes wrong in the absence of social capital 
When taking these limitations into account, several points about social capital theory in 
general can still be explored. The first observation concerns what exactly goes wrong in 
these societies due to the absence of social capital. The fundamental characteristic of 
social capital as defined by Putnam is that people have positive expectations about 
cooperation.378 These optimistic expectations are produced through positive experiences 
gained in civic associations. 
The most obvious characteristic of the three described societies are the missing 
civic connections within the polity at large and the utilities in specific. In line with the 
predictions of Putnam, cases which built up these connections, outperformed their more 
reclusive counterparts. In a sense, these successful cases built the bridges around them 
that would have otherwise been provided by social capital. 
However, Relational Distance was only a powerful mechanism when combined 
with Knowledge Availability. The existence of these channels alone was not a recipe for 
success, a constant flow of information was needed to improve the governance 
outcomes. This might suggest that next to building new connections to reach actors, 
successful cases would need to information to change the expectations of these outside 
actors.  
Because positive experiences are very hard to create, a change in attitude needs to 
come from positive information. Officials needed to entice actors to enter the 
cooperation on the basis of positive information rather than good positive experiences. 
The question is then whether the sum of Relational Distance and Knowledge 
Availability still counts as social capital, or at least its rudimentary beginnings, or 
whether the actors have generated an alternative fuel for cooperation. 
                                                 
378  C. Boix and D. Posner, ‘Social capital: Explaining its origins and effects on government 
performance’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 4, 1998, p. 686-693. 
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10.3.4 What can replace interpersonal trust in these circumstances 
To establish whether these societies have generated an alternative to social capital, the 
desired positive expectations of cooperation need to be clearly understood. The essence 
of positive expectations of strangers, or interpersonal trust, is that people make an 
optimistic pronouncement about something which is unknown: ‘I do not yet know this 
person, but I will assume that our cooperation will work out’ or ‘I do not know exactly 
what my members in parliament are doing, but I will assume they are doing their 
best.’379 In sum, actors extend their good faith beyond the line of sight. 
The difference is that in small-scale democracies a far greater part of the public 
sphere is within the line of sight of citizens. They continuously hear personal stories 
about their politicians, see their actions for themselves and know, or think they know, 
everything that is happening. Arguably, a similar effect could be observed today in 
much larger societies, where the omnipresence of the the media has collapsed the walls 
of privacy or deference around the political sphere. As suggested by Fung and Tsoakas, 
this flood of information does seem to lead to an increase in confusion and decrease in 
trust of institutions and officials.380  
Some of the utilities studied tried to stop the flood by excluding actors, asking 
them to only listen to the official reports and to let the professionals get on with their 
work. These officials would argue that government cannot work under the constant 
scrutiny of the public. This approach assumes that democracy can only work if people 
put their trust in other actors beyond their line in sight. If this confidence is not present, 
trust is assumed to have gone missing completely. 
                                                 
379  C. Boix and D. Posner, ‘Social capital: Explaining its origins and effects on government 
performance’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 4, 1998, p. 686-693. 
380  H. Tsoukas, ‘The tyranny of light: The temptations and the paradoxes of the information society’, 
Futures, Volume 29, Issue 9, November 1997, Pages 827-843. A. Fung, M. Graham and D. Weil, Full 
Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007). 
 
281
However, there are other forms of trust. Most significantly here, the object of trust 
may be different In Putnam’s definition; trust is placed in other people. This specific 
trust is also generalized towards trust in the community and its government at large. As 
Hayek observed, people can also decide to put their faith in rules, relying on good 
process. Or merely put their faith in ends, only relying on their own assessment of the 
outcomes of the process. Relevant to this particular context, Hayek argued that in tight-
knit networks, the trust would be in the ends. In small groups, people do not need to rely 
on rules to make sure people beyond their line of sight are trustworthy. Instead they can 
directly observe whether they are getting a fair share of the deal.381 A similar mechanism 
of trust may have been generated by the successful utilities. 
In the traditional forms of governance, external actors were asked to imagine the 
public utilities as a black box. They can give limited inputs and receive limited 
information through the official reports. They are asked to put their faith in the good 
intentions of the actors working inside the black box. However, in small-scale societies, 
this black box is much more transparent, or at least seems to be. Most of the action 
happens within the line of sight or else stories continuously leak out. Yet the traditional 
officials would still ask actors to ignore whatever they heard and keep putting their 
blind faith in the process.  
From the viewpoint of the outside actors, it might make more sense to directly 
observe the interactions and strive to intervene where appropriate. It is no longer 
necessary to assume government is running well, one can observe whether it is or not 
and intervene accordingly. Trust now has taken the form of a reliance on direct 
information and participation.  
                                                 
381  F.A. Hayek, Individualism and economic order, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948). 
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This argument does not suggest that trust is not important; the research might 
simply show that trust has taken a different form. Actors still need to have faith in the 
information and participation, but will take less for granted and rely more on 
themselves. Yet to keep measuring the blind faith in the black box is applying an 
anachronistic concept of trust. Patients that stop trusting witch doctors have not 
necessarily lost all forms of faith. Instead, their object of trust may have shifted towards 
the medical profession. 
There are some problems with this shifting notion of trust. Firstly, even within 
small societies, some processes will still need to be entrusted to a black box. For 
example, the deliberations between judges are by definition limited in the scope of 
participation they can offer to external actors. Furthermore, in times of crisis, officials 
may not have the time to inform and involve all the citizens. However, different forms 
of trust may be useful in different circumstances. In the case of these utilities, trust in 
direct information and participation proved to be most useful. 
A second problem is that this form of trust relies on an effective marriage of 
participation and information. However, this might well be an elite process, only 
producing good results when relying on generally well-informed actors with clearly 
understood interests. As this thesis only looks at the elites that might well be a 
possibility. Further research may be the best way of answering these questions. 
10.4 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The final aim of this thesis was to link the literature of social capital with that of public 
management, connecting grand social theories with the daily realities of government. 
Perhaps this goal was too ambitious for a research project limited in time and resources. 
Most prominently, it may have fallen short on working from a profound understanding 
of both social capital theory and the public management literature. Specifically, the 
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connection between the different concepts within these disciplines could sometimes 
have been more rigorously and consistently applied.  
Yet the main contribution of the thesis might be to show that even a limited 
attempt to combine these literatures can deliver some interesting results. To facilitate 
further such explorations, some new research questions are formulated below. They are 
meant to seize on larger questions currently playing in the literature, hopefully 
providing extra direction and precision to them.  
Returning to the three types of circumstances important to an effective 
government, these questions are divided amongst the institutional, socio-economic and 
socio-cultural conditions for democracies. One common thread through all these 
suggested questions is an encouragement to look for positive exceptions, aiming to find 
governments who overcame their difficult circumstances. 
10.4.1 Institutional design 
Question 1: Do public service organisations working under governance rules that 
stimulate the information and participation create more public value than organisations 
with more restrictive policies? 
The doctrines of good governance remain a powerful theme in the administration of 
public service organisations in both developed and developing countries. This thesis 
supports some of the criticism of this concept, but also suggests that certain elements of 
good governance could still aid the creation of public value.  
There is a growing chorus of critics who argue that good governance regimes are 
currently designed to serve only the investors or pay masters, rather than the community 
at large. Unsworth and Moore, for example, argue for the introduction of ‘upside-down 
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governance.’ The regime should be turned on its head and work to fit the demands and 
needs of the people, rather than those of the officials.382  
In specific reference to the role of public corporations, and their separated position 
from the elected officials, there is also growing concern that corporate governance 
practices may nurture a new form of oligarchy. Sintomer, Herzberg and Houdret argue 
that such public enterprise structures in local governments are used to narrow the scope 
of accountability between the legislator and executive.383 As a result, policy is set by a 
small group of technocrats. On the whole, these critics argue for a less normative 
approach towards governance and a move towards a practical method emphasising what 
actually works in the given context.  
This thesis might show that some criticism of good governance is fair, but that the 
concept retain some intrinsic value as well. On one hand, this thesis found instances 
where the rules of corporate governance were used to exclude actors from participating 
in the policy debate. Officials, mainly CEOs, would invoke the law to bar other actors 
from getting involved.  
On the other hand, many of the successful utilities used these same rules to give 
everyone a role, actually relying on good governance principles to structure 
participation. This would suggest that the good governance doctrines, and its public 
corporation applications, should not be dismissed outright. The focus should rather be 
on a fruitful application of the rules. 
Good governance rules can stimulate the flow of information and the creation of 
roles for different stakeholders, setting clear goals to report on and processes for 
consultation. The research outcomes suggest that a key variable in the governance 
practices is the availability of information to actors. This effect is only consistent when 
                                                 
382  S. Unsworth and M. Moore, ‘Upside-down governance’, Global Insight, first quarter 2011, p. 27. 
383  Y. Sintomer, C. Herzberg and A. Houdret. La participation des usagers dan la gestion de l’eau 
avec un focus sur les regies et enterprises municipales. (Centre Marc Bloch, Paris, April 2010). 
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combined with a strong effort to encouraged structured participation. This might 
provide a possible answer to critics of transparency. The question is then whether this 
effect can be observed across other cases in different societal settings. 
Further research could address this question in two parts. First, it should be tested 
on the basis of a larger sample whether public organisations with governance practices 
stimulating information and participation do indeed outperform their more restrictive 
counterparts. Second, it should be further investigated exactly which governance 
practices form good ways of marrying information to participation. For example, 
making all the financial details of an organisation available online, might only add to 
the confusion. Holding question and answer sessions in the community centre might 
provide better results. 
10.4.2 Socio-economic factors 
Question 2: What are low-costs ways for citizens to participate in the governance of 
public service organisations? 
The link between better government performance and a combination of information and 
participation relies on the assumption that citizens will be able to take advantage of the 
opportunities on offer. However, the literature is still divided on the benefits of pushing 
participation much beyond the periodic input at the ballot box. 
A first concern is that all these actors simply do not have the resources to get 
involved. Oscar Wilde commented wryly that the problem with ‘socialism is that it 
takes too many evenings.’384 Citizens may find themselves similarly pushed for time in 
such a participatory style of government. As Rhodes observed, there is a risk that 
                                                 
384  B. Day ed., Oscar Wilde: A life in quotes, (Metro Books, London, 2000). 
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participatory governance will then only benefit the well-connected few, rather than the 
disorganised multitudes.385  
This thesis was restricted in its scope by looking only at the elite actors and does 
not look at the involvement of citizens at large. It finds evidence that these external 
actors could be motivated to contribute at that level at least, but there is no insight in 
how they are being steered by their constituents. The role of the wider populace was 
arguably not to be directly involved, but to form the pressure behind the leaders, i.e. the 
members of the trade union, donators of the environmental groups, business people 
supporting the Tourist Board, etc. 
What warrants further research is how citizens then stimulated their leaders to act 
in their general interest. The ballot box is a rather crude and indirect measure, which 
may not be the best way of steering in such a small society. Perhaps some insight can be 
gained from the interest in prods and pushes: Policy makers are currently interested in 
the ‘nudges’ governments can give citizens to live better lives – eat more healthily, use 
public transport, etc.386 It might also be interesting to see what little pushes citizens, 
unions members, subscribers, etc. can give their officials to do the right thing as well.  
10.4.3 Socio-cultural factors 
Question 3: Can democracies still be effective public service providers when working 
with alternatives forms of trust? 
As covered in the previous discussion on trust, there is rising concern amongst scholars 
and politicians about a perceived erosion of confidence in public institutions. Various 
research efforts are directed at determining whether trust is indeed eroding and what can 
                                                 
385  R. Rhodes, ‘Governance and public administration’, in J. Pierre ed., Debating governance, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), p. 53. 
386  See: T. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness. (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 2008). 
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be done to stop this process.387 This thesis, researching only a small part of the 
government in a very specific societal setting, cannot claim to provide definite answers 
to these grave concerns. What it can contribute is some further direction for the 
questions that should be asked. 
The results from this thesis suggest that researchers should be careful in defining 
what exact type of trust they are looking for. As argued previously, the current 
understanding of trust refers to positive expectations of other people when entering 
cooperation.388 This reliance on other people may have shifted towards a trust in 
something else, such as own observation and intervention. People still think the 
cooperation might be beneficial, but rely on other measures to make it work for them.  
Trust is still present within societies in these new circumstances, signalled by the 
fact that cooperation continuous to take place. Many researchers, however, keep looking 
for the old forms of trust and are surprised when they do not find it. Possibly, the 
question should be asked again in its original form, just as Putnam did when he started 
his research in Italy: Which communities show a high likelihood of cooperation and 
what could explain this? Trust might then have the form of faith in the community, the 
institutions or individual leaders, or as it was in the case of these three islands, mainly in 
own observation and participation. The question is then how public services how can 
work best across these different circumstances. 
10.5 CONCLUSION 
This thesis aimed to understand how democratic government can provide effective 
services in difficult social capital circumstances. It took its cues from Putnam’s concept 
of social capital, and designated a remaining question as the starting point of the 
                                                 
387  For a review see: P. Blind, Building trust in the government in the twenty-first century: Review of 
literature and emerging issues, (UNDESA, Vienna, November 2006). 
388  C. Boix and D. Posner, ‘Social capital: Explaining its origins and effects on government 
performance’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 4, 1998, p. 686-693. 
 
288
research exercise. Assuming that social capital is important to the effective performance 
of government, it explored how such success could still be achieved even if the socio-
cultural circumstances were difficult. 
The subsequent exploration focused on the islands of Aruba, Curacao and St. Kitts 
and the limitations of their social environment. Rather than writing a litany of their 
troubles, the thesis sought to find examples of agencies and individuals that overcame 
these circumstances and created value for their communities. Dissecting the 
characteristics of these successful expectations shows that in the case of these public 
utilities, success was achieved through an active use of governance rules to include all 
interested parties, an emphasis on the spread and structuring of high-quality information 
and the nurturing of reflexive styles of governance.  
Hopefully, these achievements of the local officials and the subsequent analysis of 
their actions in this thesis will provide some inspiration for scholars and practitioners 
alike. 
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APPENDIXES 
I: OVERVIEW OF RESPONDENTS 
Due to the sensitive nature of this research topic, all actors are presented anonymously. 
As the polities are extremely small it would be easy to identify specific speakers on the 
basis of just a few clues. This appendix therefore provides extremely limited 
background information. The examiners of the University of Oxford were able to access 
a full list of the interviewees. The respondents are divided into four groups: 
1. Politicians: Members of Parliament and members of the Cabinet. 
2. Public managers: all members of the central government, public agencies and 
corporatized agencies that are directly part of the delivery chain of the utilities. 
Their experience is grouped around the sector infrastructure (telecom, airport 
and sea port), transport (buses, waste, post) and energy (electricity, water, oil). 
3. Directors: members of the supervisory boards of the public agencies. 
4. External actors: academics, private and public auditors, ombudsmen, consultants 
and other actors who are not directly within the line of management but do have 
relevant experience and knowledge of the public utilities. 
Table 48 List of respondents 
Respondent Background 
Politician 1 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 2 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 3 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 4 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
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Politician 5 Parliamentary experience. 
Politician 6 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 7 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 8 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 9 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 10 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 11 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 12 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 13 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 14 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Politician 15 Parliamentary and ministerial experience. 
Public Manager 1 Management of infrastructure agency. 
Public Manager 2 Management of infrastructure agency. 
Public Manager 3 Management of infrastructure agency. 
Public Manager 4 Management of transport agency. 
Public Manager 5 Management of transport agency. 
Public Manager 6 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 7 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 8 Management of energy agency. 
Public manager 9 Management of energy agency. 
Public manager 10 Management of energy agency. 
Public manager 11 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 12 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 13 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 14 Management of energy agency. 
Public manager 15 Management of energy agency. 
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Public manager 16 Management of infrastructure agency. 
Public manager 17 Management of infrastructure agency. 
Public manager 18 Management of energy agency. 
Public manager 19 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 20 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 21 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 22 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 23 Management of energy agency. 
Public manager 24 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 25 Management of infrastructure agency. 
Public manager 26 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 27 Management of transport agency. 
Public manager 28 Management of energy agency. 
Public manager 29 Management of energy agency. 
Public manager 30 Management of agencies. 
Public manager 31 Management of infrastructure agency. 
Director 1 Supervision of infrastructure agency. 
Director 2 Supervision of energy agency. 
Director 3 Supervision of energy agency. 
Director 4 Supervision of energy agency. 
Director 5 Supervision of energy agency. 
Director 6 Supervision of energy, transport, infrastructure agencies. 
Director 7 Supervision of infrastructure agency. 
Director 8 Supervision of transport agency. 
Director 9 Supervision of energy, transport, infrastructure agencies. 
Director 10 Supervision of energy, transport, infrastructure agencies. 
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Director 11 Supervision of energy agency. 
Director 12 Supervision of energy, transport, infrastructure agencies. 
Director 13 Supervision of energy, transport, infrastructure agencies. 
Director 14 Supervision of infrastructure agency. 
Director 15 Supervision of energy, transport, infrastructure agencies. 
External Actor 1 Auditing and advising public organisations. 
External Actor 2 Auditing and advising public organisations. 
External Actor 3 Representing interests groups. 
External Actor 4 Financing and advising public organisations. 
External actor 5 Management of public agency. 
External actor 6 Representing interest groups. 
External actor 7 Academic. 
External actor 8  Management of private company. 
External actor 9 Management of public agency. 
External Actor 10 Representing interest groups. 
External actor 11 Management of private company. 
External actor 12 Auditing and advising public agencies. 
External actor 13 Auditing and advising public and private agencies. 
External actor 14 Management of private company. 
External actor 15 Representing interest groups. 
External actor 16 Auditing and advising public agencies. 
External actors 17 Management of private company. 
External actor 18 Financing public organisations, management of private 
company. 
External actor 19 Representing interest groups. 
External actor 20 Management of public agencies. 
External actor 21 Academic. 
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External actor 22 Management of public agency. 
External actor 23 Academic. 
External actor 24 Auditing and advising public and private organisations. 
External actor 25 Advising public and private organisations. 
External actor 26 Auditing and advising public and private organisations. 
External actor 27 Academic. 
External actor 28 Auditing and advising public and private organisations. 
External actor 29 Advising public and private organisations. 
External actor 30 Academic. 
External actor 31 Academic. 
External actor 32 Representing interest groups. 
External actor 33 Representing interest groups. 
External actor 34 Management of public agencies. 
External actor 35 Management of public services. 
External actor 36 Management of private company. 
External actor 37 Management of private company. 
External actor 38 Auditing and advising public and private organisations. 
External actor 39 Representing interest groups. 
External actor 40 Auditing and advising public agencies. 
External actor 41 Management of public agency. 
External actor 42 Academic. 
External actor 43 Academic. 
External actor 44 Advising public and private organisations. 
External actor 45 Academic. 
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II: RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF INTERVIEWS 
Reliability of interview data 
The greatest problem for the reliability of interviews is that one cannot know for sure 
whether a respondent is telling the truth. If the data is indeed incorrect or intentionally 
misleading, this could fatally undermine the whole project. There is also a danger that 
the researcher will shape the data through his own personal subjectivity.  
There is always a bias in attaching code to observation and the art is to know 
oneself in this process.389 Whether using statistics or qualitative observations, 
researchers should be self-critical and transparent in the choices they make and analyse 
their own potential biases. In this case, a framework to measure performance was set out 
beforehand. After the data was collected, the results were presented to local experts and 
at scientific conferences to test the analysis. Furthermore, the thesis aims to be 
consistently transparent about all the data, giving readers the opportunity to evaluate the 
research outcomes as well. 
 
Validity of respondent perspective 
Even if the interview data is reliable, it is possible that not all information is valid. The 
first validity problem is that by interviewing the elites, even when cross-checking with 
policy documents and memoirs, one will get a very top-down perspective of the 
organisation and its behaviour. Policy documents are ultimately determined by the 
power players in the organisations and such documents are usually written by the 
                                                 
389  R.F. Fenno, Home Style: House members in their districts, (Brown, Little, 1978). 
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victors or dominant parties. As Glynn and Booth suggest, the researcher will only 
encounter the self-justifications of the elite.390 
This issue is addressed through two avenues: Firstly, the research project should 
be very careful in its selection of interviewees, making sure to identify different types of 
actors, whilst being aware of their respective powers to shape the administration. 
Secondly, it is important to match the scope of interviews to the question. In choosing to 
interview the responsible minister, one cannot claim full knowledge of the motivations 
of the rank-and-file civil servants. The research questions should match this and 
therefore only focuses on the actions of the senior officials, rather than making claims 
about the government as a whole. 
 
Validity of researcher perspective 
A second validity problem is that the perspective of the researcher may be limited or 
biased. When attempting to observe the machinations of government, it is vital to gain a 
comprehensive insight into all the dimensions of the organisations. This means that 
access to all key players and experts is pivotal. Thankfully, the islands provided a good 
hunting ground for research, since all the relevant people were geographically close to 
each other and could refer the researcher on to next contacts. Most key figures were 
present on the island and could be contacted relatively easily, including political leaders, 
responsible executives or outside observers such as journalists and consultants. 
However, the cultural bias of the researcher may still influence his reading of the 
data and circumstances. This problem should not be underestimated. Again, the best 
way of dealing with this bias is to construct neutral research tools beforehand and 
remain transparent about one’s assumptions throughout. 
                                                 
390  P. Davies, ‘Doing Politics Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite 
Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services’, Politics, vol. 21, no. 1, 2001, p. 73-
80. 
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III: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FUZZY-SET ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptors of data-set 
To provide some further insight before the actual analysis starts, some essential 
descriptors are listed in the table below for each of the six causal processes. This gives a 
first impression of the different presence of these causal processes amongst the cases. 
For example, Relational Distance has a mean membership of 0.56. This indicates that, 
on average, the utilities know some degree of Relational Distance between the actors 
involved. Given the fact that most of these utilities have been explicitly structured to 
create distance between the government and the utility corporation, this is not 
surprising. The fact that there are still cases achieving the minimum score of 0.00, i.e. 
there is no Relational Distance in the governance system, shows that this ambition was 
not fulfilled by all the utilities. 
Table 49 fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis descriptors 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Relational Distance 0.56 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Grid Governance 0.39 0.29 0.00 0.66 
Group Governance 0.35 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Actor Dominance 0.64 0.28 0.33 1.00 
Knowledge Availability 0.58 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Engineering Mentality 0.62 0.26 0.33 1.00 
By contrast, the average utility seems to have a weak sense of rule enforcement, as 
indicated by the low mean score of 0.39 on Grid Governance. No utility obtained a 
fully-in score, with the highest degree of Grid not being higher than 0.66. This could be 
explained by the fact that one of the criteria for Grid Governance is insulation between 
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the different actors. In a small-setting like the islands, this separation may not be 
possible as all relationships tend to be entangled. 
A similar score was obtained for the Group Governance, with a mean score of 
0.35 on the whole. This indicates that all relationships have at least two characteristics 
of group communality. Again this is not surprising given the island setting. Some 
utilities went on to obtain full membership, apparently having a tight group sense 
between the actors. However, the rather large standard deviation of +/- 0.34, suggests 
that there are great difference between the utilities still. 
On average, most of the utilities did seem to have a disproportionately Dominant 
Actor in their ranks, as suggested by the mean score of 0.64. With a minimum score of 
0.33, there seemed to be no case at all where there was a perfect balance between the 
actors. This fits in with the earlier dataset observations on the distribution of capital, 
already indicating great imbalances favouring either the CEO or the minister. 
The governance networks also attained a high score for Engineering Mentality, 
with a mean score of 0.62 and a minimum of 0.33. This could be explained by the fact 
that the more technical field of utility management could have attracted and enforced 
such rational and positivistic planning. Interestingly, there were no policy fields without 
at least one of the characteristics of Engineering Mentality. Even if the cases could not 
be characterised by techno-centricity or rationalism, there would always be a planning 
culture in all of the cases. 
The mean score for the Knowledge Availability was 0.58. The utilities on average 
seem to have a reasonably high degree of pooling of information between the actors. 
However, this causal process also had the largest standard deviation of +/- 0.39. There 
were cases with a full membership of the Knowledge Availability set, but there were 
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also utilities were there seemed to be no trace of any information sharing. These radical 
differences may have interesting correlations with the occurrence of performance. 
Regression per individual causal process 
Table 50 Individual elements and success 
Causal process consistency raw coverage
Group Governance 93% 74% 
~Engineering Mentality 79% 68% 
Grid Governance 66% 59% 
Relational Distance 66% 83% 
Knowledge Availability 62% 81% 
Actor Dominance 59% 86% 
~Actor Dominance 57% 46% 
Engineering Mentality 50% 70% 
~Grid Governance 48% 66% 
~Relational Distance 41% 41% 
~Group Governance 40% 59% 
~Knowledge Availability 40% 37% 
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Recipe for success: Complex solution 
Table 51 Complex solution for success 
Recipe Cases 
raw 
cov 
unique 
cov Const. 
Relational*Grid*Group*Dominant*Knowledge 1,2,4 47% 9% 100% 
Relational*Group*Dominant*Engine*Knowledge 3 42% 5% 100% 
Relational*Grid*~Group*Engine*Knowledge 5,8 35% 7% 76% 
~Relational*~Grid*Group*~Dominant*~Engine* 
Knowledge 10 23% 5% 83% 
Relational*~Grid*~Group*~Dominant*~Engine* 
~Knowledge 9 22% 8% 78% 
     
solution coverage 76%    
solution consistency 77%    
Recipe for success: Parsimonious Solution 
Table 52 Parsimonious solution for success 
Recipe Cases 
raw 
cov 
unique 
cov Const. 
Relational*Knowledge 1,2,3,4,5,8 72% 48% 73% 
~Dominant Actor*~Engine 9,10 40% 16% 76% 
     
solution coverage 88%    
solution consistency 72%    
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Recipe for failure: Complex solution 
Table 53 Complex solution for failure 
 Cases 
raw 
cov 
unique 
cov Const. 
~Relational*~Group*Dominant*Engine*Knowledge 12 41% 7% 100% 
Relational*Grid*~Group*Engine 5,8,15,16 40% 17% 82% 
~Grid*~Group*~Dominant*Engine*~Knowledge 7,13 39% 4% 94% 
~Relational*~Grid*~Group*Dominant*~Engine* 
~Knowledge 6,11 30% 4% 90% 
Relational*~Grid*~Group*~Dominant* 
~Knowledge 9 29% 1% 86% 
~Relational*~Grid*Group*~Dominant*~Engine* 
Knowledge 10 19% 4% 83% 
     
solution coverage 80%    
solution consistency 80%    
Recipe for failure: Parsimony 
Table 54 Parsimonious solution for failure 
 Cases 
raw 
cov. 
unique 
cov. Const. 
~Group 
5,6,7,8,9,11,12,13,
14,15,16 95% 23% 82% 
~Relational 10 (6,11,12,13,14) 66% 1% 83% 
~Dominant Actor (10) 53% 0% 83% 
~Grid*~Engine (6,9,11) 44% 0% 73% 
     
Solution coverage 100%    
Solution consistency 74%    
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IV: PUTTING ON A PERFORMANCE OR CREATING PUBLIC VALUE 
 
Impression of the cases 
It was usually more difficult to separate the excellent utilities from the abysmal utilities, 
than to separate the excellent from mediocre utilities. Both excellent and terrible utilities 
displayed a larger number of actors involved, Relational Distance and strongmen. The 
utilities in the middle were usually different in most of these aspects. On the whole, the 
policy fields on both sides of the spectrum look alike in many ways and the differences 
only became apparent when measuring intangibles like mind-set or the sum of all the 
variables. 
Related concepts 
As many others have observed before; that what looks good, is not necessarily good. In 
a sense repeats the ancient adage that ‘it is not only gold that glistens.’ Beyond the 
methodological implications, this fallacy also points to two faults in the discourse on 
performance that have become apparent in the recent years.  
Firstly, there are some unwelcome side-effects of applying supposed private 
sector principles too rigorously. Even today, much emphasis has been placed on the 
tangible and measurable output of public agencies. Baldacchino signalled that especially 
on islands, where large capital projects are often funded by overseas donors seeking 
‘value for money’, performance management is reduced to the maximisation of rents. 
The output of government and the prosperity of the people are reduced to the amount of 
kilometres of roads, foreign investment and new jobs.391 Whether these digits actually 
add up to a better life is not easily measured and is therefore ignored. Instead the 
numbers of the output are equated with the outcome. 
                                                 
391  G. Baldacchino, ‘The Contribution of ‘Social Capital to Economic Growth: Lessons from Island 
Jurisdictions’, The Round Table, vol. 94, no. 378, 2005. 
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It could be argued that such paradigms are a represent are an offshoot of the 
popularity of New Public Management in the 1980s and 1990s. This has now been 
replaced by a new emphasis on the quality of the organisational structure. However, as 
mentioned before when looking at the movement in the literature on public 
corporations, this field of government has always swayed back and forth between public 
and private sector ideology, with New Public Management being yet another 
reincarnation. 
The second paradigm, which puts more emphasis on the processes of organisation 
also has its drawbacks. For example, models like EFQM, Performance Prism and the 
Balance Scorecard emphasise what a good organisation looks like. However, an 
organisation that looks effective is not necessarily one that delivers value to the 
community. New Public Management overemphasises the output, whereas the next 
model overemphasises the throughputs. 
Critical distinctions between performance and no performance 
In his work on public utilities for electricity in the Caribbean, Martina defines the 
performance mission for managers as the task of ‘Creating a flow of value from the 
organisation.’392 It could be observed that the failing utilities were still creating a sum of 
value within their organisation, but that this is not flowing out into the public sphere. 
The worth generated by the activities are either pocketed by commercial partners 
involved or the individual actors working for them. This is not always necessarily in the 
form of straightforward fraud or corruption, but in expensive contracts, pension raids or 
simply by keeping alive a salary paying organisation which has no further purpose to 
the community. 
                                                 
392  I.S. Martina, Regulation in splendid isolation, (NGIF, Delft, 2009), p. 61. 
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A truly successful utility is both efficient in value creation and in delivering this 
value to the community at large. When dividing up the cases on these lines, they could 
be fitted in the matrix as shown in the table below. 
Table 55 Creation of value versus creation of public value 
 Efficient at value 
creation 
Inefficient at value 
creation 
Directed towards 
public sphere Case 1, 2, 3, 4,5 Case 6,7,8,9,10 
Directed towards 
private sphere Case 14,15,16 Case 11,12,13 
This could help us to understand why cases 1 to 5 and 14 to 16 looked initially so alike. 
The things determining their image; the building they work in, organisational culture 
and prestige within the community are often based on the accessories of efficiency. 
However, to test whether they actually deliver public value requires further scrutiny. 
One problem is that the community may reject any of the utilities deemed to be 
too flashy and thereby strike down the successful utilities as well. Even good utilities 
may need accessories in order to uphold an ethic of efficiency. In addition, they do have 
different characteristics to the poor performers which ensure that this efficiency is 
utilized for the greater public good. It is therefore critically important to weigh the 
utilities in a proper manner and not be too hasty in passing judgment. 
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V: LOOKING BACK AT THE METHODOLOGY 
 
Reflecting on choices in the research design 
When coming to the end of an extensive research project, it is wise to step back and 
critically assess the process followed. With the benefit of a fuller understanding of both 
the theory and the empirics, it is possible to evaluate the applied methodology and 
weigh how well it served the ambitions of the thesis. The main purpose would be to see 
how the results and theorems generated could be taken further into a next round of 
improvement and experimentation.  
Looking back at this project, three broad questions could be raised: What were the 
advantages and disadvantages of formulating the research question in the chosen 
manner? How did the concepts employed to measure and analyze the different variables 
align with each other? Has the fuzzy-set Qualitative Case Analysis been used to its full 
potential? 
Costs and benefits of restricting the ambition of the thesis 
The thesis began with a broad ambition to understand the link between societal 
circumstances and government performance. Based on an exploration of the literature 
and the empirical situation, this was translated to a more restricted question. With the 
goal of responding to Putnam’s concept of social capital, the research focused on the 
link between social capital conditions, the behaviour of elite actors, and the performance 
of public utilities.  
In this translation, several decisions were made which restricted the scope of the 
investigation. Each of these choices came with a cost in terms of conceptual consistency 
and empirical completeness. They are explored in the figure and paragraphs below, 
discussing respectively the controlled, independent and dependent variables. 
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 Figure 25 Translation of the research ambition 
Connection between social circumstances 
and governance behaviours
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research 
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State of social 
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Performance in 
Public Value 
Framework
Cultural Theory, 
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Controlled variable: From socio-cultural setting to Putnam’s social capital 
As stated in the introduction, this thesis was interested in the socio-cultural roots of the 
performance of democracies. This discourse is filled with theories about the social 
prerequisites for an effective government. The choice was made to particularly explore 
the role of associations. It was then argued that Putnam’s concept of social capital is the 
most prominent perspective in this literature. However, by choosing to adopt his 
perspective on interpersonal relationships, the analysis was also restricted considerably. 
The critics of Putnam cited in this thesis mainly come from a governmental 
perspective, questioning the link between public administration and social capital. 
However, Putnam is also criticized by sociologists, many of whom argue that Putnam 
misconstrues social capital. Fischer, for example, protests that Putnam only cares about 
organisational interactions between people. In other definitions of social capital, such as 
the one propagated by Coleman, a wider spectrum of interactions is considered.393 The 
argument would be that bonds other than civic organisations, such as informal 
                                                 
393 C. Fischer, Bowling Alone: What’s the score, Paper for the Author meets Critic session of the American 
Sociological Association, Anaheim, California, August 2001. 
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communities or general sociability, perform a structurally equivalent function to 
Putnam’s social capital. 
The decision to respond mainly to Putnam could be defended by the fact that this 
thesis tries to innovate against the dominant literature on small societies. Putnam’s 
definition is arguably the most prominent understanding of social capital and therefore 
makes a worthwhile opponent.394 Moreover, the analysis does at times move beyond 
Putnam’s restricted definition, covering more than just a simple count of associations.  
However, this definition of social capital still seems to come up short when trying 
to capture the different networks in which the senior officials participate. This 
shortcoming prompts the introduction of concepts such as Cultural Theory and 
Relational Distance when mapping the social space. This does indeed lead to some 
uneasy innovation in the methodology which will be explored in more detail below. 
 
Dependent variable: From democratic success to Public Value 
The dependent variable is first construed as a broad interest in the performance of 
democracies. This is translated to a more concrete measurement of their success in 
delivering services to citizens, measured through the Public Value Framework. Again, 
this translation comes with certain costs. 
The first step from democratic success to public sector effectiveness fits with the 
public management ambitions of the thesis. This literature is more oriented towards 
service chains than the overall health of democracies. Furthermore, the concept of 
Public Value still measures success from the perspective of the entire polity, as it goes 
beyond merely looking at customers or finances. 
                                                 
394  B. Gilley, ‘Democratic Triumph, Scholarly pessimism’, Journal of democracy, vol. 21, no. 1, 
January 2010, p. 160-167. 
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Yet the cost of using the Public Value Framework is mainly incurred because of 
this same focus on a universal measurement of success. It does not take into account 
that the appreciation of government services may alter according to the actor, time or 
place considered. Instead, Public Value adds up all individual perspectives into one total 
score. This loss of diversity is particularly felt when trying to capture how different 
stakeholders thought about the process outcomes. For example, environmentalists and 
industrialists may have fundamentally different verdicts on the electricity production on 
the islands. Yet Public Value compresses this into one measurement.  
In the defence of Public Value, it could be argued that the thesis would always 
require a metric to measure performance if causal inference was to be possible. Public 
Value is particularly good a measurement. It is above all an instrument to think about 
government; a careful procedure to weigh the burdens and gifts of government to 
society. Having said this, as will be discussed in reference to Cultural Theory below, the 
incorporation of plural views could have strengthened this thesis further. 
 
Independent variable: From open question to structured measurement 
The thesis aimed to approach the empirical field with a broad view, afraid that crucial 
mechanisms would be ignored if a rigid framework was adopted. It did choose to focus 
on elite actors, arguing that they form a key joint in the generation and distribution of 
public value. The research design did not add any further concepts beforehand. Such 
theoretical tools, such as Cultural Theory or Relational Distance, are only introduced in 
the thesis when prompted by the subsequent phases of the fuzzy-set analysis.  
The obvious cost is that, through its focus on the elites, the thesis loses sight of the 
larger groups of actors outside the corridors of power. It is no longer possible to make 
pronouncements about the will or influence of the people at large. For example, 
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although the involvement of trade union leaders is considered important, the research 
says little about their connections with the union members. Although the thesis does not 
make any claims on this front, it would still have been good to learn more about the 
constituencies of the senior actors.  
A more subtle loss is incurred by the late introduction of conceptual 
measurements. Even if this is what the analysis prescribed, it does create a degree of 
heterogeneity, if not incompatibility, between the concepts used. For example, Cultural 
Theory claims to capture all the fundamental characteristics of human interactions. It 
then seems superfluous to also measure Engineering Mentality or Knowledge 
Availability. Furthermore, the relations between these concepts and those used to 
describe the controlled and dependent variables may also problematic. Cultural Theory, 
for instance, emphasizes a difference in perspective between actors on what is good and 
bad, while the Public Value Framework constructs a universal measurement.  
The thesis could so be accused of ‘easy conceptual eclecticism’.395 The defense 
would be that the welding together different disciplines necessitated a trade-off between 
simplicity and completeness on one side and consistency on the other. It is now time to 
see whether this trade was worth it. 
Alignment between the concepts used 
The thesis is mainly shaped by three concepts: Social capital, Cultural Theory, and 
Public Value. The analysis may have been undermined by contradictions between them. 
The potential friction between Public Value and Cultural Theory has already been 
discussed, but there could be more mismatches. Social capital as defined by Putnam 
regards one type of associations as conducive for democratic government: Egalitarian 
and formalized organisations. By contrast, Cultural Theory argues that any one of its 
                                                 
395  A. Mutch, R. Delbridge and M. Ventresca, ‘Situating Organisational Action: The Relational 
Sociology of Organisations’, Organisation, 2006, vol. 13, no. 07. 
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four types of relations can be made to work, even if they each have their own 
weaknesses. Finally, the managerial focus of Creating Public Value as professed by 
Moore does not fit automatically with the societal perspective of Putnam. 
There are roughly two ways of dealing with these tensions. On one hand, one 
could take a very orthodox approach, emphasizing the need for conceptual consistency. 
One the other hand, one could argue that any thesis aiming to combine two literatures 
will have to be more pragmatic. In this latter approach, the main aim is to capture the 
relevant empirical facts and this requires some conceptual stretching. 
 
Orthodoxy 
In the orthodox approach, all variables are ideally measured through the same concept. 
In this regard, the combination of Putnam’s social capital, Cultural Theory, and Public 
Value is inappropriate. Instead, one of the concepts should have been used throughout, 
as is explored here. 
To start with social capital, the research did consider the use of a derivative from 
this perspective as the central lens. Yet, as explored in the literature review, Putnam 
gives no clear indication of the micro-level mechanism under-pinning his theory. This 
necessitates the introduction of something like Bourdieu’s practice theory. This would 
make it possible to measure such discrete factors as habitus, capital and field. Yet 
Bourdieu still required additional concepts which would have overcomplicated the 
research design, failing the test of Occam’s Razor. 
Alternatively, the Public Value Framework could have been used as an all-
encompassing lens. Yet it was felt, however, that this model comes up short in capturing 
and measuring all the relevant behaviours. Public Value tends to focus at the 
performance at the organisational level. While Moore does list a few helpful techniques 
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in his subsequent work, they are not integrated into a single framework to catalogue the 
behaviours of actors.396 
A more credible alternative would have been the use of Cultural Theory beyond 
the independent variables. This would have also allowed for the identification of 
different types of connections across society, rather than the blanket pronouncement of 
Putnam based solely on organisational links. Moreover, the contradictory worldviews 
catalogued in Cultural Theory, could also serve as the framework to measure different 
types of government success. For example, Talbot links the Public Value Framework to 
alternative views on human relations, Verweij and Thompson discuss how ‘clumsy 
solutions’ can appeal to different worldviews at once.397 
However, these possible uses of the Cultural Theory framework only became 
apparent with the benefit of hindsight. The first analysis was necessary to show that 
actor perspective and knowledge consolidation might be crucial in these contexts. At the 
time the research was being planned and executed, the main concern was to capture all 
the relevant aspects of the then still messy empirics. 
 
Pragmatism 
Starting from a more pragmatic view on the combination of concepts, a dogmatically 
consistent use of concepts was of secondary importance. The main aim was to generate 
new theoretical thoughts. Unusual combinations are then inherent to the trial and error 
of research. 
                                                 
396  M. Moore, “Managing for value: Organisational strategy in for-profit, nonprofit, and governmental 
organisations”, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, March 1, 2000 vol. 29 no. suppl. 1 183-208. 
397  C. Talbot, Measuring public value: a competing values approach, Paper for The Work Foundation, 
October 2008. M. Verweij and M. Thompson, Clumsy solution for a complex world, (Palgrave MacMillan, 
London, 2006). 
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Within this process, the thesis did always try to be clear and precise about its use 
of concepts. The tenets of social capital were carefully dissected and translated to the 
Caribbean setting. The concepts of Cultural Theory, Relational Distance, etc. were 
selected because they captured the intended variance of the independent variables, but 
were otherwise not prescriptive about its impact on governance. For example, in his use 
of Relational Distance, Hood does not argue that a high distance will always translate to 
better outcomes than low distance, but rather that it depends on the circumstance.398 
Finally, the application of the fuzzy-set analysis went through a structured calibration of 
the concepts. 
At all these steps, the rigidity of the concepts had to be weighed against the 
availability of the data and the ambition of the thesis to find the crucial causal 
mechanism. However, now that the research process has been completed, it would be 
equally pragmatic to reconsider the concepts used when moving the project forward.  
For example, having established it could be relevant in this small-scale democracy 
context; it may be very worthwhile to use the Cultural Theory framework as the single 
conceptual lens. In addition, other models of human interactions may be used to analyse 
the social interactions of the key players. In short, the long and winding road this thesis 
had to travel did generate several useful ideas. A more straight-forward reconsideration 
could now deepen the analysis and refine the causal model. 
Presenting the results 
A final question is whether the results derived from the research process have been 
brought to their appropriate conclusions. A concluding chapter could easily fall in one 
of two traps; over-claiming, without a link to the data, or saying too little and leaving 
the reader unsatisfied. This thesis did try to synthesize a broader story in the concluding 
                                                 
398  C. Hood et al. Regulation inside Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleaze-
Busters, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999), p. 101-102. 
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chapter by introducing the four types of governance. It may so have fallen into over-
claiming. Another view could be that the concluding chapter could actually have done 
more to use the possibilities of fuzzy-set analysis to generate the typologies.  
A fundamental strength of Qualitative Case Analysis is it overview of the vector 
spaces, or configurations of possibilities. Qualitative Case Analysis shows which 
configurations are theoretically possible, but also maps which actually occur in reality 
or do not in fact materialize. This may suggest which variables cannot co-exist with 
each other or are co-dependent. In the case of the six fuzzy variables used here, there 
were 46 possible configurations of Knowledge Availability, Grid Governance, etc. 
Based on the current data, which admittedly only existed of sixteen cases, just four 
clusters of configurations actually appeared.  
This property of fuzzy-set analysis could serve as the bridge from case analysis to 
the creation of wider typologies in the results phase. Rather than jumping straight from 
the Venn-diagram to the typologies, an intermediate step to survey the different 
configurations that have manifested themselves could make the process more rigorous. 
The diagram below show how typologies could have been generated in more close 
cooperation with the data, giving the example of three configurations. 
Figure 26 Generating typologies from fuzzy-set outcomes 
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For example, the configuration of High Distance, Group, Knowledge, and Grid actually 
returned only five cases, which all happened to be very successful. The corresponding 
typology could therefore be marked as a best case practice. Interestingly, there were no 
cases found with the configuration of High Distance, Grid, and Knowledge, combined 
with Low Group, even if this is on paper the ideal good governance situation. Again this 
can be translated to a typology. This diagram analyses only three clusters, but many 
more could be discussed. 
Next to being more transparent in the creation of these typologies, the method is 
also more rigorous. The typologies are more mutually distinctive from each other 
because they are separated by differences in the configurations. In addition, they could 
be claimed to be jointly exhaustive when applied to larger-N studies, as they represent 
all the configurations that were actually manifested in the empirical reality.  
In addition to some further consideration of the concepts used, the more 
incremental creation of typologies of governance could have so strengthened this thesis. 
In its current form, the project does provide several stepping stones for small societies. 
When also taking heed of the methodological lessons discussed here, its value could be 
increased further in future endeavours. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Public utility – The unit of analysis is formed by sixteen public utilities. In this thesis, 
the term public utility is meant to include both the organisation delivering the service as 
the governmental leadership responsible for its direction. For example, the public utility 
for electricity supply refers to the public corporation tasked with producing the 
electricity, but also to the responsible minister and the involved civil servants. As an 
alternative, the term policy field will also be used as a synonym. Terms such as system, 
network or arena are avoided as they imply a certain model of governance which may 
not be appropriate. 
 
Executive agency – The agency is defined as the discrete organisation responsible for 
the delivery of the service. This is delineated from the highest executive officer, be it 
the CEO or head of department, down to the street-level operators. They will also be 
referred to as public corporations, although two of the cases were in fact government 
departments. 
 
Government – For short hand, the ministers and their immediate advisors are referred to 
as the (central) government; this is distinct from the executive agencies. Both could 
technically be considered part of the government, but as the minister possessed a 
political mandate, the term government here refers only to this office. 
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His/her – Where possible, the language used is gender neutral. However, at the time of 
the data collection, all ministers and CEO responsible for the utilities were men. Only a 
handful of women were represented in the boards of directors or at the management 
level. A specific effort was made to talk to more female respondents to avoid a male 
bias, especially as many women had key positions in other parts of the central 
government. However, on the whole, elite offices in the public utilities fields were male 
bulwarks. 
  
Anonymity – The choice was made to use anonymous quotes for the interviewees and 
anonymous references during the ranking of the different utilities. Ideally, any scientific 
inquiry is as transparent as possible, allowing for easy scrutiny and replication of its 
analysis. However, given the sensitive nature of the subject, little information would 
have come out of the respondents if they were to be named. Similarly, CEOs and 
ministers indicated that they would not cooperate with a public ranking of their 
organisation. To still provide accountability, the names of the respondents and cases 
will be made privately available to the examiners of the thesis at the University of 
Oxford. 
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